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20 January 1983

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BRIEFS

YUGOSLAVIAN OIL PROSPECTING--The natural resources board in the Jordanian Kingdom has decided to continue prospecting for oil in the Jordanian al-Azraq Desert by drilling a third well in the area. The board based this decision on the encouraging results from the drilling of the first two wells in the same area. The wells were drilled by the Yugoslav Naftgaz Organization. It should be pointed out that the Yugoslav organization has been engaged in prospecting for oil in Jordan since October 1981 and that at the beginning of this year it found quantities of oil at a depth of 2,650 meters. The natural resources board is using technical expertise provided by the Iraqi Oil Company in prospecting. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 302, 4 Ced 82 p 49] 8389

CHEMICAL FERTILIZER COMPLEX--A group of Jordanian, Arab and foreign organizations have set up a complex of chemical fertilizers plants in the city of al-'Aqabah at a cost of 150 million Jordanian dinars. King Hussein inaugurated the complex last week. The chairman of the National Planning Council and the chairman of the board of directors of the complex, Dr Safa 'Awdah, stated that actual production of chemical fertilizers had begun last June, 70,000 tons having been exported to date. He added that the plant will consume one quarter of Jordan's phosphate production and so Jordan will be transformed from an exporting country of raw materials to a manufacturing country and an exporter of industrial products. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI No 292, 6-12 Dec 82 p 43] 8389

CSO: 4404/128

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT MEASURES REVIEWED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26 Dec 82 p 3

[Text] Algiers (APS)--At its May 1980 meeting, which was devoted to conditions for stimulating the agriculture sector, the Central Committee of the FLN Party paid particular attention to various aspects of the reality of daily life in that sector. Analysis of the problems encountered by agriculture led the Central Committee to order a series of specific measures to integrate agriculture into the overall development strategy and the building of a stable and prosperous socialist society.

For this reason the decision was taken to do everything possible in as short a time as possible, to draw up and put into operation, beginning with the Third Plan, an integrated, consistent and long-term national development program, with a concern for satisfying the food needs of the populations, promoting the rural world and realizing the objectives of economic independence.

In that perspective, clear directions were outlined, on the one hand to strengthen the agrarian revolution as a strategic choice, and on the other hand to put in concrete form all of the efforts toward protecting and encouraging the small peasantry, allied with the revolution.

Out of concern for stabilizing the agricultural sector, the Central Committee also considered it urgent to put an end, in the immediate future, to all bureaucratic hindrances, in order to liberate the peasant from all of the stumbling blocks he is subject to in his daily activity.

On another level, to act to create a climate that will enable producers to assume their responsibilities and initiatives in a clear organization, having for its framework a planned and coherent approach.

The Central Committee's resolution, a true national plan for integrated agricultural development, calls for mobilizing and making available to the producers the means indispensable to quality production in sufficient quantity and continuously, throughout the entire country and at low prices.

The resolution also calls for creating favorable conditions to make working on the land worthwhile, in order to keep and attract more young people, to ensure for agriculture the human potential that is indispensable to it and contribute to reducing the rural exodus. The resolution also recommends setting up indispensable measures so that the allotment agreement honors the producer as a fully responsible farmer enjoying the conditions necessary for security, stability of confidence and lasting total control over the activities connected with the land on which he works.

The resolution deems it useful to release all the means required to effectively stimulate intensive development of agriculture within a planned framework, making the producers partners in all the phases of drawing it up.

Among other moves toward stabilizing the sector are those relative to: putting all agricultural land into crops and ongoing control over all irrational forms of occupying the soil:

- extending the useful agricultural area to all lands which, in return for adequate development operations, may be usable for agriculture;

- furnishing special efforts toward the agricultural economy of mountains, forests, steppes and the Saharan area, with the idea of making rural activity dynamic and strategically occupying the territory;

- developing rational and gradual mechanization of agricultural production and pursuing the introduction of technical progress into agriculture, for the purpose of intensifying production and improving the working conditions of the producers.

Toward a self-managed sector, the moves outlined by the Central Committee are aimed at:

- restructuring self-managed farms to make them into easily exploitable and humanely controllable units;

- rejuvenating the human potential and improving its professional level;

- reinforcing the technical staff and working for its gradual integration into the workers' collective as a producer.

- making the agricultural units specialists in terms of the cultural vocation of their land and their geographic situation;

- encouraging all production units to form specialized cooperatives which will eventually strengthen the production potential;

- setting up a vast self-construction program to benefit the farmers;

- putting an end to illegal occupation of agricultural infrastructures and housing belonging to the socialist sector by taking radical measures toward rehabilitation and allowing each APC [People's Communal Assembly] to have a building program to rehouse the families whose cases may be of obvious interest;

taking energetic measures to give maximum protection to agricultural lands against any form of allocation.

Concerning the agrarian revolution sector, the Central Committee's decisions tend to put the finishing touches to the first- and second-phase operations as soon as possible, in order to start the basic restructuring of the farms, establish the communal cadastre, liberate and encourage producers' initiatives and allow the freeze on land transactions to be lifted for the purpose of forming viable and productive farms.

Aid to Small Peasants

This involves:

studying and taking technical measures likely to make the CAPRAs [Agricultural Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution] as profitable as possible and eventually planning the conversion of those that do not obviously viable, with the participation of the co-operators;

making it possible for farmers affected by the restrictive measures to benefit from the plus value created by their own means without being the object of a new limitation, in order to encourage intensification of agricultural production;

going ahead with a direct allotment to the producer who is closest to land that is bare or planted in fruit trees and in palm trees, that has been nationalized and whose area or number [of hectares] are on the short side of the allotment and have not yet been assigned;

taking measures toward a just and accurate enforcement of the agrarian revolution, promoting the combining of lands and preventing division of lands;

considering every citizen an assignee who develops land in the Saharan zone by his own means, in conformance with the law.

Concerning efforts to be undertaken in favor of small peasants, the Central Committee's resolution emphasized that they are to fit into the framework of a policy aimed at making them the allies of the revolution, in conformance with the directives of the National Charter.

At this level the actions recommended by the Central Committee are oriented toward launching actions to solve the problem of dividing lands on the basis of a true regrouping policy built on legal, technical and economic foundations. They also involve encouraging and developing farmers' organizations within the pre-cooperative or cooperative groups, with their free consent.

To enable all of the producers to have the necessary production factors, both in quantity and in quality, the resolution recommends the following measures:

structures that support production to be integrated, to make them more operational and more flexible;

to ensure that control and management of support and marketing structures are effective on behalf of the producers;

that means be mobilized consistent with putting them at the disposal of the agricultural sector, such as agricultural equipment, developing agricultural infrastructures, developing systems of storage and maintenance of agricultural equipment, strengthening the number of transport vehicles, relaxing the procedures relative to the means of financing the agricultural sector.

In the area of stabilizing the environment of the agricultural sector, the resolution stresses the necessity to guarantee reforestation and protection of forests, the environment and the land, perfecting and teaching farming technology, stopping the desertification process in the steppe areas, pursuit and expansion of the "green barrier" program and developing and organizing routes in the context of applying the third phase of the agrarian revolution.

Concerning research in and teaching of agricultural technology, it is recommended that a consistent and long-term program be set up, having as its objective fulfilling agriculture's staffing needs and the continuing raising of the producer's level of technical knowledge.

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OPPOSITION PAPERS REVIEW NATIONALIST AIMS OF MUBARAK POLICIES

Comparison with Nasirism

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 25 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by Mahmud 'Awad]

[Text] The Kuwaiti newspaper AL-ANBA' published this article by the journalist Mahmud 'Awad on Thursday 14 October. The article, in essence, is a response to the campaign of whispered rumors that have been set off against Husni Mubarak, on the claim that he was headed toward the nationalization of private projects. The article refutes these rumors through argumentation and logic and spells out exactly who it is who has an interest in spreading them around. The welcome and prominence AL-ANBA' gave the article were in reality a receptivity to correct Egypt's image and an expression of confidence in the probity of the regime, Husni Mubarak's basic cause. However, unfortunately, this defense of Egypt has been prevented from appearing in Egypt. According to the procedure followed, the "distribution" company in charge of distributing the newspaper in Egypt sent copies of this issue to the censor's office on the morning of Saturday 16 October. When the censor's office's agreement was delayed until the following morning, the distribution company became resigned to having the censor's office refuse to let the issue appear at all, and it ordered that all copies of this issue of the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-NABA' be destroyed.

This is the article, which AL-AHRAR is publishing.

In a recent speech, President Husni Mubarak deviated from the written text for a moment, to answer a rumor that had been circulating. He said, "Fellows, there will be no nationalizations, I can swear to you." At the time, I tightened up over these words, because I realized that people with an interest in these rumors had finally succeeded in drawing the president onto ground where they wanted to attack him. It is dangerous territory, a territory with shifting sand, on which this group of people engage in a war of nerves against a president under whom the ground has not suddenly shifted, with the result that they see him before themselves today in the seat of power. However, he was there in the seat directly under the president for 6 whole years before events brought him in as president of Egypt following the assassination of the former president, Anwar al-Sadat.

This tendentious rumor on the probable drive of Husni Mubarak's regime to nationalize private sector projects was only part of a psychological campaign to raise a greater question, which is, is Nasirism now returning to Egypt at the hands of Husni Mubarak?

People who repeat this kind of question are whispering it all the time, trumping up evidence so that the question will seem to be based on proof and evidence. Suddenly, they tell you, Egypt is celebrating the anniversary of the July revolution. Suddenly the voice of 'Abd-al-Nasir comes booming out again, with his famous decree nationalizing the Suez Canal. Suddenly the songs of 'Abd-al-Halim Hafiz are reappearing on television. Suddenly an article is being published here or there which does not arrogate all the evils of the world and lay them on the head of 'Abd-al-Nasir. And so forth.

Then they will cite you another item of proof, this time more categoric: Husni Mubarak resembles Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir in his conduct and his appearance. Didn't you see his necktie, which he wore on television?

Thus the people spreading the rumors will ultimately bring you to their categoric conclusion: Nasirism is now returning to Egypt at the hands of Husni Mubarak!

From the outset, the people spreading these rumors will not spell out for you exactly what their conception of "Nasirism" is. The fact is that Nasirism, as a political notion, is just an arbitrary word uttered to express a group of policies which Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir engaged in, policies which totally changed the map of Egypt and the Arab world and that still have their partisans and enemies up to now, although the man himself died 12 years ago, and although countries, governments and agencies formed "militias" to assassinate 'Abd-al-Nasir's personality when he died, having failed to do so when he was alive.

What Is Nasirism?

First of all, there is no political belief or ideology by the name of Nasirism, except as far as there is an ideology in France called "Gaullism" or a belief called "Nehruism," attributed to Jawaharlal Nehru, in India.

However, Nasirism was connected to a group of political positions that set out in accordance with a specific conception of the role of Egypt and the Arab world in confronting the challenges posed by 'Abd-al-Nasir's era. Even when an attempt was made in 1962 to cast "Nasirism" into the mold of what was called at that time the "National Action Charter," this charter was more a link to the adoption of future political positions on the issues that had been raised for discussion than it was an ideology.

Why, then, are these questions springing up around Husni Mubarak and Nasirism in Egypt? Why now? Who are the people who have an interest in this?

In answering these questions, one must go back a little, specifically to the first policy statement Husni Mubarak made as president last 14 October.

In that statement, Husni Mubarak said that Egypt was not in anyone's debt, but that we were all indebted to it, and that we must all start to work most seriously and chastely, without jesting or delusion, without contradictions between word and deed, hypocrisy or dissimulation, and without trafficking in people's livelihood.

The meaning of these words clearly was the new president Husni Mubarak's commitment to bringing about integrity in the regime. Since that was the situation, the man on the street was concerned with it on account of his long suffering from corruption. However, at that time this "society of beneficiaries" preferred to wait to see more of the experiment and examine how serious the new president was in his commitment to the integrity of the regime. Perhaps seriousness, probity, clean-handedness and integrity in speech were just more slogans which would never find their way to execution.

However, signs began to follow one another that spelled out the new president's method of governing.

First of all, he decided to stop the attack on Arab countries in the Egyptian media. The fact is that the triviality with which the media battles had been conducted in the days of the late President al-Sadat had degraded the level of discourse in Egypt and had degraded the value of Egypt itself to the lowest possible degree. Above and beyond that, it had left the door wide open to people who were sick in their hearts with the Arabs and Arabhood, and were pouring an innumerable amount of articles into Egyptian public life to which an extremely few people who were purveyors of words and expressions of political "castigation" devoted themselves. Putting a stop to this degeneration and deterioration was tantamount to a restoration of Egypt's very intelligence, before anything else.

Then there was Husni Mubarak's refusal to visit Jerusalem, in spite of all the fraudulent acts which Israel carried out with him at the time, imagining that it could repeat against him the game it had played with al-Sadat, the game of giving itself free rein politically and in practical terms against Arab rights in exchange for the restoration of an occupied Sinai with reduced sovereignty. Israel had dealt with a single person in Egypt, name of Anwar al-Sadat; Menachem Begin agreed to negotiate only with him, to obtain decisions and concessions only from him, and to engage in no contacts except through him. There Israel dared to act toward Egypt, and, after that, the Arab world, with an unparalleled brazenness.

Now, through the new president's insistence on dealing with Israel in his capacity as a president, and not the superintendent of an estate named Egypt, the scales have started to move into some sort of balance, and the process of political consultation within Egypt, and within the institution of the president's office itself, has started to regain weight and seriousness, having previously been, when carried out absolutely, largely just a facade for the benefit of photographers' cameras.

When it was decided that there would be no vacation homes and resorts in the area of the Pyramids in Giza, people saw with their own eyes that the president's rest house there was the first to be removed. Thus all the tongues of all the persons who had an interest in rallying around the decision, or even suspending it, fell silent, and, for the first time, people saw that the peak of power was subject to what the rest of mankind was subject to and that when decisions were issued they were issued in order to be applied to everyone, without lies or favoritism.

That Is New Conduct

These three examples at their time represented the expression of new conduct as far as the man on the street was concerned. Even though the restrictions that al-Sadat created were still in existence and continued, there was new conduct vis-a-vis the Arab world, in spite of the continued severance of diplomatic relations. There was new conduct vis-a-vis Israel, in spite of the perpetuation of Camp David. There was new conduct vis-a-vis domestic public opinion inside Egypt itself, in spite of the continuation of all the repressive laws and the retention of the people the former president had recruited to serve him.

That was the feeling of the man in the street at that time. Let us note that the word "Nasirism" did not enter the minds of the man in the street as he was appraising the new conduct he saw in front of himself.

I was one of the people involved in the notorious September 1981 decrees by which al-Sadat repressed the primitive human rights in Egypt. When I started to writing again, with all the colleagues who had been involved in the massacre, I tried to observe the view of the man in the street in Egypt vis-a-vis this new conduct. In the first article I wrote after my return, there were paragraphs that were not printed, in which I mentioned that the man in the street in Egypt considered that Husni Mubarak was in practice "a president who would not go before the people on television unless he really had something to say, and, when he said it, chose the briefest words to express himself, not too many or too few. This president's mouth doesn't water whenever he sees a photographer's lens or a television camera. He is a president who does not fabricate things and does not react excitedly. He is a president who refuses to have his aides call out to him every minute. He asks them to put their minds to work not their hands. He is a president whom we have not seen living in palaces, rushing after the friendship of millionaires, or hastening with his wife to meet Prince Charles, the crown prince of Britain, passing through the Suez Canal with his wife Diana. He is a president of whose wife and children we have known nothing, because he wants to raise them the way any ordinary family in this country raises its children. He is a president who you can immediately tell from the clothes he wears is actually living off his salary and whose salary is subject to taxes — as is the case with millions of honorable people in this country. He is a president who traveled to Aswan to meet with the president of the Sudan, met with him in the house of the governor of Aswan and immediately returned to Cairo. He convinced us, without words, that that really was a working trip, not a winter promenade. He is a president who indicated to the photographers in the People's Assembly that they should stop taking photographs, because he knew from the beginning that one photograph was enough, and the remaining acrobatics and gymnastics were of concern only to people who were afflicted with the madness of trumped-up grandeur. This president does not have a private hairdresser, special cameras or private photographers, living and traveling to the farthest eastern and western reaches of the earth on salaries, allowances and customs exemptions at the expense of all of us. This president goes to his office in the morning and the afternoon as ordinary people do. Yes, do you know what Egypt needs? Egypt needs a president

who sits down at his desk at 0900 hours in the morning to manage people's affairs, not one who manages them by telephone, by rumors, by uncontested statements or by false slander on the part of a corrupt retinue or statements written by clagues — a president who, when he surprises the people working on the land reform project in al-Salihyah, for example, really wants to surprise them, and not put on an act. Then why should Zayd and 'Ubayd insist on greeting him? A president who lands at an airport without having the whole country land with him but just the governor of the city concerned. A president who does not burst in on us in our homes at every moment in order to make shouts, threats and menacing noises, but rather knows full well that this serious position, the position of the president, is not assigned to the mentally incompetent but is reserved rather for those of us who bear the most responsibility. He is a president who does not say ('I' but says 'we') a president who does not tell people ('follow me') but tells them ('be with me') He is a president who views power as a burden and one whose evils are not endured for the sake of its benefits. He is a president whose voice you can hear in your own head and who could have been your brother or the person living in the apartment next door yesterday. He is a president who speaks our language and does not embezzle what is beyond our means for his own benefit."

These paragraphs (which were not published) were part of an article I wrote in January of this year. In them, I tried to express the vision of the man in the street, who was not concerned with ideologies and pre-cast molds, his vision of new conduct which he saw before himself on the part of a new president restoring respect, seriousness, responsibility and involvement to the position of the presidency.

Once again, the matter here was not related to 'Abd-al-Nasir or Nasirism, unless we consider that the fact that one plus one equals two was an invention of 'Abd-al-Nasir's and that credit for it should go to Nasirism.

However, the society of people benefiting from the corruption of the regime saw this new conduct differently, and most clearly; they saw it as a sign of a serious future threat, a threat to their interests and their illegal deals.

Then cases occurred from which totally spontaneous events revealed themselves, cases of the discovery of transactions of rotten food imported in darkness so that the Egyptian people would be fed on its poison, deals which realized millions of illicit pounds for the members of this society of beneficiaries in the twinkling of an eye, without any overseers or persons holding them to accord.

At this point two specific developments occurred. First, these cases were handed over to court so that they could take their course. It was decided to reinstate the Administrative Surveillance Agency which al-Sadat had suddenly eliminated at the stroke of a pen, under questionable circumstances, after he had ordered its files and documents to be burned.

These two developments were in reality tantamount to a final warning by which the society of beneficiaries considered that its battle, and the battle of its cancerous influence, against Husni Mubarak, had been joined. They discovered

from the outset that the issue of probity in the regime was not just a slogan to win people over, but rather was serious and real this time.

At this point alone did the society of the people benefiting from corruption start to launch rumors of Nasirism against the new president. From the outset, we must stipulate that "Nasirism" was absolutely not an accusation or a crime to the toiling millions, but it was of course one to the people whom Nasirism had prevented from having an opportunity for illicit gain. In reality, 'Abd-al-Nasir's concern, throughout the years of his rule, for integrity in the regime, was taken for granted even by his adversaries themselves.

For example, in 1961, it happened that publication of the Cairo magazine AKHIR SA'AH was suspended and one of its pages was torn out before it went into the market, in a rare instance whose secret the people did not learn at the time.

The fact was that at that time a minister had been celebrating his daughter's wedding. At the celebration, the minister's daughter and her groom passed before the cameras in jewelry that was far beyond the minister's financial means. This matter drew 'Abd-al-Nasir's attention. He first demanded an investigation into this minister -- where did he get that from?

When it became apparent that the minister's salary and income at least raised serious doubts about the sources from which this jewelry was acquired, 'Abd-al-Nasir dismissed him at once, because the probity of the minister represented the probity of the regime, and they both had to be above doubt and suspicion. This incident was not something that set 'Abd-al-Nasir apart from the rest of mankind; rather, it just arose from a feeling of responsibility toward the people from whose taxes the ministers and officials received their salaries. (Last year, for example, we saw the American president Reagan removing his national security advisor from his position because of \$1,000 he had received from a Japanese newspaper and had failed to inform the White House of give to the government.)

The Intelligent Businessman

The essence of the struggle in Egypt, then, is the integrity of the regime.

However, the group of people benefiting from the corruption did not dare to wage their struggle against such integrity openly and clearly. Therefore they began to try to harrass Husni Mubarak with tendentious rumors.

The most powerful of these rumors was that Husni Mubarak's talk about seriousness, cleanness and integrity was a new prelude to the reinstatement of the policy of nationalizing private projects which had been carried out during 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime!

Thus the rumor leapt from an ordinary prelude to an ordinary task any ordinary regime would carry out to the abnormal result of abnormal measures that took place under abnormal conditions in 1961 and 1962.

Nonetheless, like every rumor, this one had the objective of creating a climate of anxiety and apprehension among owners of private capital inside Egypt, so they would become hesitant and cowardly at a time when Egypt was in the greatest need of investment and progress.

The fact is that this rumor could not stand up to the intelligence of any honorable businessman, for numerous reasons.

The intelligent businessman does not reach his decisions or evaluate his projects on the basis of pictures of 'Abd-al-Nasir, the songs of 'Abd-al-Halim Hafiz or articles that swear to him that he is in a security state.

The intelligent businessman knows that guarantees for his investments that exist in Egypt are not verbal ones that a president or minister formulates; rather, they are totally objective ones related to international agreements and commitments which one does not joke about and through which Egypt is in fact linked to numerous international parties, plus organizations that have their own weight, importance, and analysis, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and so forth.

The intelligent businessman knows that in this era of ours there is no longer any opportunity to create a closed economic market. Numerous international factors have started to be as important as domestic ones in terms of their effect in the formation of a domestic economic market. The price of a disc of bread in India, for example, has come to depend as much on American-Soviet relations as on the acreage farmed in India itself.

The intelligent businessman knows that the ultimate guarantee of his rights lies in the existence of real political democracy which will protect the ruler and the ruled alike against surprises and catastrophes. The notorious September decrees al-Sadat issued last year in Egypt resulted in the flight of more than \$1 billion from Egypt in the 3 weeks directly following them.

The intelligent businessman is never reassured by a president who is in a state of collapse, and his stability is never bolstered by a tyrannical ruler. What reassures him, rather, in fact, is a political stability which has not been manufactured, a stability founded on each party's knowledge of the rules of the game from the beginning.

Rather, here we are talking about intelligent, honorable businessmen. These are never deceived by lies about the reinstatement of nationalization which, in turn, were part of the rumor of the reinstatement of Nasirism. They have continued to engage in their work and make their investments on the basis of the actual facts the market presents them with, not on the basis of rumors.

As for the people who propagated the rumor and adhered to it, once again this group of vagabonds who benefit from political corruption understood that they were the ones who tried from the beginning to exploit political relations within the regime to gain millions in a twinkling of the eye by trafficking in the people's livelihood. They are the ones who supported all the repressive September measures. They are the ones who helped, deliberately and regularly, to blind the Egyptian citizen to Israel's goals in the region. They are the ones who made up misty lies about the advent of an imminent welfare in Egypt, a welfare which has never come. They are the ones who fought the call for

serious change following the killing of al-Sadat. They are the ones who embrace Israel's goal of poisoning the path toward Egypt's serious return to the Arab world.

If we take this thinking of the "Mafia gangs" into consideration, the greatest threat facing the Mafia is to have a governor who cannot be bribed come to a city, in a situation where there is no way to corrupt his integrity, he is not surrounded by a greedy family, he does not want to manufacture false, evil glories for himself, and there is no way into back roads by which one can mortgage the city. The Mafia considers that having this sort of governor in a city is a direct threat to its activity and future, because the honorable capitalist engages in his activity openly and in the context of a public law and an open competitive market for everyone, while the member of the Mafia gang engages in his activities in darkness. To him, the key to success is in the presence of a political cover that will protect him from surveillance, examination and punishment.

This sort of Mafia first starts to launch a war of nerves against the new governor in the city, in order to put him in the position of having to defend and justify himself. Then, secondly, it tries to harrass him on all sides, in the hope of uncovering a breach in his rear through which he can be made "cooperative." Then, third, if ultimately it fails, it will stand up to him in an attempt to eliminate him.

Something of this sort is going on now. Unless the ruler in Egypt is a partner, and not just one who cooperates, in the illicit deals the society of beneficiaries will enter into a war of survival with him, where there is no room for shades of gray or intermediary positions. The control of Egypt through corruption will ultimately mean the control of the whole region, not just another country.

The struggle began with trumped-up rumors, but the logic of events shows that rumors alone are not enough. Therefore oblique whispers were started in some people's ears about the return of "Nasirism," in the hopes of burying the issue of the integrity of the regime in its difficult birth and deterring the "new governor" of the city from adhering to this appeal for integrity.

It does not seem that the battle will be determined in a single round. That leads us to return again to the issue of "Nasirism" as a political notion.

Afro-Asian Conference in Tashkent

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 26 Oct 82 pp 10, 11

[Article by Hamid Zaydan]

[Text] Husni Mubarak's name was not submitted for discussion, and his policies were not sections in the agenda. Egypt after Anwar al-Sadat was not one of the issues for whose sake we went to Tashkent. Rather, it was the size and role of Egypt that dictated the discussion of these issues, when the issues of peace, freedom and the struggle against colonialism in Asia and Africa in general and in the Middle East in particular were discussed.

At a time when statements of condemnation against American and Israeli conspiracies in the region were being launched from the podium, questions about Egypt, its future and its role in the future historic stage in which the Arab area is being threatened by grave threats aimed at redrawing the map of the area in a manner securing foreign, colonialist and Zionist interests at the expense of the peoples and countries of the region, and questions about Husni Mubarak, stood out: Where to? Is he really an extension of al-Sadat and his policies? Or is he a hope for a new future for Egypt, offering it and the peoples and countries of the region greater security?

What is his position on the issues of freedom, democracy, and nonalignment? On colonialism, zionism and Israel? What are his policies regarding international relations, the policy of alliances, and foreign military bases?

I spent 2 weeks in the Soviet Union, during which I attended the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Tashkent, a capital of a republic, 25 years after the establishment of the Organization of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity. More than 500 members representing 64 delegations that came from the countries of Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America and 15 international organizations, including the United Nations, and people's organizations, including the World Federations of Labor, Youth, Students, and Women, and the League of Democratic Lawyers, participated in the conference.

The conference agenda included the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Organization of the Solidarity of Afro-Asian Peoples, issues of the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America, economic and social development, demilitarization, peace, security and nonalignment.

Egypt was not removed from these causes. It played its pioneering, prominent role in them. It was on Egypt's territory that the solidarity organization was born, in 1957, and its headquarters still are in Cairo. It was Egypt that led the national liberation causes in Africa and Asia in the years of national struggle on the two continents in the sixties, which witnessed the independence of most of the countries of the African continent. It was Egypt that, along with India and Yugoslavia, under the leadership of 'Abd-al-Nasir, Nehru and Tito, led the international current of positive neutrality and nonalignment.

Egypt was not removed from the discussion of these issues, though it was absent from them for many years during the seventies. It was natural that the issue of Camp David and its effects on the organization and on Egypt's Arab, African and international policy should be brought up, and it was natural, in the light of our positive participation in the discussions, that the tone of condemnation should be absent, and that, in the light of our presentation of political and national life in Egypt, many questions should be raised about Husni Mubarak, his policies and Egypt's future, without any verbal auctioneering over Egypt or Husni Mubarak, about whom many people are ignorant because of a foreign media blackout over Egypt's policies and the inadequacy of the Egyptian media, which are still speaking in backward terms about political events, including positive Egyptian positions, at least 10 years behind the times in terms of style and subject matter, as if they do not know that there

now is a new president in Egypt who has a policy different from that which had previously been in effect and to which the Egyptian media are still captive, not knowing the language of the age in which other people are addressing the world.

It was a member of Egypt's delegation, which included Ahmad Hamrush, the secretary general of the Egyptian Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, and Muhammad Fa'iq, the former minister of information. Nuri 'Abd-al-Razzaq, the secretary general of the Organization of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity, was chairman of the conference sessions, and he ran them with an objectivity that gave us our full right to positive participation.

The changes that has occurred in Egyptian policy in the past year became apparent to the delegations taking part, although a single year in the life of nations is not enough to achieve the desired change to the needed extent.

In our meetings with them, a number of members of delegations expressed their amazement at Egypt's new positions regarding the elimination of the American Bright Star maneuvers that were to have been carried out in Egypt, as Husni Mubarak's declaration that foreign military bases would not be granted on Egyptian soil, and at his declaration, to all foreign parties, that Egypt would commit itself only to what was written and signed, not to promises that were previously given to Israel or others.

They expressed their receptivity to the positions the Egyptian opposition has taken in support of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples and the role of the Higher Egyptian National Committee in support of the two peoples, including the sending of an Egyptian ship to Beirut, Israel's attempt to prevent it from entering the Lebanese capital, and Husni Mubarak's position of insisting that the ship, which was bringing aid from the Egyptian opposition, enter since it was bearing the Egyptian flag.

They expressed their questions about the future of Egypt and its renewed exercise of its role and occupation of its normal place in the course of the Arab nation, the movement of African liberation and unity and the nonaligned movement. We expressed our role in terms of our democratic practices and the policy changes Husni Mubarak has brought about. Although we considered that they do not represent what we are demanding, nonetheless they are an asset from the course of a year and they are steps along the proper road for hopes for a new future for Egypt.

The question we encountered everywhere, inside and outside the conference, concerned the future of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union in the light of the declaration President Mubarak had previously made, to the effect that Egypt's international relations must be balanced and equal, including those with the Soviet Union as compared with its relations with the United States of America. That was also our affirmation to them of Egypt's position of principle and strategy. The following question always was, Who will begin? We were not in a position to permit us to answer that question. However, we could tell them that we had to start with ourselves. We came to Moscow representing the Egyptian Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, by invitation of the

Egyptian committee, and let us start exchanging delegations of people through this meeting, in order to build bridges over which Soviet-Egyptian relations could return to their normal state, having been severed in the abnormal circumstances that Egypt had been going through which were recently dispelled, with the result that a new course had started in Egypt, which had to establish its international relations on grounds of balance, equality and equity, as President Mubarak declared in his speech on the occasion of the anniversary of the victory of the October war.

In order for these balanced, equal, equitable and friendly relations to help build peace, progress and economic and social development, our international relations must be nonaligned, lest we fall once again into an area of influence and hegemony.

A few hours before we left Moscow, representatives of the Soviet Solidarity Committee came to inform us of their acceptance of the Egyptian solidarity committee's invitation and to request that a date be set for their visit to Cairo.

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INTERIOR MINISTER DESCRIBES POLICE FUNCTIONS, PRIORITIES

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 6 Dec 82 p 3

[Interview with Interior Minister Hasan Abu Basha by Sana' al-Sa'id: "A Frank Conversation with the Interior Minister: The Enforcement of Security Does Not Conflict with Democracy"]

[Text] Security is his main cause; no other cause competes with it. Security, that is, in order to restrict peoples' chances to dominate and monopolize; security in order to implant people's freedoms and protect them from manipulation, extremism and violence; security in order to protect the rights of citizens and apply the principle of the sovereignty of law, legitimacy and constitutionality; security in order to enhance clean living devoid of the clouds of crime and the fog of fraud of any form or type; security as a weapon that is brandished to cope with anyone who delegates himself to impugn esteem for the law. Security which is in harmony with democracy and does not conflict with it in any way, because before all else it represents the individual's commitment to the law and prevents the minority from imposing its views and ideologies on the majority through terror, violence and force.

Here, in this conversation, Hasan Abu Basha, the top security official in Egypt, talks about numerous security goals, about the emergency law and about the crime rate. He talks truthfully, bluntly and without equivocation. His slogan is a tradition of the prophet, on whom be [God's] prayers and peace: "Faith is speaking truthfully, even if it entails harm for you." This he considers to be a fundamental pillar of any successful society. The pillar consists of honest men who do not dissemble, are not hypocritical and do not flatter: serious men who feel responsibility and are truthful with themselves, honest with their society of growth, probity, welfare, stability and security.

[Question] [What is] the security situation in Egypt, in the context of the responsibility assigned to you as men in charge of security and as an executive arm which is in the limelight?

[Answer] The most important goals and responsibilities of the police is to impose awe of the law. Imposing awe of the law is in the interests of the citizen more than the authorities, and this means that every citizen should respect the rights of others, so that citizens will not just consider their own circumstances and ignore the circumstances of others. This situation should be considered the

point of departure for any civilized society. It could lead to the relinquishment by every citizen of a portion of his rights for the sake of the group, so that it will be feasible for him to live in a civilized society. However, if there is laxity and negligence in the commitment to the law, and consequently there is a disruption in what we call awe of the law, the interests of the citizens will be threatened with annihilation.

[Question] Plans or programs alone, or laws by themselves, have no value unless they are actually applied, and the test lies with the people who are in charge of this application and carry it out, with commitment to the most basic laws, which state that human conduct is founded on a double-edged sword — men are rewarded if they do right and punished if they do wrong. What prevents the attainment of this small point, which constitute a deterrent element that one cannot disparage, in Egypt?

[Answer] It is not a small point; rather, it is the basis of one of God's sayings, that if a man does right he will be rewarded and if he does wrong he will be punished. In fact, worms often gnaw away at the bones of any society that abandons this saying. My belief is that this is the leaders' responsibility. My notion is that the leader always must radiate an atmosphere of discipline and seriousness of performance, and that can be achieved only by rewarding and compensating people who do right and penalizing people who do wrong. In fact, when leaders commit themselves to this principle, they make it incumbent on people in all the levels below them to bear their commitments and carry them out with the seriousness that I consider is the most important quality we are lacking in Egypt. Commitments to seriousness are the means for automatically solving more than 80 percent of our problems.

[Question] Undermining awe [of the law] is a broad phenomenon which may be conspicuous in our current society. What is the secret behind this undermining of awe of the law?

[Answer] First of all, I reject the notion that awe of the law has been undermined, because it has not been. Errors by individuals or the improper conduct of individuals do not undermine awe of the law. Rather, awe of the law can be undermined whenever an entire system proceeds in the wrong direction. The agency of the police, with thanks to God, is sound, and in most cases it enforces the law. There is no greater proof of that than the fact that crimes of all forms are on the wane in Egypt, and not increasing, in spite of all the variables that have been appearing in Egyptian society, because, in spite of the tremendous population density of the Egyptian streets and the increasing growth in the number of cars, which is in no way in keeping with the planning of Cairo, traffic in Cairo is nonetheless no worse than it is in New York or Paris. In fact, traffic at rush hours in European countries can delay citizens for an hour and a half, while, if a citizen is delayed in traffic half an hour here, we consider that we are being negligent. I can state that in spite of the density in Egyptian streets, traffic has not become paralyzed; to the contrary, in all security aspects the police, thanks be to God, are performing their role as they ought to, and there is categoric proof that Egyptian society is in a secure state, since crime does not dominate — rather, it is the law that is dominant at all times. For that reason I can say that awe of the law has not been undermined.

[Question] Leaving crime aside, in the context of the discussion about the conduct of individuals in our society, it is the garbage and the noise in the streets, along with the soccer games, vandalism of traffic signs, wedding processions, and the firing of guns at weddings, that have come to cause suffering for all Egyptians. These are all small violations but they are a source of annoyance for the citizen and are not in any case in keeping with a progressive, civilized society.

In the past, the police had a large measure of discretion vis-a-vis this conduct. At some point, it could control it and constitute a deterrent force against people who allowed themselves to be enticed into engaging in such conduct.

[Answer] If any society on the face of earth asks the police to deal with people's conduct, it will be treating itself unfairly. The police are responsible for enforcing the law, but I believe that dealing with people's behavior is the responsibility of the home, the school and the media. However, we in Egypt are being very deficient in dealing with people's behavior. If we do deal with any wrongful or improper conduct, we do so in outbursts and then abandon it; therefore, the negative features of people's behavior become aggravated. On top of that, there is an important point which we are always leaving out of consideration, which is that we have become a society that is more congested than need be. Any society that has a glut of people automatically reflects the ills of a crowded society, since the provision of people's needs becomes inadequate. Our population growth today is greater than our resources, whether that is in transportation, housing, the upkeep of road repair or hospitals. Problems of congestion arise from this. There is no doubt that enforcement of the law is one of the factors that can help put people's behavior in the right direction, but it is not the whole story, and if we depend on the police alone, to the point where everything is up to the police, we will be succumbing to a very big error. For that reason, it is my ambition to have the media, the family and the other agencies that are concerned with the matter take precedence over the police system in dealing with people's behavior.

[Question] Some people wonder about the period when the laws on the times for opening and closing shops were fully enforced. These laws were part of what was called discipline in the Egyptian streets. Many laws which are of concern to Egyptian citizens were not applied, especially in the area of prices; indeed, there are people who explain the constant, rampant inflation by the fact that the surveillance process is not vigilant; some people say that the police force that is involved in that is not doing its duty as thoroughly as it could.

[Answer] If you mean commodities whose prices have been set, I believe there has been absolutely no negligence with regard to them whatever.

[Question] The greatest example of negligence in honoring set prices lies in fruit and vegetables.

[Answer] The lack of commitment to set prices is an obvious crime. The instructions at the disposal of the police are clear. The law will be applied to any merchant or shop which shirks its commitments. The thousands of supply

cases that are being reviewed by the courts underline the fact that there is effective surveillance, constant patrolling, and examination and investigation of cases where merchants are not honoring the set prices. At the same time, millions of transactions to obtain special commodities or ones that are at a reasonable level of quality take place every day between citizens and merchants, and in order to get them citizens waive the set prices. We are anxious to get to a level where the dominant situation will be a commitment to set prices. I was informed that the secretary of the police in the Sulayman Jawhar market did not play his part as he ought to, and we set that straight, so that the commitment to appropriate legal procedures would prevail. That is what we always do in the case of all the deviant acts we learn about. In fact, we have arrested officials in some cooperative societies who were speculating in massive volumes of supply commodities, and a bonus has been given to Giza supply officers for uncovering caches in certain villages where certain goods were stored to affect the supply of those goods and consequently to benefit from the price rises resulting from the reduced volume at hand. A great effort is being made, and if there had not been any effort control would have been lost to an even greater extent.

[Question] The talk about police secretaries leads us to an evaluation of the state of this group, which came into being a few years ago. Could we review it, especially since some people are accusing some of the people in this group of acting badly and exploiting their positions as police secretaries in order to go beyond their main duty, which is to serve citizens and watch carefully over their welfare?

[Answer] Some negative features marred the system after it was established. These negative features were presented to us, and a constant emphasis has been placed on remedying them. However, in its totality, the positive aspects of the system are much greater than its negative ones — indeed, the system remedies the negative features that exist at the level of the policeman at the base, and it represents an appropriate level between the officers and the policemen at the base. It has been proved that the secretaries work well when they are assigned special activities; therefore the last 2 years we started to emphasize assigning them to special activities such as traffic, police communications, investigation, criminal evidence and acts of seizure in precincts and posts. It has actually started to become evident that police secretaries are extremely useful in specialized work, more useful than as patrolmen.

[Question] How can one compensate for the shortage of patrolmen in the streets?

[Answer] We have started to remedy this phenomenon by seeking the help of the second class group. People in this group go through a specific training program, after which they are assigned to patrol the streets.

[Question] What is the reason for the shortage of policemen? Might it be the salaries?

[Answer] There was little enthusiasm in enlisting in the police. We raised salaries starting July, so that the lowest starting salaries for policemen now are 60 pounds, aside from other benefits, whose principal component is medical treatment. We have established a special police institute where illiteracy is

eliminated over a period of 3 months, after which the policemen are assigned to special work such as traffic or patrols for 3 additional months.

[Question] A charge has been directed against you to the effect that State Security (the political security) gets the main share of the Ministry or Interior's attention, and conversely individual security receives less of this attention. In fact, it has been said that the police cars that are concentrated in the main focal points on the streets are only a private militia to maintain political security.

[Answer] The statements being made about that are just fabrications; the vehicles in the streets are only reinforced police patrols. We have resorted to them as mobile patrols in order to make up for the deficiency that exists in the number of policemen, since a car can cover an area supervised by 20 policemen. Therefore these mobile patrols are not a private militia for State Security — they are basically for the sake of individual security. The second point is that the nation's security cannot be separated from that of the individual; each influences the other. The third point is that, with thanks to God, Egyptian society has one of the lowest crime rates in the world. Crimes of various forms are not automatically proportionate to the population.

[Question] In the course of the discussion on the scope of terrorist schemes in Egypt, I wonder whether your campaign against extremist groups has managed to contain them to the point where one could say that we are on the verge of a period of peace, security and stability.

[Answer] The phenomenon of religious extremism was essentially introduced into Islamic religious thought from outside. Therefore, most unfortunately, certain groups which believe in this extremist thinking, which claims to have been derived from the Koran and the sayings and doings of the prophet, started to become widespread. Therefore, it has had an effect on young people, who, by their nature, are inclined toward religion. A predisposition toward religion in itself is a healthy phenomenon and there is nothing wrong with it; however, if we introduce wrongful notions and concepts into religious values and attribute them unjustly to the Koran and the sayings and doings of the prophet, one must reject that. Most unfortunately, foreign elements have played the main role in these extremist groups through their ideas or participation in secret organizational arrangements. These took the form at the outset of the Military Technical [Faculty] operation, then the al-Jihad organization, which carried out the October 1981 incidents.

[Question] But can you now contain these groups, or have you at least succeeded in extirpating the extremist thinking which these groups embrace?

[Answer] Eliminating the errors which have marred religious ideas current among young people, whose outcome has been the spread of groups which are given the label of extremist groups, cannot be done easily overnight, but a continuous security process of dealing with secret activities outside of the law, to which certain groups, such as the recent al-Jihad organization or others might resort, is taking place. The police must constantly expose the illegal activities that take place aboveground or underground, because that is criminal activity which is punishable by law. The closer the police get to the requisite level of competence, the more they are able to prevent the danger from getting out of hand.

[Question] But there still then remains the issue of confronting ideas with ideas.

[Answer] That is the second guarantee. The gist of it is that we are continuing the guidance process, in order to reveal the misguided nature of extremist ideas and to strip them of their influence. That is the first step, in confronting this phenomenon, in order to confine and reduce it, in order to protect growing young people from falling prey to these groups and in order for people who have enrolled or become implicated in these groups to be convinced that they have gone astray and that the issue does not benefit religion, young people or the government but rather the groups which have exploited them and led them astray. Some young people who have joined these groups have actually started to realize this fact; after that they, that is, the young people, will proceed to think carefully more than once before anyone can lead them to the abyss of extremism. However, the important task of coping with extremist thinking will continue to be a responsibility of carrying out guidance which will lie on every man involved in ideas, religion, or learning in Egypt. It can be dealt with and eliminated only over the long haul; for that reason we have started to establish the dialogue we have been conducting in the prisons.

[Question] But isn't that a dialogue with imprisoned persons?

[Answer] The dialogue has been totally free. No opinions were imposed on prisoners in the course of the dialogue, and there is no better proof of that than the fact that some prisoners have proceeded to renounce and attack the society. The dialogue has been totally free.

[Question] There are people who approve of the steps you have initiated in proceeding with the dialogue and confronting ideas with ideas. However, it has been said that the experiment could have yielded better fruit, in the form of long-term results, intellectually at least, had it been carried out outside the prisons rather than inside them.

[Answer] I did not say that the dialogue ought to have taken place inside the prisons; rather, I do say that what we have done is only to start to open the door, which must be opened wide so that the dialogue can be extended to every spot in the mosques, the schools, public conferences, the press and television. I have raised with his eminence the senior imam, the sheikh of al-Azhar, the possibility of using Muhammad 'Abduh Hall as a hall for the propagation of up-right religious ideas, holding periodic symposia in it and discussing all Islamic ideas in it, with an elite of scholars in attendance; it would be tantamount to a center disseminating all aspects of sound religious thinking and consequently cleansing the Islamic religion of all random alien impurities. For this reason, we started the dialogue which we have been carrying out behind bars, so that the issue could then extend beyond the prisons into every time and place and this phenomenon could at least be reduced.

[Question] Let us for a moment consider the emergency law, which was said to have been codified as a means for arresting people without investigation or trial on many occasions.

[Answer] The emergency law involves two stages. There was the emergency law after the 6 October incident; when Egypt was on the brink of going under, it was necessary that stability be imposed and guaranteed. We sought the help of the emergency law in order to deal with all the elements in the extremist groups in the first, second and third levels. The law is applied only to deal with people who try to enroll in terrorist activity or activity that has the character of unlawful violence.

[Question] How many people are subject to the emergency law, approximately?

[Answer] When the application of the emergency law began after 6 October 1981, the number of people to whom the emergency law was applied came to about 4,000. Now, the number of people to whom the law is applied does not exceed 100. However, there are about 1,600 people who have been provisionally imprisoned in accordance with investigations which the Office of the State Security Prosecutor has carried out, including the accused persons belonging to the al-Jihad organization which carried out the 6 October incidents. There are the leadership personnel, who are 302 in number, there are 50 juveniles, and then there the people who are accused of memberships, whose indictments have not yet been released. Then there are the accused persons in other secret organizations which have been unearthed; these are the Renunciation and Atonement Organization, the Qutbists and the Party of God. They were all organizations which operated underground and gradually came under the influence of extremist thinking which renounces society and promotes acts of violence.

[Question] Is that what dictated the retention of the emergency law? What criterion have you relied on in releasing imprisoned persons?

[Answer] Following the application of the emergency law in this expanded form, which was dictated by considerations of securing the survival of the state in the aftermath of 6 October 1981, we subsequently started to release persons as the foundations of stability in the government gradually became consolidated, once the opportunities available to them to resume secret activity in behalf of these organizations were sealed off. The releases began to be in effect vis-a-vis people in the least extreme levels, and now the number is less than 100. It then suddenly happened that a group tried to pick up its activities last August and September; however, the security forces managed to abort the movement before any plots could be carried out, and today, now that the emergency law has been extended, we are committed to applying the law only in dealing with people who seek to commit terror and violence through their affiliation with secret groups that adhere to the idea of overthrowing the regime under the banner of repudiating society.

[Question] Does that mean that the law will go on forever, to function as a weapon that is wielded in dealing with the possible consequences of incidents?

[Answer] No, the emergency law will not go on. It will have its own set period and at the outset was related to a major incident which almost overwhelmed all of Egypt. Now stability is being consolidated and this phenomenon is being dealt with; for this reason, we hope that by the end of this year matters will no longer make the emergency law mandatory and that ordinary laws can guarantee that all disruptions of the law will be dealt with.

[Question] What about legal guarantees? Do those exist in the case of people to whom the emergency law is applied?

[Answer] Yes, all forms of legal guarantees exist. After 15 days, people can present a grievance to judges in the state security department. That department can release them. However, the minister of the interior has the right to protest the decree of the court in turn, on grounds that he is in charge of security. Judiciary guarantees exist. There is the commitment to apply the law only in dealing with acts which have a character of violence or terror, and this entails adequate guarantees for the citizen that the emergency law will not be used against him. For that reason, no citizen will be aware of the emergency law unless he engages in terrorist or violent activity.

[Question] Prejudiced charges are being circulated to the effect that in spite of the application of the emergency law, there does not seem to be any stability, notwithstanding the security measures, and the number of fanatics has started to increase and grow.

[Answer] First, the number of fanatics is not increasing. Rather, to the contrary, it is shrinking. When I say "fanatics," I mean extremists or people who are prepared to join in terrorist activity. Their numbers are shrinking. On another subject, let me state here that there has been no boycott of Islamic thinking; rather, there has been a desire and a responsibility to purge Islamic thinking of the flaws some people have tried to introduce into it, and that responsibility will remain in force until the phenomenon of introducing flaws into Islamic thinking diminishes. These, unfortunately, come from abroad for the most part.

[Question] Where from?

[Answer] From various places. Most of them are based on what has been called al-Salafi thinking. Although this has its own tradition, some of it unfortunately represents apostasy within Islam, and represents an attempt to bring Islam back to the earliest times, thus ignoring the fact that Islam is a religion for every time and place and a religion of strength, civilization, logic and learning -- the religion which calls on man to adopt all manifestations of learning. We abuse Islam when we try to take it back to formalities and appearances and strip it of the essence and the dynamism with which it is made up by its nature.

[Question] In light of the sensitive, difficult responsibilities you are bearing, how far can we effect a reconciliation here between the requirements of security in present circumstances, and democracy, which you are always striving to enhance?

[Answer] First of all, enforcing security does not conflict in any way with democracy. Rather, it is the main, proper approach to democracy, when security means commitment to the law by the individual. Democracy, in reality consists of the religious stricture that people should know what commitments they have in exchange for the rights they possess. It means that no minority may impose its views by terror or violence on the majority. In my conversation with the leaders of the various parties, I said that we all have a historic responsibility

toward Egypt, which in recent years has been exposed to a grave phenomenon which could annihilate democracy, and we cannot abandon the stage to a handful of extremists who assign to themselves the right to look after this people, governing in accordance with specific rulings that they carry out in anger and hostility. In no way is that democracy. Democracy makes it incumbent on people who want power to attain it through democratic means, means which are incorporated in the demands of the people themselves for change or for the advent to power of a specific part. That is an initial step in which we must make a start on the basis of sound practices; if we do that, we will be guaranteeing that our country is stable, and that will lead us to overcome our problems and raise the standard of living of the Egyptian citizen. Democracy and freedom do not mean violating the law and refusing to honor the legitimate authorities; if they do, then our society will turn into a jungle which is in no way connected with Islamic society, which is basically more civilized than any other.

[Question] The security process, in the midst of tumult, problems, apprehensions, doubts and concerns, could constitute an extreme embarrassment for those who are in charge of it.

[Answer] The embarrassment lies in the pathological phenomenon in our midst, which has arisen through the fact that individual interests now prevail over the interests of the group. As a security agency, we try to effect as great a reconciliation as possible between the two interests, and that is reflected in the decrees we issue, which are essentially aimed at the interests of the individual and the interests of the group.

[Question] What is the degree of stability in Egypt today?

[Answer] It is as great as the citizen feels it to be, generally. However, I, as a man who is responsible for the security system, can say that the system is trying, with the power it has been given, to bring about stability in this country and to combat crime, whatever its nature might be. I can say, thanks to God, because our society is blessed with a degree of stability. There are people who are still trying to avoid committing themselves to the law. This is an eternal task of security, to stand up to people who do not honor the law. However, all in all, I can say that we are a stable society and stability becomes firmer and stabler every day.

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'ABD-AL-NASIR'S, AL-SADAT'S VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENT, ARAB NATIONALISM COMPARED

Leaders' Approaches to Development Compared

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 724, 29 Nov 82 pp 28-30

[Article by Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim]

[Text] Ever since its entry into the age of modern awakening--this is usually designated by the French campaign early in the 19th century--Egypt has experienced five major attempts at development. These are in sequence as follows:

--The Muhammad 'Ali experience (1805-1849): we may call this experience economic growth through the capitalism of the state and oriental autocracy.

--The experience of the Khedive Isma'il (1863-1879): we may describe this experience as economic growth through reliance on outside forces and oriental splendor.

--The Tal'at Harb and Misr Bank experience (1920-1940): we may describe this experience as economic growth through national capitalism under the aegis of political liberalism.

--The 'Abd-al-Nasir experience (1952-1970): we may call this experience development through socialism of the state and just autocracy.

--The al-Sadat experience (1970-1981): this experience may be described in terms of economic growth realized through an open-door policy toward the West and swinging back and forth between democracy and autocracy.

In this article we will deal only with the last two experiences because they are recent ones whose positive and negative legacies we are still experiencing. More importantly, we are going through a period in which we are carrying out a general review of the conflicting ideas and practices of the past three decades. We all need to learn lessons of success and failure so that we may start our journey through the eighties and beyond those years with a firm foundation of knowledge.

The Nasirist Approach to Development

'Abd-al-Nasir's approach to development was associated from the outset with the objective of consolidating national independence and reducing Egypt's subordina-

tion to the western powers that control the international capitalist system. 'Abd-al-Nasir articulated directly and indirectly the need for fighting exploitation internally and abroad so that the national forces of production may, on the one hand, set out to achieve a suitable standard of living for citizens and, on the other hand, preserve the country's dignity and independence. The principle of resisting exploitation inside the country and abroad is the principal clue to all the measures and battles that 'Abd-al-Nasir embarked upon locally, regionally and internationally in the field of development and in other fields as well.

'Abd-al-Nasir realized from the outset that throughout the ages land and the peasants had constituted one of the central problems in Egypt. Therefore, agrarian reform laws were issued, limiting ownership of agricultural land and regulating the relationship between landlords and tenants. These laws were clearly biased in favor of the lower classes in rural areas so as to reduce exploitation. But this was one aspect of 'Abd-al-Nasir's dual approach to development: that of reducing exploitation as a condition for unleashing the forces of production in rural areas. The second aspect of 'Abd-al-Nasir's approach to development was to provide the structural conditions for increasing production. The Revolution tried to improve methods of irrigation and drainage; it reclaimed land; and it expanded the cultivated terrain. Construction of the High Dam was one of the gigantic projects that demonstrated 'Abd-al-Nasir's earnest attempts to develop Egypt economically. The cultivated area was increased by about 8 percent during his term, and the harvested area was increased by about 15 percent. In the period between 1952 and 1965 Egypt succeeded for the first time since the thirties of this century in effecting an increase in food production that exceeded the ratio of the population increase [in the country].

In industry, Egypt under 'Abd-al-Nasir succeeded in shattering the myth of its agricultural destiny. In the first 10 years of the Revolution it was able to double its industrial production. Standard production figures in factories that employ 10 or more workers rose from 100 in 1952 to 383 in 1960. Power production rose by about 800 percent between 1952 and 1970, and the number of people employed in industry rose from 350,000 to 1.2 million. Between the early fifties and the early seventies industry's contribution to the GNP rose from 9 to 22 percent. These formidable leaps in the industrialization of Egypt could not have been as enormous and rapid as they have been had not the state interfered and created a public sector that assumed the responsibility of providing leadership for the national economy.

It is for this reason that we say that economic growth in Egypt, particularly between 1952 and 1965, has been a model for the growth of the socialist state. Although similar to Muhammad 'Ali's development experience in its centralization, it differed from it in its motives and its results. Although Muhammad 'Ali used a centralized bureaucracy to monopolize and manage all the principal aspects of economic activity, he did not put the surpluses produced by this activity to work for people employed in production, to improve the opportunities of their lives or to achieve any kind of equality among the groups and classes of the people. Under 'Abd-al-Nasir, however, we saw the opposite: there was an urgency to regulate opportunities for life and [to establish] equality of opportunity. This was most evident in services, the most important of which are education and health.

In education the most salient accomplishment of Nasirism was the creation of a national, standardized system of education. The Revolution thus put an end to the fragmentation, chaos and contradictions [that had prevailed in the process of] bringing up generations of Egyptians. On the one hand, there were several systems that had nothing to do with each other and, on the other hand, they had nothing to do with national or production objectives. When 'Abd-al-Nasir's period began, the number of students in the various stages of education did not exceed 2 million; by the end of that period that number had reached 6 million. That is a 300 percent increase compared to a 70 percent increase in the population during the same period. More importantly, this formidable growth [in education] created opportunities for social mobility, and many groups of people from the lower classes were able to move into a different social class.

In health, Egyptians' chances of getting more food and better quality of food improved in the period between 1952 and 1962. The average daily per capita calorie intake for Egyptians rose from 2,300 to 2,600 calories per day, and the ratio of protein [in the average diet] rose from 35 to 50 grams. In this regard the standard of nutrition in Egypt rose to the accepted international standard which is in accordance with the standards of the World Health Organization and the international Food and Agricultural Organization [FAO]. Egyptians' chances of getting medical care also improved. The number of physicians tripled: from 5,000 in 1952 to 15,000 physicians in 1970--a 375 percent increase. The physician-population ratio became 1 per 2,000; it had been 1 per 2,300. All this affected the death rate and average life expectancy for Egyptians. The death rate declined from 18 per 1,000 to 13 per 1,000 between 1952 and 1970, and average life expectancy rose from 42 to 53 years.

We chose agriculture and industry as indicators of economic development to show [the extent to which] the forces of production were unleashed in the sector of basic goods. We chose education and health as indicators for [the development in] services to show that most of the surplus economic value was utilized to ensure the basic needs of the majority of citizens.

In evaluating the development experience in 'Abd-al-Nasir's epoch it is of course possible to pursue the course that fellow economists prefer and to summarize the whole experience in terms of two quantitative complex indicators: the growth of the GNP and the growth of national revenues.

Between 1955 and 1965 the GNP [almost] doubled: it rose from 1 billion pounds to 1.9 billion pounds in fixed prices. This is an annual growth rate of 6.5 percent. As we've seen, industry's contribution to that increase was a sizable one. Average annual per capita income rose during the same period by 43 percent in fixed prices. It is the opinion of Dr 'Ali al-Jartili, may God have mercy on his soul, that "this is considered a novel occurrence in Egypt's modern economic history." In the 40 years that preceded the revolution average real per capita income had not risen at all. More than likely it had declined slightly from what it was early this century. But from 1967 to 1977 the annual increase in per capita income did not exceed 1 percent. ([See] 'Ali al-Jartili, "25 Years: an Analytical Study of Economic Policies in Egypt from 1952 to 1977," pages, 118-119).

Several salient characteristics were predominant in the Nasirist development experience. The most important of them was the fact that the state was at the center [of everything] and the public sector led principal production and service

activities. Second, the Nasirist experience adopted a method of partial planning at the outset and then a method of comprehensive planning in the period between 1960 and 1965. Third, 'Abd-al-Nasir's inspiring, charismatic leadership controlled the progress of these development efforts. This control had positive as well as negative effects. Therefore, this was a development that came from above, and it relied on the personality of the leader or hero. It was carried out by a bureaucratic machinery that consisted of all the military and civilian segments of the middle classes. People did not really take part in making major political or economic decisions, even though the lower popular classes in rural and urban areas did receive generous benefits from the Nasirist experience in development. Therefore, we have described this experience as development on the basis of the socialism of the state and just autocracy.

The enormous moving force in 'Abd-al-Nasir's development experience peaked in the mid sixties. He was subsequently besieged with challenges to which he failed to make the required creative response. The obligation that was missing from the Nasirist plan in general and from his development experience in particular was the absence of participation by the people. This was despite 'Abd-al-Nasir's unquestionable loyalty to the broad sectors of the people. Just as the blow that did set Muhammad 'Ali's and Isma'il's experiments back had come from abroad, the blow that set 'Abd-al-Nasir's experiment back also came from abroad: the 1967 defeat.

Al-Sadat's Approach to Development

Al-Sadat's approach to development was associated with his general tendency to ally himself with the West and with his fascination with western technology, with the western mode of production, with the western style of management and with the western life style. Al-Sadat's dream was to let Egypt bound successively so it can catch up with the West and become part of it, if possible. Therefore, he quickly and forcefully turned towards the West and tried to make the United States, the leader of the western camp, a full partner with Egypt in the peace process and in the reconstruction of Egypt's economy and infrastructure. Therefore, al-Sadat's development model adopted the western mode, western aid and joint investments made by westerners and Arab oil [interests]. From 1974 to 1980 laws, statutes and decrees were issued to achieve this quantitative shift. These are generally referred to as the open-door policy. These laws covered areas of investment, currency, trade, banks and imports.

During the first stage of the open-door policy (from 1974 to 1977) the rate of economic growth was slow, and the effects that had been hoped for from the new policies did not materialize. However, in the following 4 years the rates of economic development were high, averaging 8.5 percent per year at fixed prices.

Between 1975 and 1980 the GNP rose from 4.8 billion U.S. dollars to 6.6 billion dollars in fixed prices (for 1975). Consequently, the average per capita share [of the GNP] rose from 127 to 160 dollars in fixed prices. This increase is about a 25 percent increase in 5 years. In the second half of the seventies most of the economic growth that was realized in al-Sadat's period was in the oil sectors (33 percent annually); in transportation, especially the Suez Canal (25 percent annually); in construction (11 percent annually); in public utilities (9 percent annually); and in trade and banking (9 percent annually). These are non-commodity

sectors. In the most important commodity sectors, which are agriculture and industry, the rate of annual growth, excluding the general rate, was 1.6 percent in agriculture and 7.7 percent in industry. Also the rate of annual growth in the housing sector was below the general average; in the second half of the seventies the annual rate of growth did not exceed 5.5 percent.

In a recent International Labor Organization study prepared by Bennett Hansen and Samir Radwan I deduced the following from an examination of the makeup of the Egyptian economy and the rates of growth in that economy from 1975 to 1980:

1. The process of industrialization has not achieved more progress beyond that which it had achieved in the sixties. In fact, industry's contribution to the GNP declined during those 5 years despite the fact that that period as a whole was one of rapid growth. In the early seventies industry's contribution to the GNP was 20.4 percent. In 1975 it dropped to 18 percent; and in 1979, to 17 percent.
2. The contribution of agriculture to the GNP also declined from 32 percent in the mid sixties, to 31 percent in the mid seventies and to 24 percent in the latter seventies.
3. Despite the enormous growth in the process of construction as a whole, the contribution of the housing sector to the GNP also declined from 5.7 percent in the mid sixties to 2.7 percent in the mid seventies and to 2.4 percent in the latter seventies.

The fact that the contributions made by agriculture and housing in particular to the GNP during al-Sadat's epoch have been declining means that the national economy has failed to stay in step with the Egyptian people and to meet their basic needs in general and the basic needs of the lower classes in particular.

During al-Sadat's period the Egyptian economy relied on Arab and western foreign assistance to finance most of its development. In the seventies that assistance amounted to about 10 billion dollars. About 7 billion dollars came from the United States, compared with about 1 billion dollars during 'Abd-al-Nasir's period, and most of that came from the Soviet Union.

The mode of development during al-Sadat's period affected the distribution of national revenues among the sectors of society. According to one IBRD report, "Worldwide Export Tables for 1980," the top five percent of the population in Egypt received a larger share of national revenues; that share rose from 17 percent in the late sixties to 22 percent in the late seventies. At the same time the share received by the poorest 20 percent of the people dropped from 7 to 5 percent during the same period of time. In other words, the distribution of wealth in Egypt became even more unbalanced in favor of "the well-to-do minority" at the expense of the "hard-pressed majority."

The disparity in income distribution was exacerbated by the inflation which swept the Egyptian economy during al-Sadat's period. The annual rate of inflation fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent during the seventies. This usually means that the redistribution of income favored those who were employed in domestic and foreign trade and self-employed professionals and businessmen and that it was carried out at the expense of working people and retired people who receive fixed

incomes. In fact, there are numerous indications which point to the fact that it is the socially unproductive class, the class of parasitic capitalists, who benefited the most from the poor distribution of income. This class of people speculate, act as brokers, take commissions and use their influence to make a quick profit. This parasitic class is characterized by its propensity to engage in luxurious modes of consumption, and this affects the economy, causing an increase in the luxury goods that are imported and worsening [the situation] regarding the balance of payments. Furthermore, this situation affects society since these luxurious modes of consumption, on the basis of the effect of imitation and simulation, create a big gap between the consumer aspirations of the middle class and those of the lower class on the one hand and their modest incomes, on the other. In turn, this causes people from these classes to try to earn money by any means, and this leads them into deviation and corruption. They become discontented, and they resort to extremist [modes of behavior].

It seems that the luxurious spending of al-Sadat's period was not restricted to members of the new parasitic class and to people from other classes who imitated them. Government also engaged in extravagant spending. If we exclude funds spent for defense, education, health, utilities and other services, we will notice that funds spent on the remaining items constituted a higher ratio of total government spending in the seventies: about 11 percent. In the mid sixties spending for these items did not exceed 5 percent of the budget. Most of this increase is attributable to the cancer-like growth of government machinery which has nothing to do with the question of defense or the problem of development.

It was an inevitable result of the development mode in al-Sadat's period that the general deficit in the state's budget grew from 91 million pounds in 1965-1966 to 1.154 billion pounds in 1975-1976 and to about 1.450 billion pounds in 1979-1980. Foreign debts rose from about 1 billion pounds in 1970 to about 12 billion in 1980. Payments and service charges on these debts consumed about 23 percent of revenues from Egyptian exports every year. The situation could have gotten worse had it not been for the funds transferred to Egypt by Egyptians working abroad. In the late seventies these funds amounted to about 2 billion dollars every year.

As a result of the growth of Egypt's foreign debts and the constant deficit in the state budget, reliance on foreign countries, particularly the United States, and on foreign financial organizations grew. This led to increased interference by these agencies in the economic affairs of Egypt. One of the most salient manifestations of this interference occurred in late 1976 and early in 1977 when the IBRD and the IMF required the Egyptian government to withdraw its subsidy from some basic goods, to float the Egyptian pound and to allow the laws of supply and demand to have their effect on the pricing mechanism [in the country]. When the government yielded and announced its economic decisions lifting the subsidy in January 1977, angry demonstrations broke out in all the principal cities. Demonstrators clashed with security forces; and according to official reports over 70 people lost their lives and hundreds of people were injured. These incidents were the worst manifestations of violence and civil disobedience that Egypt had seen since the Cairo fire in January 1952.

Like Khedive Isma'il's experience, the development experience of al-Sadat's period relied on an open-door policy toward the West. It relied on the West; on funds borrowed from the West, on consumer spending and on extravagant [modes of] consumption. Al-Sadat's [development] experience was accompanied by a tightly

controlled, democratic open-door policy that was subject to an ebb and flow movement in its last 4 years. The experience was also accompanied by the difficult growth of a truly productive national economy and a rapid cancer-like growth of parasitic capitalists. In his experience President al-Sadat did not depart from most of the gains and accomplishments that were realized in the course of development during the Nasirist age. The most important of these is the public sector which was [nevertheless] subjected to neglect and deliberate or inadvertent containment. To a certain extent the social and economic function of the public sector changed during al-Sadat's period. On the one hand, it was deprived of its leadership in the national economy, and many of the privileges that were granted to the private sector were denied to it. On the other hand, the public sector came under sharp criticism, and it was blamed for all mistakes. It became the scapegoat and the object for all blame and all bursts of anger and frustration from popular groups when any economic bottlenecks or supply shortages occurred. People who are well off and wealthy had the goods and services they needed--including health, educational and recreational services--provided for them by their private sector. The dichotomy in the Egyptian economy became glaring; each part of that society was dealing with different prices, a different wage scale and different rights and duties. With the two parts of the economy polarized, what was more serious happened: both parts of society were polarized.

Leaders' Arab Nationalism Compared

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 726, 13 Dec 82 pp 28-30

[Article by Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim]

[Text] Egypt's relationship with the Arab homeland is the relationship of one part to the whole. The Egyptians are one of the peoples of the Arab nation. But the relationship of the Egyptian part to the Arab whole and the relationship of the Egyptian people to the Arab nation is not like that which exists between the other parts or the other peoples and the Arab whole or Arab nation. It is a more complicated relationship, and it involves a unique controversy. Consequently, possibilities for expansion or shrinkage, for idealism or opportunism and for leadership or subordination are enormous. These possibilities and the likelihood that each of them might actually materialize would have special national, ethnic and international repercussions.

There are three levels in the relationship between Egypt and the Arab homeland. The first level is that of identity or the feeling of belonging. The second level is that of Arab nationalism as a political movement whose purpose is to unify the countries of the Arab homeland. The third level is that of common interests: strategic, economic and cultural interests. At each one of these three levels the ruling regime in Egypt may be inclined to fluctuate between an idealistic extreme and a pragmatic extreme. During 'Abd-al-Nasir's and al-Sadat's periods in the past three decades Egypt saw a quick movement between the two extremes.

'Abd-al-Nasir and Arabism

The first features of 'Abd-al-Nasir's directives to the Arab homeland began to take shape in the second year after the outbreak of the Revolution. In the book, "The Philosophy of the Revolution," which was published late in 1953,

'Abd-al-Nasir spoke about the three circles to which Egypt belongs. Accordingly, Egypt has to move within those circles. The first circle is the Arab circle; then there are the Islamic and African circles. 'Abd-al-Nasir traced the embryonic beginning of his Arab sentiments to his years as a secondary school student. In those the days he used to go out each year on the 2nd of November in demonstrations protesting the Balfour Declaration. These embryonic beginnings grew gradually during the days of his military education and his participation in the first Palestine War in 1948. In his heart the problem of identity or affiliation began to coalesce with the strategic problem, that is, the question of defending Egypt. This coalescence was furthered and heightened by his reading of history, geography and the [Arab] heritage.

By the mid fifties Arabism for 'Abd-al-Nasir had become an inseparable part of his general plan to consolidate national independence, comprehensive development, social justice and non-alignment. 'Abd-al-Nasir realized that the success of his revolution in these areas would be negatively and positively affected by the action of the Arab homeland as a whole. Consequently, there was a unity of destiny between Egypt and Arab ideas, and as long as there was unity of destiny, political, social and international action must be congruous with all the ideas of Arabism. For this reason, he was concerned in principle, strategically and tactically about [the following]:

--Backing Arab liberation movements that have been and still are fighting against colonialism.

--Fighting foreign alliances in the region.

--Liberating Arab resources, particularly oil, from the grip of foreign monopolies.

--Backing popular revolutions and uprisings whose purpose is to get rid of social injustice and political autocracy.

--Opposing Israel as part of world-wide colonialism in its old and new forms.

--[Promoting] Arab unity.

The Suez War was a living demonstration of all aspects of the Nasirist plan, including its Arab nationalist aspect. The 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal confirmed national independence on the one hand and shattered the foreign monopoly over national resources on the other hand. Thirdly, [it affirmed Egypt's right] to use its revenues to build the High Dam and to finance its development programs. Then came the developments that followed the nationalization decree. The most important of these was the tripartite aggression that was waged by England, France and Israel against Egypt. This aggression reaffirmed to 'Abd-al-Nasir the fact that the ingredients of his grand plan were interrelated. One of these ingredients was the unity of Arab destiny. The aggression revealed dramatically that France had taken part in the aggression not only because the Suez Canal had been nationalized, but also to avenge itself [and to punish] 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt for supporting Algeria's revolution. Britain took part in the aggression, not only because of the nationalization, but also to avenge itself [and to punish] 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt for supporting Arab liberation

movements in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and in the Gulf and for resisting the Baghdad Pact, which Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan had established with the blessings of the United States. The aggression affirmed Israel's small imperialist role as the cat's paw for the largest international imperialist.

What matters to us in all this, for the subject of this article, is the fact that 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt was truly taken by surprise, not only by the mere fact that the Arab people had sympathized with it in the battle of Suez, but rather by the fact that Arab nationalism had surged and spread from the Ocean to the Gulf. The fierce battle of Suez was truly the offensive, strategic starting point in 'Abd-al-Nasir's national odyssey. Before Suez 'Abd-al-Nasir had settled the problem of identity. For the first time [in Egypt] the 1956 Constitution had clearly stipulated that Egypt was part of the Arab homeland and that its people were an inseparable part of the Arab nation. However, it was the battle of Suez that placed 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt in a position to lead the Arab nationalism movement and the Arab unity movement. Up to that time only a few thousand Arab intellectuals in the East had been preoccupied with thoughts of nationalism. Up to that time action for unity had been the preoccupation of several small parties, chief among which was the al-Ba'th party and the Movement of Arab Nationalists led by George Habashi. With 'Abd-al-Nasir leading the Movement of Arab Nationalists, nationalist thought and action for unity turned into a popular tide sweeping the area from the Ocean to the Gulf. This tide continued to spread until the mid sixties. Under the aegis and the banner of that tide 'Abd-al-Nasir entered numerous battles: he won some of them; he suffered setbacks in some; and he was defeated in some. But the Arab masses continued their support for him, and they continued to rally around him even in the most cruel moments of defeat in 1967 and until his sudden departure from our world in 1970.

'Abd-al-Nasir's certainty about Egypt's national identity was profound and unaffected by the horror of the battles he had embarked upon. He was not shaken by the bitterness of the defeats he had suffered, and his faith in the unity of Arab destiny in the present and in the future remained unaffected even though his enthusiasm for his unification plans was reduced by the setback of the separation with Syria and Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic in 1961.

'Abd-al-Nasir's nationalistic idealism was the driving force behind the fact that Egypt's military might was placed at the service of the Yemeni Revolution in 1962. Egypt thus became involved in a long, domestic war in the mountains and valleys of Yemen that depleted its resources. This was a grievous mistake for which we paid a high price several years later. 'Abd-al-Nasir's idealism was not the mistake; and the principle of supporting Yemen's revolution was not a mistake. The mistake was in the form which that support assumed and in the machinery that was used to deliver it.

'Abd-al-Nasir's nationalistic idealism was the driving force behind the promptness with which he rose to defend Syria when in May 1967 there was news of an impending Israeli attack against that country. He sent his forces to Sinai, and he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships in anticipation of a battle with Israel that would serve to reduce the military pressure on Syria. Israel's sweeping attack caused the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan to suffer a shameful defeat in June 1967. Once again, 'Abd-al-Nasir's idealism was not at fault and

the principle of providing Syria with moral and military support was not at fault. The fault, however, lay in considerations that were made of one's and the opponent's power, in the real preparations that were made for an expected battle and in choosing the proper military leadership for running such a battle, particularly since one third of the Egyptian army was still on Yemeni territory.

These two examples, besides others, indicate how the Egyptian leaders' reading of the reality of the region was correct, how his certainty about Egypt's Arab identity can be correct and how truthful were his directions. But how can an error in [the process of] setting priorities, in considering the balance of powers and in timing the battles lead to most grievous consequences? The war in Yemen caused the second 5-Year Plan to be diminished, and the 1967 war caused the plan to be completely suspended. This was reflected on the course of domestic development and even on the course of the Arab Nationalism Movement. Just as the battle of Suez in 1956 proved in a positive way the extent of the association of destiny between Egypt's national battles and the Arabs' national battles, the 1967 defeat proved in a negative way the same strong association.

Al-Sadat's Approach to the Arabs

President al-Sadat basically used to consider the question of Arabism from a pragmatic standpoint. Of the three dimensions of the problem--identity, nationalism and interests--he was interested only in interests. These interests were defined from a purely Egyptian perspective, as he himself saw them.

Al-Sadat was not fighting for Egypt's Arab identity or for Arab nationalism except inasmuch as that would serve purely Egyptian interests. At the slightest suggestion that Egypt's Arab identity or Arab nationalism would not serve Egypt's interests, he would appear prepared not only to turn his back on Arab identity and Arab nationalism, but he would also be prepared to take them lightly and perhaps even to fight them.

This explains the winding policy of President al-Sadat towards Arabs and Arabism. During the first period of his term in office (1970-1973) the man was very careful about Arab solidarity and about maintaining the peace with all Arab regimes [despite] their different ideological plans. He did not allow any propaganda campaigns against any of them. This was the period during which preparations were made for the October battle. For this reason he cooperated with Ba'thist Syria, with the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, with al-Qadhdhafi's Libya, with Numayri's Sudan and with Hashimite Jordan. He cooperated with all these countries from a purely pragmatic rationale that was governed by Egypt's national interests. [Those interests lay in] entering into a limited battle with Israel in the hope of liberating Sinai. Al-Sadat cooperated with all these countries despite the differences or contradictions that existed between their regimes.

Because President al-Sadat's cooperation with these and other regimes did not stem from their identity or nationalism, his relationship with each of them after the October War was subject to the considerations of Egypt's new interests as he saw them. He saw Egypt's interests after the October War to lie in [the following]:

1. Friendship with the West.

2. Attracting financial investments from Arab oil countries.

3. Making peace with Israel. Consequently, from 1974 to 1977 we find him dissatisfied with Syria and Libya, with whom he had a unity agreement, and we find him trying to get closer to Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf. He believed that his relationship with Saudi Arabia in particular was not only a means for attracting Saudi investments to rebuild Egypt, but that it would also serve and strengthen his constant effort to befriend the United States. With the end of this period (early in 1977) President al-Sadat had concluded that his relationship with the United States had become a strong and direct one and that he did not need the Saudis as intermediaries. He also concluded that the volume of aid coming from Saudi Arabia and from other Gulf countries was much less than what he had asked and hoped for. Even after the events of January 1977, which rocked al-Sadat's regime, the oil tycoons did not demonstrate the generosity and decency that he had expected from them in his hour of need. For this reason he began to be annoyed with the oil regimes, and he began to show a willingness to dissociate himself from them. Like progressive regimes in a period that preceded his, there were no basic ties of identity or of a common national effort for unity between him and them. His relationship with them was one that was based on interests, and since they dragged their feet in giving him financial and economic assistance, they were of no use to him.

It is from here that President al-Sadat's regime enters the third and final stage of his attitude toward Arabs and Arabism. This is the stage that began in November 1977 with his visit to Israel. In that period he gambled that almost all Arabs--progressive, conservative, republican and royalist--would boycott Egypt. The climax of this period (1977-1981) was the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. President al-Sadat paid little attention to the resolutions of the Baghdad Summit, the Arab boycott and the suspension of Egypt's membership in the Arab League. He was certain that the Arabs would need him, and he was certain that the United States would compensate him financially and diplomatically for the Arab boycott.

During the period of the boycott (1977-1981) the Arab homeland was becoming weaker and more fragmented. Israel flexed its muscles more every day and tried to provoke its Arab neighbors further. Arab regimes attributed this deteriorating situation to al-Sadat's policy and to his separate peace with Israel. President al-Sadat, however, attributed it to the stupidity and ignorance of the regimes and to the fact that they were not listening to him and were departing from the course he had chosen for dealing with Israel, with the West and with the world.

President al-Sadat saw the Arab homeland around Egypt exploding from within: the Mecca incident in Saudi Arabia; the clash between the Muslim Brothers and the Syrian regime; the Gafsa incident in Tunisia; the Tizi Ouzou events in Algeria; the clashes on Arab borders; domestic strife in Iraq; and the war between Iraq and Iran. Al-Sadat used to consider all this evidence that other Arab regimes were in danger while his own was not. He used to say that Egypt under al-Sadat was an island of peace and security in the region. Perhaps until the moment of his tragic death he believed that he was still on a safe and secure island.

The Language of National Address

The language 'Abd-al-Nasir used in his national addresses manifested the fact that he was convinced about the principle of the Arab character of Egypt and its

historical destiny to lead the Arab nation in battles for liberation, construction and unity. Beginning with the Battle of Suez in 1956 and until his departure in 1970 'Abd-al-Nasir used to communicate with the people of Egypt and the Arab nation directly. In addressing the Arab nations his priority was to talk directly with the people on radio or in public squares. Arab masses from the Ocean to the Gulf used to listen to him; they used to respond to his appeals; and they used to cheer his name and the slogans he had proclaimed. Sawt al-'Arab Radio was one of the effective tools he used to address these masses. This emotional hold 'Abd-al-Nasir had on the masses was the means by which he applied pressure on the regimes that were in power. His address [to the masses] was second on his list of priorities. Thus, inasmuch as his relationship with the Arab masses everywhere was a direct, positive and emotional relationship, his relationship with the regimes in power were fraught with doubts and suspicions on both sides. 'Abd-al-Nasir did not deal with the regimes unless he had to. An example of that occurred in 1964 when he invited the Arab regimes to the first summit meeting in Alexandria to confront Israel's plans to divert the waters of the Jordan Valley. This custom continued during his life and went on after his death, and it continues today.

Nevertheless, the rule during 'Abd-al-Nasir's period and until the 1967 defeat was to commit hostile acts against ruling Arab regimes and to stir up the people against those regimes. The periods during which he had a truce with these regimes were brief and were exceptions to the rule. In many cases 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime used Egyptian intelligence agencies to create difficulties for hostile Arab regimes. The recruitment of aides in all Arab countries was easy because millions of people believed in 'Abd-al-Nasir's sincerity and trusted his charismatic leadership. Throughout his life, however, 'Abd-al-Nasir never set one Arab nation against another, nor did he stir up any regional, chauvinistic tendencies or brag to other Arab people about what he did for them. 'Abd-al-Nasir did not suggest that Egypt and Egyptians were better than others or more civilized than the rest of the Arab nation. Briefly, his hostility campaigns and his hostile acts were always directed against other rulers; they were never directed against Arab people. In his national addresses 'Abd-al-Nasir was always careful to distinguish between the rulers and the people, not only when he addressed Arab people, but also when he addressed non-Arabs. At the peak of his hostility to the Shah of Iran, for example, he did not once attack the Iranian people. Quite the contrary, he considered the Iranian people as a whole to be like all the oppressed people: his ally against colonialism and tyranny.

In his relationship with Arabs and Arabism the language President al-Sadat used in his national addresses demonstrated his ideas and his convictions about that matter. Just as his relationship with Arabism went through three stages, the language he used in addressing the nation fluctuated from one period to another. During the first period (1970-1973) the emphasis was on ideas of Arab brotherhood, Arab solidarity and a single Arab family. Al-Sadat dealt basically with the rulers and the regimes that were in power, not with the peoples of the Arab nation. Unlike 'Abd-al-Nasir al-Sadat rarely addressed the masses of the nation directly. At first, some observers regarded this as [evidence of] his concern with the fact that he not arouse the suspicions of Arab rulers who used to be annoyed by the fact that 'Abd-al-Nasir communicated directly with their subjects. However, a more accurate interpretation of al-Sadat's style in this matter lies

in the fact that his conviction in the principle of one Arab nation with one Arab destiny was not as profound or as certain as that which 'Abd-al-Nasir had. The most that al-Sadat believed in in this regard was that the Arab and Islamic nations were fraternal nations that have linguistic or religious ties but that these ties in themselves do not entail rights, obligations or duties. If his regime can deal with the ruling regimes in those countries from the premise of interests and if he can obtain from them material or moral influence here or there, all of this would depend on the individual skills of the ruler.

Therefore, the language al-Sadat used in addressing Arab regimes shifted in tone from thankfulness and gratitude in the first stage, to calling upon them to resist obstacles to gallantry and generosity in the second stage (1974-1977) and to condemnation and disdain in the third stage (1977-1981). We even notice during the last stage that there was a call to fight against a purely Egyptian identity that was so haughty that it came close to being regionally chauvinistic against other Arabs. At that point even the boundaries between rulers and their people began to disappear, and al-Sadat's language diligently scorned other Arabs. [He said that] we, the Egyptians, were the only ones who had a true civilization in the region. We had had 6,000 years of civilization behind us but they, the Arabs, were tribes each of which had a flag. The Arabs were tribes who had been deceived into calling themselves nations and countries. Briefly, the language al-Sadat used to address others in recent years has turned into statements in which he gloats over the Arabs, scorns their regimes and their people and sets the Egyptians against them. Slogans such as Egypt before everybody; Egypt first; and Egypt always appeared.

The Harvest

'Abd-al-Nasir's national idealism and al-Sadat's Egyptian pragmatism demonstrated two opposite approaches to the problem of Arabs and Arabism. Each approach had positive results and negative consequences. The positive results of 'Abd-al-Nasir's national idealism gave Egypt and the Arabs tremendous moral power in the period during which the tide of liberation was spreading, from 1952 to 1962. With the Arabs around it, Egypt was strong; and with Egypt in their midst, the Arabs were strong. The battle lines were clearly drawn in times of victory and in moments of defeat. Between 1962 and 1970 the negative consequences of 'Abd-al-Nasir's national idealism emerged. 'Abd-al-Nasir and Egypt were dragged into wars that had not been taken into account. They were dragged into battles whose times and places had not been well chosen. The result of that was that energies were wasted, blood was spilled and 'Abd-al-Nasir's entire plan suffered a setback in domestic development, in his efforts to consolidate national independence and non-alignment and in his effort to achieve Arab unity.

The most important positive results of al-Sadat's Egyptian pragmatism was execution of the October War and the liberation of Sinai. Its most important disadvantages was the fact that in recent years (1977-1981) al-Sadat's Egyptian pragmatism isolated Egypt from its vital surroundings and left the Arab world without leadership, thus increasing its division and fragmentation. With Egypt's isolation from the Arabs, Egypt became weaker, the Arabs' subordination was intensified, and the Arabs' weakness grew and was intensified by their subordination. Israel was the primary beneficiary of this Egyptian pragmatism. It became the mightiest country in the region, creating havoc here and there and expanding

here and there. Using force, promises and threats, it began dictating its wishes not only to the countries of the Arab East, but also to Egypt. It began to act [as though] its vital territory stretched from Pakistan to the West. The second beneficiaries of this Egyptian pragmatism were the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Egypt relinquished its national leadership of its Arab homeland, and the two superpowers stepped forward to fill this leadership vacuum either directly or indirectly. Now when any crisis occurs Arab countries turn either to Washington or to Moscow.

This is the mixed harvest of both 'Abd-al-Nasir's and al-Sadat's period on the matter of Arabs and Arabism. Lessons of success and failure must force us to sift through this mixed harvest and do as much as possible to turn it into a pure harvest. This is the challenge of the eighties for both Egypt and its Arab nation.

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RELIGIOUS LEADER CONTINUES DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL VIEWS, ANALYSES

Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 8 Dec 82 p 3

/Interview with Shaykh al-Mahallawi by Khamis al-Bakri: "Shaykh al-Mahallawi Completes His Conversation with AL-NUR: The New Law on Proselytizers Is Unfair and Must Be Changed"/

/Text/ In the first part of AL-NUR's interview with him, His Eminence Shaykh al-Mahallawi recounted his experiences proselytizing in the Sidi Jabir Mosque, the circumstances of his repression, indictment, transfer from his job, and mistreatment, the investigations that were made on him, his imprisonment for a period of a year, and his banishment from his pulpit.

In this second and latter instalment of the conversation, Shaykh al-Mahallawi sheds light on the nature of the reports written against him, the slanderous statements that aroused the anger of the late president against him, and his techniques and platforms for proselytization and speaking, which he has declared he will not abandon, because his guilt has not been established. He then states his opinion bluntly regarding the new law on proselytizers, which prohibits people who proselytize from the pulpits of mosques from addressing themselves to other religions or political issues, and expresses his view that this is wrong and that one cannot adhere to it, because the Koran addresses itself to other religions and Islam cannot be Islam if it is divorced from politics. Shaykh al-Mahallawi also addresses himself to the issue of corruption, states that the proselytizers were the first ones to give warning against it, and repeats his hope that he and all sincere proselytizers will stand alongside Mubarak in his battle against corruption.

"I Did Not Take a Position of Defiance"

AL-NUR: How was the decree transferring you to the Mosque of the Commander Ibrahim in 1975 carried out so easily, in spite of your defiance of the government and your threat /to operate/ a pushcart and sell lemons?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: I did make that threat, yes, but I did not defy the government or anything of that sort. Rather, I was the wronged party and the person who was in the right. The person who is in the right must shout a little. I did not say that I was being defiant--rather, I said that I would not resign and that I would leave it to them to act as they wanted, in accordance with what their

consciences dictated them to do. At that time I made this statement openly and said that the masses had offered me 10,000 pounds with which to get started on any project.

AL-NUR: Don't you consider that the fact that you have not returned to your mosque is no longer a personal problem but is connected to the reinstatement of all proselytizers who have been banished from their mosques?

SHAYKH al-Mahallawi: Indeed I do, and the situation seems perverse and strange. People who have not been found guilty of anything are then prevented from proselytizing. What did they do, then, and what is the reason? They have distinguished between truth and falsity. We have learned from our great Koran that the malicious and the good are not equal. However, the actual nature of what is happening has turned the situation we are faced with fluid and confused. When we find successful proselytizers who are not giving sermons, and proselytizers who are not up to the necessary level who are, we cannot tell what is right and what is wrong on the one hand, and on the other we complain that the mosques are empty and abandoned, and there are unceasing complaints about a religious void among young people, about the fact that there is an absence of imams in mosques, and about the shallow nature of what is being said in the mosques. All right, let them let the masses reject us or follow us and accept some of the things we say!

AL-NUR: What was the reaction to the decree banishing you from the pulpit, among the masses of people who have become attached to you?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: In reality, I am not devoted to provocation and chaos. When people have come I have told them, "Let me relax a little bit." Then they say, all right, until the atmosphere quiets down a little." Naturally, it is our task to keep hold of our mass following and not lose it or cause it to lose hope. At the same time, we appear before the ruler and state that we are not devotees of discord and provocation even though we have been oppressed!

AL-NUR: You say that you have not deviated from the proper conduct and that you did not vilify the person or home of the president. What, then, are the basic causes that led to your arrest?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: What happened after that gave me the right not to answer this question, because I was not the only person to be arrested. Let us assume that they arrested me because I attacked al-Sadat's home and his inviolable personal life; what about the other 1,536 people who were arrested? They said that was because of factional strife. All right--why were there communists among them? And what part did persons like Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din play in the factional strife? What has the role of the Labor Party or the Grouping Party?

AL-NUR: Let us turn the question around a little. Why did al-Sadat single you out for a personal attack in his speech after you were arrested, although he had also arrested the men in the opposition/ political leadership that then existed?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: I held opinions and views which were totally at variance with al-Sadat's. I considered that al-Sadat was personally responsible first and last

for all the corruption that existed in Egypt, and I still hold this view. This criticism, which I call counsel, can be found in most of my speeches, and it was directed at him personally. I addressed him personally, without equivocation. My supporting evidence for doing this was the fact that during the period of his rule many changes would be observed in the government and the People's Assembly. Many bodies were dissolved and others were established, and the gentleman was behind the selection of people and chose many of these for himself--while they were the active parties, he of course was the motive force. For this reason, it was not proper for me to criticize the ministers of supply, religious endowments, or health, or any other ministers; rather, the proper thing was for me to direct myself toward the fundamental point. Perhaps that caused him pain. Perhaps the criticism of others besides me, such as Shaykh Kishk, may God give him the best of rewards, was remote, and touched upon /only/ social aspects and so forth, while my criticism was directed against the president's political conduct, not his conduct at home. I did not get into his home, but in spite of that a slanderous phrase was uttered by him vilifying me, a phrase that a president does not utter regarding a person who is not just a man of religion but has also been treated wretchedly and has been wrongfully imprisoned by his orders and cannot defend himself. When he uttered this phrase it wounded the feelings of all Moslems, they felt that it was not right, and everyone around him also felt that. However, the latter wanted to justify what he had done and tell him that I had embarrassed him to the point where he had to be distressed to the point where he said what he said. What did they tell him? They said that al-Mahallawi said, regarding the first lady of Egypt, that she was the prime evil in Egypt and that that pronouncement of his was very common. I did not need to be defended, because all the tapes exist, and they are totally devoid of such slanderous statements, because that has not been my style at all. It is not proper to mention gossip about women in mosques and on pulpits, which all must observe high levels. However, the president's wife has been involved in public life, and it is necessary to criticize public life. As for her conduct in her home and her husband's home, and her personal conduct, we have nothing to do with that. If she had stopped at those limits, absolutely no one would have had the right to be critical. Nonetheless, I did not address myself to her in a personal way at all.

The Casual Discussions Occurred after the Friday Prayer

AL-NUR: What issues did you usually deal with in your sermons?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: My sermons were divided into two segments--and I am honored that the scholar al-Hamzah Da'bas has followed up on some of my sermons. One segment was /sermons/ on the pulpit before the Friday prayer. These were all concerned with the issues of Islam, religion and exegesis, since, through my followup sermons of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, before the Friday prayer, I found that these were focussed on religion and discussion of the hereafter, to the point where it was said that his companions memorized the Chapter of the Qaf as a consequence of the proliferation of things the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, would give sermons on on Fridays. That was my platform.

The second segment, which came after the Friday sermon, was just casual discussion. We would bring up all the newspapers, foremost among them the nationwide papers, or we would bring up the speeches of the president himself, because these embodied

the policies of the country and they concern us all. We would criticize what was written and said, would say "this is wrong in this and this area, and this is right in this and this area," and would set every issue out. On the subject of the rest houses, I said "I am pleased that the president has considered that the people are faced with a shortage and that he should give up rest houses he has so that the government can make use of them for public works. Let him keep two or three of them" I stated that at the sessions which we held. On the story of the mortgage on the Suez Canal, I said that history is almost repeating itself, but unfortunately, the people who were writing the reports were operating on the technique of /quoting the prophet as saying/ "don't go near prayer" and not completing the verse. They wanted to write reports not about the sermon but about the excesses that it contained. Let me record the fact here that this is not a proper technique in a country whose religion is Islam and whose form of government is Islam, and which acknowledges that Islam is the proper platform, that it is not a proper technique to conduct surveillance over proselytizers, especially in mosques; that should be done in symposia or in lectures, but in mosques, no.

Diplomatic Immunity for Proselytizers

AL-NUR: Don't you consider that the situation requires that proselytizers be given immunity as diplomats are?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: I embrace this totally. I have made this sort of statement in my mind and in the presence of sincere persons. Thanks be to God, the president himself supports this; I have demanded a union for imams, and he supports that also. I carried through with the notion of the union here in Alexandria, although it does not exist in as comprehensive a form as I could make it, because, due to my constant contact with security personnel, I would tell any imam when he was summoned by any precinct officer or intelligence officer, "Come let me know about it so I can go with you--let us not refrain from going or coming, but let us go in groups, in a manner which will preserve our respect and not hurt people's feelings. The defense a union gives is stronger than the defense of a single individual." Therefore immunity is very necessary. For the record, it will put greater responsibility on proselytizers, because it will not mean unlimited chaos, freedom or impulsiveness--rather, it will mean commitment and accountability, the most intensive accountability. Immunity does not protect persons who act wrongly; persons who are in the right should not worry about anything.

AL-NUR: Are you in favor of specific rules to which the proselytizers should commit themselves, such as keeping away from politics in the mosque, for instance?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: If we strip Islam of politics, this means that there is no Islam. The first statement the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, revealed was "There is no monasticism in Islam." Not just Islam--I do not want to accuse other religions and say, as some people do, that the religion of our lord Jesus was all commandments, as was the religion of our lord Moses. No, I do not believe that. Every religion has revealed a comprehensive system of life; God, as we know, can dispense with both worlds, and therefore he has set out only laws which are in the interests of human beings. Religion, in two words, means a system of living. Part of it we call ritual, and part of it we call morality. Let us

give the designations we like, in the areas where that is permissible, in the sense that if we act or do not act, we will do so only in accordance with the methods of Islamic law, since Islam has left us no field whatever on which it has not expressed an opinion.

Al-Sadat Did Not Rule through His Own Person

AL-NUR: Has there been any change in the style of government since you came out of the penitentiary?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: I can state most sincerely and truthfully and I have total conviction in what I say and will bear the responsibility for it if I am asked again, that al-Sadat governed not through his own person but through an apparatus. If I condemn al-Sadat that means, more accurately, that if we are convinced that al-Sadat's policies were to be condemned, the people who were with him and helped him must be condemned, even if they were carrying out his wishes on his behalf, because people like that do not know, because the people who are suitable are people who have been won over to a specific idea, policy and platform, so that, if the ruler tells them "this will not work," or if it becomes mandatory that he do such and such, he will be faced with two and only two things--he can either carry out his wishes on his behalf or he can tell him "Goodbye, I am not taking part in this." For this reason, the people who helped the president do what he did, which we consider to have been harmful to the country, must bear their share /of the blame/ for what they did. President al-Sadat chose the /members of the/ People's Assembly, and I have the right to say this because I was part of it, and neither Alexandria security nor any other agency can refute what I say on this. That assembly is still in existence. It is a legislative assembly whose work is very sensitive as far as the country's policies go, because it holds the government to account. In my opinion, there must be a complete change. The people who corrupted political life in al-Sadat's era--and the nationwide newspapers have said the same thing about them--must appear before ordinary judges and must be stripped of the power of the socialist prosecutor or the court of values.

/Question/ Has the Ministry of Religious Endowments played its part in defending the proselytizers' reinstatement in their mosques?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: I had expected that the Ministry of Religious Endowments would do something on our behalf. It has, and may God reward it bountifully.

AL-NUR: What has it done?

Shaykh Zakariya al-Barri: It condemned us in every way it could, especially when the doctor and sheikh Zakariya al-Barri, then minister of religious endowments, stood up and said that he had given us advice but we had not listened to it. I addressed him the day I was suspended from my job and told him, "Shaykh Zakariya, you are a man of religion, a man of Islam, and a venerable man, are you happy being a cat's paw? Are you happy standing over your brother's corpse and my children's livelihood?"

I Will Never Change My Platform or My Methods

AL-NUR: If you go back to your pulpit, will you change your method of speaking and proselytizing or will you adhere to your former style and platform?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: I tell people, "You have not condemned the methods I was pursuing through your judiciary, and if I return I will return to the same platform, the same methods, the same platform and the same approach /as before/. Proselytizers must be given the right to keep people from exploiting the pulpit to propagate their own ideas. By the way, I am very happy that news is being published about the minister of social affairs demanding that a review be made of the Personal Status Law, to which Shaykh 'Abd-al-Mun'im Nimir contributed. They wanted to enforce the law and asked the Ministry of Religious Endowments to bring the directors together in order to prepare public opinion /for it/, but the pulpits of the prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, must not be exploited to support the government's view. This is a form of behavior that I do not find satisfactory. Proselytizers are people who are the object of trust, not records or cassette tapes. Almighty glorious God did not reveal his Koran to people, tell them "Read it" and settle for that. Rather, he sent a prophet down along with it and told him, "We have revealed the /holy/ recitation to you so that you can show the people what has been revealed to them." That means that almighty glorious God is revealing legislation in the holy Koran and is revealing legislation from the sayings and doings of the prophet. Our lord says "Perform the prayer," and the prophet says "Perform the prayer as you see me performing it." On this basis, the sayings and doings of the human prophet complement divine religious law, while the Ministry of Religious Endowments assigns me to work as an imam then later asks me to become petrified or turn into a record.

This Law Is Unfair

AL-NUR: Have you heard about the law that was issued regarding proselytizers?

Shaykh al-Mahallawi: This law is unfair and must be changed. It will never be enforced. Why? Because if you read a chapter from the book of almighty, sublime God which talks about the people of the /holy/ book, I ought to be condemned according to the stipulations of that law. Do you want us to abandon the book of almighty, sublime God? According to this law, proselytizers are not permitted to address themselves to political matters, the policy of the government, or religions on the pulpit; otherwise, they will be subject to the force of the law. I pray to almighty God and tell them, "Come, give me something that I can testify is in violation of God's law and the sayings and doings of his prophet: this is my law." Assume that I have joined the Labor Party, for example; I will have the right to speak, to criticize and to engage in political activity. Then I ascend the pulpit and find that the law prevents me from doing any of that. How can I be given permission here but not be given permission there? There is another question: the government, through this law, puts proselytizers in a position of total paralysis and cowardice. It is thus arousing the masses against the government, since these masses consider that the government does not want the mosque to be faithful to its mission, and then leaves the television and radio in freedom.

Intimations by the Proselytizers

For the record, if the initial intimations on corruption made by these sincere proselytizers who were concerned about society had been taken to heart, there would be no crisis regarding 'Isamat al-Sadat or anyone else now. Thus the issue here is that proselytizers start to give the ruler warning of what is going to happen; if he wants to drown them, they will go underground and engage in secret activity and secret violence.

A second observation: When I told the security officials, "In the name of God, you are no more concerned about the country's interests than I am," and by the way, when I got out of prison and I found that the al-Jumruk District, the Mina' al-Basal District, was vacant, and I nominated myself as a candidate for it, they confronted me with every manner of threat, enticement and promise to keep me from that, I told them, "You have prevented me from speaking but don't prevent me from participating in my country's affairs, you are no more concerned about the country's interests than I am, give me a chance or convince me that I am wrong or a threat to security." Because of me, my son Mahmud, who had been an officer in the army and decided to join the army although he had acquired a bachelor's degree in commerce, had to leave. I have another son who went into the army as a draftee after finishing with the Faculty of Education. However, they threw him out too. I did not do anything except defend the country.

The fact is that if we address ourselves to the incident of the killing of al-Sadat, no one can pass judgment on the killing of al-Sadat, because al-Sadat killed himself when he muzzled people; but when we talked, or were making preparations for provocative acts as they say, nothing happened. Here I would like to point out that I have always tried to get close to words illegible and it does not concern me if they have got Eng Sayyid Mar'i to deny it--they show only the side they like, the critical side. How many telegrams of support I sent him! I even supported this initiative at the outset, though it has been rejected, and said that al-Sadat was taking peace away from Israel, which was always talking loudly about peace. Now Israel's face is to the wall, and what is it going to do with the peace? I supported him, and statements were issued in the name of the Federation of the Scholars of the Mosques of Alexandria. Then I sent him cables and told him, "Mr President, since you are meeting with all the various bodies, we would like you to meet with the imams." However, he did not answer. I consider that it is the religious scholars' duty to build bridges of cooperation and understanding with the ruler, and I am still prepared to do so. I am prepared, as all scholars are, to help support President Mubarak, as I said, in his war against the corruption we previously gave warning of and referred to, because our job is to order what is commendable and prohibit what is reprehensible, and Mubarak cannot wage the battle against corruption alone; rather, he will be able to perform the cleansing mission through the people and their devout, sincere proselytizers.

Finally, I would like to say that more than at any time in the past the situation demands that one hasten to apply Islamic law. Only through that can one stand up to political, religious and moral aberration and eliminate corruption and the people who wreak corruption on earth.

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CSO: 4504/120

ORIGINS, PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION REVIEWED

Causes of Corruption Studied

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 99, Oct 82 pp 119-127

/Article by Gen Muhammad Faruq 'Abd-al-Hamid/

/Text/ Preparatory Introduction

Manpower is considered to be one of the pillars of Egypt's national wealth. Egypt has a large human population which is increasing at high rates, and young and newly-emerging elements constitute the bulk of it. In spite of the burdens which the increasing population imposes on the domestic economy, it is nonetheless expressive of an inexhaustible source of Egyptian human resource, with all that signifies in terms of abundant manpower and all it provides in the form of increased productivity, support for the domestic economy, provision of opportunities to supply the Arab and African countries with the experts they require, and the increasingly significant foreign currency remitted to the country from its surplus wages, which has become one of the basic foundations of Egypt's financial resources.

While the increase in the population in Egypt at rates of up to 2.5 percent a year is an actual fact, along with the continuous efforts that have been exerted in the area of family planning, further efforts should be made to regulate the benefits provided from this tremendous volume of humanity in various economic spheres, so that massive human efforts can contribute to effective production and the country's economic growth and provide ways in which it can meet its various requirements. In light of the customs and traditions prevalent in our society, which have had an effect in limiting the results anticipated from the area of family planning, the efforts that are being made in the field of organizing manpower and raising its output must occupy a prominent status in national planning concerns, above the status given the concern shown to family planning, or at least parallel to it in degree and emphasis.

Public employees have represented the basic, main sector of productive manpower in Egypt, especially since the application of socialism in the sixties, which resulted in the formation of the public sector, with its numerous companies, which extended to cover industrial and commercial activity in the country and, at the same time, inflated the volume of manpower working in the government area.

This fact provides an important indication of the approach that efforts at organization and reform must take in the manpower field. A large share of this approach must be directed toward the sector of government employees, including people working in traditional governmental administrative units and public sector units alike.

A general survey of the condition of the administrative and government system indicates low productivity among government employees, widespread manifestations of bureaucracy and red tape in the activity of those employees, and the extension of that to the emergence of numerous manifestations of acts of administrative and criminal aberrance among people in the system, severely affecting performance efficiency in the service or productive fields the government agencies engage in. That constitutes one of the serious phenomena which are preoccupying the government's political and administrative leaders and have prompted many people to cry out forms of aberrance among government employees and to set forth plans which will aim at attaining administrative discipline and probity among people in the government sector.(1)

The starting point in bringing about the goal mentioned above is embodied fundamentally in the need to furnish a definition of elements that influence government employee's tendency to aberrance, as a fundamental means for ascertaining the real causes that lead to it and as an essential step for devising the best methods for remedying it. These will be effective in limiting various forms of aberrance by combating its causes in a radical manner. To the extent that success is achieved in identifying and considering the greatest possible number of these elements, when setting out plans to combat and treat the phenomenon, these plans will meet with effectiveness and when they are put into actual execution.

A general view of this issue will reveal the number of factors which are effective in driving government employees toward aberrant behavior. Some of these are connected to the administrative systems in effect, which suffer from an actual imbalanced in the distribution of labor among work sites or in the supervision and surveillance of these worksites. Some are connected to government policies applied in economic, social, military and political fields, on top of that there is the social environment in which the work is performed or in which government employees have emerged, that influences their performance of the job duties assigned to them.

In spite of the proliferation of the influential factors noted above that affect government employees, who are individual human beings, the factors all come together and flow in a single channel, which passes through these employees, becomes intermixed with their reactions, motives and material and moral requirements and emerges in the form of a specific pattern of bad or aberrant conduct, in accordance with the direct effects these factors have had on the employees themselves, prompting them to follow behavior patterns they consider to be compatible with the desires, aspirations and hopes articulated within themselves.

From this point of departure, no discussions in the realm of aberrant conduct by government employees can ignore this fundamental dimension; otherwise these discussions will be marked by superficiality and remoteness from reality. Therefore, a positive effort to ascertain the psychological factors that prompt aberrant conduct among government employees and the various outside elements which influence

the formation of these factors becomes the cornerstone for attaining true, correct results in this field. It is something which one cannot avoid if we wish the plans and methods of treatment to be effective and successful, since at that point they will have the goal of treating the causes before addressing themselves to the cause, and this will ultimately enhance the possibilities of eliminating aberrance from the ground up and will bring about the results sought from the plans for remedying it.

On the basis of this introduction, we can subdivide this study into the following headings:

First, a review of the results of psychological studies in determining factors which have an effect in building human conduct in general.

Second, an analytical study of crimes of embezzlement and dissemination of the conclusions they have reached.

Third, a definition of modern psychological factors that influence government employees' tendencies to act aberrantly.

Fourth, the recommendations that must be taken into consideration in drawing up plans for combatting different forms of aberrant conduct in government positions.

In this article, we will proceed to review the first and second headings, and will deal with the third and fourth in a coming article.

First Investigation: Factors Influencing Aberrant Human Behavior

Human behavior, before it emerges into the realm of external reality, goes through numerous psychological stages which affect its formation and strongly intervene in the selection of its tendencies and character. Psychological studies have come up with a number of basic principles which govern the formation of human behavior in general. These studies underline the role and effect of human needs on conduct. Criminological studies underline the factors influencing the individual's tendency to deviate toward criminality.

As we stated previously in the preparatory introduction to this investigation, the conclusions that the various branches of psychology and criminology have reached directly serve the goal of identifying the psychological and neurological elements which influence the aberrant behavior of government employees. We will review the most important results that have been attained in this field under the following three headings:

First, basic principles governing human conduct.

Two, the role of human needs in guiding conduct.

Three, factors influencing the formation of criminal tendencies in conduct.

One: Basic Principles Governing Human Conduct

Freud, in the course of his initial research work on psychoanalysis in 1895, formulated a number of basic principles governing the directions Human conduct assumes. He then proceeded to develop his formulations, adding new principles to them in the period which followed his research in 1920. One can summarize the results that psychological studies have arrived at in this field by confining the basic principles to which human conduct is subject to the enunciation of several major principles, namely:

1. The principle of a balance of attitudes. (2)

Psychological studies show that the human psyche is constantly subject to nervous tension, whenever it is faced with material of psychological desires which basically issue forth from human instincts, which constitute one of the genuine states of mankind. Thus instincts are considered the basic source of the numerous tensions and desires the psyche feels.

Analytical studies of the phenomenon of innate psychological tension have concluded by breaking the phenomenon down into three interconnected stages--first, the stage of innate physical excitation, which is the source of the tension, followed by the emergency of the desire to curb this excitation, a stage which represents the goal of human conduct, after which human conduct arises in the form of freely chosen human behavior aimed at attaining and satisfying desires. (3)

It is a requirement of the principle of balance that people are constantly aiming to reduce the tensions they are subject to to the greatest possible degree, in order to keep them in as stable a state as possible. Their means to achieve this is to guide their conduct in a fixed direction toward the satisfaction of desires that cause psychological tensions, as a way to release their constantly increasing pressures and bring them back to the stable level to which they are accustomed.

On this principle, innate desires, whether connected to life and survival or defense against threats, must be coped with by positive human conduct so that they may be satisfied, no matter how great the human progress in the fields of education and acculturation and in the refinement of one's instincts might be. The psychological tension arising from the emergence of innate desires must be satisfied in a manner which brings the tension back to its ordinary, stable level.

2. The pleasure-pain principle.

This principle is related to the principle of stability described above. All psychological tension resulting from innate desires causes the individual to feel a kind of sensation which ranges from physical or psychological pain to a countervailing reaction of overwhelming pleasure, as a result of the satisfaction of the desire and a reduction of the intensity of the accompanying psychological tension.

The inevitable result of this principle is that people rush out to respond to their desires, provoked by two pressures which though opposed result in compelling

them to pursue a specific course of action which makes it possible for them to satisfy these desires. Both the pressure resulting from the pain derived from the psychological tension and the pressure resulting from the desire to obtain probable pleasure ultimately lead to the tendency of the individual to respond to his desires and gratify his needs.

3. The principle of learning.

This principle postulates the notion that human beings' knowledge of their true condition, with all the restrictions, customs and behavior patterns associated with that in various situations, affects their choice of the appropriate time for satisfying their desires in a stable, safe manner. That prompts them to endure the painful psychological tension that results from their desires, up to specific limits, until they are granted an opportunity to satisfy them in a safe, sound manner. That principle leads to discrimination among patterns of thinking and preparation for a specific mode of conduct aimed at gratifying the desire in one of various realistic ways. This is fundamentally connected to specific types of phantasy that are far removed from reality.

The actual states produced by this principle constitute a sort of rule which the individual may impose on his conduct to the end of attaining the various desires his psyche requires. That to a great extent depends on the power of the knowledge that has been attained and the degree of force with which the desire is linked to instinct. There are innate desires whose gratification an individual cannot delay, no matter how high his level of learning might be. That is also strongly connected to the extent to which the individual's thinking is in sound balance during the stage when he is preparing to choose the appropriate mode of conduct between reality and phantasy, and that becomes a part of the determination of numerous factors which may lead to the emergence of a disruption in balance which could result in pressures aimed at severe repression or lengthy deprivation. These elements constitute weak points in the person's psychological makeup that prompt him to choose modes of behavior which are totally removed from balanced reality and to throw all precautions and prohibitions to the wind.

4. The principle of repetition.

People, through their instincts, tend to repeat the conduct which they have tested out in previous actual situations; they repeat such behavioral experiences in their minds and bring them to mind when analogous desires are repeated and they find themselves driven to follow the same behavior in a manner which is marked by a kind of compulsion under which it is difficult to turn toward another form of conduct which is at variance with the powerful experience which the person has achieved through previous practice. This result is attained regardless of the benefits or harm derived from such repetitions.

On the basis of this principle, people might be compelled to repeat wrongful conduct in an unconscious manner in order to satisfy certain instinctive needs or cope with a number of ramifications which are concomitant with their conduct, even if such conduct is far removed from the actual ground of reality, as long as they find a form of gratification for these desires in their behavior.

Two: The Role of Needs in Guiding Conduct

1. Stages of the formation of behavior.

Behavior is generally known as the overall combination of physiological, psychological and physical acts which individuals who live in specific environments perform in an attempt to resolve the tensions that various factors create in their psyche. (5) Behavior, in this broad sense, reaches out to include moments of thought and decisionmaking aimed at choosing modes of conduct, whether that conduct is verbal or physical or simply confined to negative abstention from behaving in a specific manner.

Human behavior passes through a number of stages in the period of its formation. It generally starts with the stage of the formation of the instinct which produces a specific mode of behavior. This is a stage in which a desire which demands to be satisfied emerges, creating a form of psychological tension which in turn must be reduced if one is to alleviate the pain that results from it in accordance with the principles of balance and pleasure described above.

The stage of the formation of the instinct and the emergence of the desire (that is, the psychological tension) is followed by the stage of the person's quest for the appropriate means for satisfying this desire. This stage is entered in accordance with the force of the instinctual craving connected to the desire that is to be satisfied and the degree of balance between reality and phantasy which the individual has attained. That point, as we see it, is connected to the degree of education and refinement of instincts and the dominance of higher security /sic/ over lower security in the individual's psyche, in addition to the types of actual experience the individual has gone through, which might prompt him to choose a specific form of behavior toward which he is drawn by force of habit and repetition.

After finding the appropriate means for satisfying the desire, the individual acts to bring his mode of behavior into being, thereby making efforts to achieve his basic goal, which is to satisfy his instinctive desires in order to arrive at a reduction of his psychological tension, which is accompanied by pain, and to reduce strain in order to restore his psychological balance and obtain the pleasure that is likely to accompany the gratification.

2. The role of needs in guiding conduct.

Instincts which prompt people to develop a certain form of conduct become apparent in the form of needs which assume various forms. These are accompanied by psychological reactions, one result of which is the emergence of psychological tension. On that basis, various needs are considered to be the prime motive force in the individual's behavior and the starting point which intervenes directly in timing the emergence of conduct and the selection of the means, type, and directions of this conduct.

When an individual's need for a certain object comes into being, psychological tension begins simultaneously to arise, and continues to grow in intensity as long as the need is not satisfied. During specific periods of extreme tension, the

Individual's efforts are directed toward satisfying his need, following a set mode of conduct which is in harmony with legitimate courses of action for satisfying one's needs. However, after a specific period, with the increases in the intensity of the tension as a result of the failure of efforts to satisfy the need, the individual's conduct begins to turn from the context of normal, legitimate modes of behavior toward irregular conduct which constitutes a departure from recognized means, in an attempt to find the desired satisfaction. (6)

When the pressure of the psychological tension arising from the unsatisfied needs reaches this stage, the person suffers from the onset of a new psychological stage which is characterized by the emergence of an element of frustration produced by the failure to satisfy the needs. This causes the person to enter into a stage in which he loses his psychological health, and his behavior, in the quest for the desired gratification, assumes irregular forms and a lack of balance, to the point where, on some occasions, as his psychological tension becomes more extreme along with the pressure of the ungratified need, it prompts him to lose self control and tend toward aggressive behavior, withdraw from all activity, or collapse into a state of dejection which prompts him to take a negative approach in all his behavior. (7)

The proliferation of unsatisfied needs leads to an escalating increase in the degree of psychological tension resulting from the failure to satisfy these needs, an increase in the person's internal psychological struggle as a result of the fragmentation of his efforts to seek the gratification of all of them, and an increase in the degree of frustration. Their negative effects are a function of the types of failures in the gratification process; the failure becomes more extreme if the needs that are to be gratified lie within the context of legitimate healthy needs which everyone agrees contribute to the development of the personality of the individual and his attainment of self-realization. (8)

From this one may reach the summary conclusion that needs, since they constitute the external manifestation of human instincts, play a prominent role in guiding people's behavior and in selecting means and approaches of aberrant behavior, according to the degree to which the individual succeeds in satisfying them and reducing the psychological tension derived from their emergence.

Three: Factors Inducing People's Conduct to Deviate in the Direction of Crime

The preceding review of the results of the studies of psychology and psychoanalysis bring us to the conclusion that individuals' failure to gratify their needs has an effect in creating direct disruptions in their conduct, driving them to deviate in the direction of a tendency to act aggressively and depart from balanced conduct. In this field, criminology offers other dimensions, which reveal a number of factors that contribute to the formation of criminal tendencies and prepare opportunities for people's conduct to deviate in the direction of crime.

These factors may be generally broken down into internal factors connected to the psyche of the individual and his physical makeup, foremost among them factors of heredity, genetics, sex, age, addiction to drugs and affliction with various diseases or moral perversions, and external factors which are connected to the milieu

in which the individual lives. They all play a role in nurturing the causes which drive individuals' psychological instincts to pursue roads toward crime. (9)

Studies conducted in the field of the effects of external factors on conduct have unearthed a number of important facts which are of use in the approach this research is taking. Foremost among them are the following: (10)

1. Malnutrition results in aberrant behavior, the departure of behavior from orderly routine, and the propensity to commit crimes of beggary and theft.
2. Unsanitary housing affects the individual's physical and psychological makeup and drives him toward aberrant behavior.
3. The prevailing economic situation produces pressures that are effective in guiding individual conduct, through the ungratified needs it may create.
4. The fragmentation of the family or disruptions in relations among the members of the family result in a direct influence on the psychological makeup of the individual, shaking his stability and nervous equanimity and provoking his behavior to manifest disturbance and aberrance.

In this regard, it is our concern to underline the fact that the preceding are all related to one fundamental factor, which is embodied in disruption of the economic balance in the individual's financial condition. These add to its effect, creating the other factors which are connected to malnutrition, a lack of appropriate housing and the fragmentation of the family. Indeed, disruptions in the economic situation which are connected to general economic distress, or are restricted to certain groups of people, constitute a motive for committing crimes of theft and embezzlement, "since at that point it is hard for people to find ways to meet their basic requirements, resources become scarce, the distribution of resources is disrupted, resources become hard to obtain and the force of instinctual need rebels against the call of reason, so that all the ways in which the individual may satisfy his needs become unattainable, except theft or other financial crimes." (11)

There is no doubt that the confluence of the abovementioned factors creates a climate which is suitable for the emergence of further ungratified needs in individuals and provides an opportunity for the increased psychological tension that arises from continuous lack of gratification. That ultimately pushes individuals into a circle of psychological frustration and aberrance which, if exaggerated, could reach the point where the most serious aggressive crimes are committed against persons or property.

To complete laying emphasis on these scientific facts, in order to round out the sum total of the data which will illuminate the path so that one can arrive at the concomitant psychological factors that lead to aberrance in government employees, we must shed light on the analytical data of a group of crimes which have been set down in embezzlement and bribery records, in order to extract the greatest possible number of objective indices which an analytical study of the statistics on this sort of crime can provide. We will deal with this in detail in the second investigation in the study.

Second Investigation: Analytical Study of the Crimes of Embezzlement and Bribery Recorded in the Years 1960-80

In an attempt to examine actual conditions in the field of aberrant conduct by government employees, we will, in the course of this investigation, try to shed light on two of the most serious forms of deviation, namely, the crimes of embezzlement and bribery, with the objective of obtaining information which, following an analysis of the volume of each, and an analysis of the persons who were accused of and arrested for them, will lead to conclusions that will undoubtedly contribute to one's knowledge of the psychological factors that provoke deviant conduct among government employees. We will deal with an analytical study in three segments. We will present, in the first segment, an analysis of the volume of crimes of embezzlement; in the second, we will present an analysis of the volume of crimes of bribery; in the third we will deal with an analysis of a group of persons accused of and arrested for both types of crimes.

First, an analysis of the volume of crimes of embezzlement.

Crimes of embezzlement in the period 1960-80 totalled 6,689 cases.

The recorded total of crimes of embezzlement in the period 1960-80 was 1,708 cases.

In the period 1965-70, the number of these crimes rose, reaching its peak; 2,637 instances of the crime were recorded then. The incidence of this crime dropped in the period 1970-75, when 1,232 cases of the crime were recorded. It then registered a drop in the period 1975-80, totalling 652 cases. (12)

The great upsurge recorded by crimes of embezzlement in the mid-sixties may be ascribed to the fact that the broad nationalization process began then. It added numerous diverse elements to the public property sector, extending the character of public designations to people working in agencies that had been nationalized and putting the thefts of money entrusted to them they had committed in the context of crimes of embezzlement, increasing the number of such crimes.

In addition to this cause, the emergence of the public sector, along with the concomitant processes of putting nationalized property under the jurisdiction of the new agencies, was accompanied by the occurrence of many attempts at embezzlement, where the opportunity offered by instability in the systems of oversight and review in these agencies on the one hand and the instability of traditional methods of dealing with them during this transitional period on the other were exploited.

While the curve on the number of instances of embezzlement shows that their number has declined, the size of the sums and objects that have been embezzled indicates that the value of the property embezzled has grown year by year. That may be attributed to the fact that administrative bodies content themselves with disposing of many acts of embezzlement by administrative means and do not hand accused persons over to the investigative authorities, while, in the case of certain others, the office of the Public Prosecutor contents itself with administrative punishment, while administratively reserving the criminal records. These records all lie within the context of the current statistics on the losses resulting from embezzlement

which the Central Accounting Agency prepares; these show the true dimensions of the phenomenon of embezzlement and its actual rising trend in terms of the enormity and gravity of the financial losses it produces, subjecting public funds to usurpation. (13)

This fact also leads to another important aspect, which is embodied in trends in embezzlement activities taking place at the present time toward a type of aberrant conduct in which the aberrant individual, through his methods, aims at embezzling the greatest possible amount of public property in accordance with a strategy where the number of items of evidence is reduced even though the volume of the funds embezzled increases. This point shows how critical are the behavior of the aberrant person and his tendencies in this direction, which reaches the point where the crime of embezzlement ceases to be a mere spontaneous activity and turns into a sort of careful plan which demands a certain amount of thinking and manipulation reflecting the accused person's insistence on committing his crime and his perseverant efforts to bring it off one way or another.

Second, an analysis of the volume of crimes of bribery.

In the period 1960-80, 2,982 crimes of bribery were recorded. These crimes were concentrated in the urban governorates of Egypt (Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and al-Isma'iliyah), where the bulk of government employees are generally concentrated. This fact reveals the proper approach to take in the realm of carrying out reform plans and defining accurate methods of supervision and oversight.

Breaking down the crimes of bribery which were recorded during this time into 5-year periods (1960-65, 1965-70, 1970-75 and 1975-80), one can observe a perceptible drop in the number of crimes of bribery in recent years in comparison with earlier periods. In the period 1960-65, the total number of recorded crimes of bribery came to 1,015; this dropped to 367 in the period 1975-80. This development inspires one's amazement, because it contradicts the actual state of affairs and the statements officials are making to the effect that it is necessary to combat the spread of the phenomena of laxity, activity by middlemen and patronage. We can find no justification for this statistical contradiction, but it might be attributable to the fact that this sort of activity has turned into an ordinary pursuit that neither party needs to record. This numerical drop may also be ascribed to the elimination of the major oversight agency which had been assigned to crack down on these occurrences--that is, the Administrative Surveillance Agency.

In general, statistics in this area offer no sort of picture of the current state of affairs, with respect to this sort of deviant behavior, for the reasons that have been raised, which in themselves constitute a trend that is of some gravity--that of a state of affairs where crime is being transformed into ordinary conduct that does not provoke any kind of uneasiness or guilty conscience in the spirits of the people who venture upon it but manifests itself as a sort of acquired right or indirect tax that is added automatically to goods or services, which the government employee seeks to collect as a sort of fair compensation for the meager salary and other material benefits it is his lot to receive..

Third, an analytical study of the persons accused of crimes of bribery and embezzlement.

The number of people accused of and arrested for crimes of embezzlement and bribery in all governorates of the country in the past 9 months of 1981 (14) came to 85. That number is almost equivalent to the number of people accused of and arrested for such crimes in all of 1980; at the same time it offers an indication of the extent to which the growth of the phenomenon of aberrant conduct in general has accelerated.

Herewith we will offer an analysis of a group of accused and arrested persons which will categorize them in terms of age, sex, social status, educational levels, and professions in the following detail:

1. Analyzing the accused persons by age categories, it becomes evident that among them there were:

No accused persons less than 20 years of age.

23 accused persons between 20 and 30.

33 accused persons between 30 and 40.

12 accused persons between 40 and 50.

11 accused persons between 50 and 60.

One accused person over 60.

Five accused persons whose age was not stated.

From this information, it is clear that aberrant conduct is concentrated in the group between 30 and 40 years of age, which is characterized by the fact that the employees in it have increased burdens and responsibilities and family duties.

2. Analyzing the accused persons by sex, it becomes apparent that among them there were:

80 male accused persons.

Five female accused persons.

That indicates a high level of males in the group of accused persons, as a result of the fact that social traditions in our country still place the burden of meeting family requirements on the husband, not to mention the fact that the number of male employees is very large compared with females.

3. Analyzing the accused persons by personal status, it is evident that among them there were:

68 accused persons who were married.

13 accused persons who were single.

One accused person who was a widower.

Three accused persons whose status was not stated.

That shows a high level in the proportion of married persons among the accused, indicating a connection between these aberrant acts and the pressures arising from family burdens.

4. Analyzing the accused persons on the basis of their family status /sic/ it becomes evident that among them there were:

16 accused persons who were illiterate.
30 accused persons who had received a primary education.
Five accused persons who had received a preparatory education.
19 accused persons who had received a secondary education.
Nine accused persons who had received a higher education.
Six accused persons whose status was not shown.

From this it appears that there is automatically a high level among people with low educational levels and a noticeably high level among people with an intermediate education.

5. Analyzing the people by professions, it becomes apparent that among them there were:

47 accused persons whose affiliation with either the government or public sector was not stated.
Five accused persons who were merchants.
17 accused persons who were public employees.
Two accused persons who were guards.
14 accused persons who were public sector employees.

From this it becomes evident that the analysis fails to provide the necessary indices especially as far as ascertaining the degree of aberrant conduct in the public sector goes.

6. Analyzing the people in accordance with their religions, it becomes apparent that among them there were:

78 accused persons who were Moslems.
Four accused persons who were Christians.
Three accused persons whose religion was not stated.

That is in keeping with the breakdown of the population in Egypt by religion, although it does not give a specific ratio in this regard.

From the preceding analytical review, the following facts become apparent:

1. Most of the arrested accused persons were married, which perforce indicates that there is a relationship between features of aberrant behavior and the pressures of economic conditions and family burdens.
2. Most of the accused persons who were arrested were people who did not complete their education, which indicates that aberrant conduct is concentrated among people in low or intermediate positions on the administrative ladder which are held by people at that educational level and offer low wages--increasing the burdens the people in these positions bear in the form of pressures of family responsibilities.

3. A high proportion of male to female accused persons. That indicates the same psychological pressures in this group, since the bulk of the responsibility of meeting family requirements devolves upon them, in accordance with the general nature of the social traditions prevalent in our present era.

4. The analysis did not offer a clear indication on the breakdown of aberrant groups by public and government sector units because of a statistical inadequacy which handicapped the description of professions in this area, although the amount of confirmed data the analysis did offer indicates that the proportion is nearly the same in the case of both sectors.

This analytical study confirms that the phenomenon of aberrant behavior in the government sector is being accelerated, as it emphasizes the constant increase in the value of the property that is embezzled and the proliferation of cases of bribery that are defected, in the context of crimes of which the judiciary seizure agencies have been informed. If to that we add the number of crimes that have not been discovered, or have been discovered but where the authorities of the relevant department contented themselves with imposing administrative penalties on offenders without venturing to file public suits, in addition to other types of manifestations of aberrant conduct which do not reach the stature of crimes, the gravity and immensity of the phenomenon will immediately become apparent.

Thus a state of affairs is revealed which immediately underlines the pressing need to seek a successful, effective remedy if one is to cope with this chronic ailment and stop the serious growth of this phenomenon, which, above all else, threatens public property, in a country where economic growth in most areas depends on the proper use and nurturing of this property. It is this point that we will seek to find the proper answer to in the next article.

Footnotes.

1. Speech by the president to the People's Assembly on the occasion of his assumption of the duties of his position.

2. Daniel (Lagash), "Collected Works on Psychoanalysis," translated by Mustafa Zayyur and 'Abd-al-Salam al-Qaffash, 32 ff.

3. Daniel (Lagash), op cit., p 45.

4. Daniel (Lagash), op cit, p 36.

5. Daniel (Lagash), op cit., p 71.

6. Dr Sayyid Khayrallah, "Human Psychology," 1974, p 112.

7. Dr Sayyid Khayrallah, op cit., p 123.

8. Dr Sayyid Khayrallah, op cit., p 128.

9. Dr Ramsis Bihnam, "Criminology," p 66.

10. Dr Ramsis Bihnam, op cit., pp 70 ff.
11. Dr Ramsis Bihnam, op cit., p 91.
12. "Annual General Security Report," 1980, Ministry of Interior.
13. Central Accounting Agency report.
14. "Compendium of Analytical Criminal Statistics for the First 9 Months of 1981," issued by the General Security Department.

Administrative Oversight Defects Discussed

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 724, 29 Nov 82 pp 10-14

/Article by Kamal Jaballah and 'Imad Ghunaym/

/Text/ The economic crimes that have manifested themselves recently have been an object of concern to the public. Perhaps the basic characteristic common to crimes of corruption, revelations of which have been occurring in succession since the beginning of this year, is that all /the people involved in them/ are millionaires but started out in life either poor or as minor officials. Also, the period of time in which these people moved from the limited income class to millionaire status was no more than 10 years! Such names have shone forth as those of:

Rashad 'Uthman, Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy, various wholesalers and drug dealers, and finally 'Ismat al-Sadat. The phenomenon which draws one's attention is the fact that the elements of these cases do not consist of crimes of embezzlement, bribery, theft, or depredation; rather, the cases have yielded up totally new elements, such as transgressions against government property, trafficking in government foreign currency revenues, irresponsible importation procedures, tax and customs evasion, profiteering and black market dealings. While the investigations that have gone on and are going on now assume a political form, and while some of these people have been detained and penalties have been imposed on some others, the question this article will seek to answer is:

What guarantee is there that this phenomenon will not be repeated? What position do the surveillance agencies and their officials take regarding the disclosure of corruption and the persecution of aberrant persons? Will the change in climate help the disclosure and prosecution of this corruption? These are questions which we are putting before people in administration, economic activities and the judiciary, and responsible officials in the surveillance agencies!

Dr Husayn Ramzi Kazim, the first deputy chairman of the Central Organization and Management Agency, says, "The most important problems affecting the low level of efficiency in external surveillance throughout the government, which results in encouraging aberrant behavior among some people, is the proliferation of and contradiction or overlap among laws and bills and, on some occasions, the fact that they have not evolved to keep up with developments in society. For instance, laws were set out many years ago and still are in force which might not be suitable for

use at the present time. These laws might contain many loopholes which give the people subject to them an opportunity to act deviously and aberrantly. The government's method for remedying the deficiencies in these laws has been to tend to amend them partially. This has resulted in the emergence of other laws which are not integrated or in harmony with the remaining laws, and this in turn has led to the emergence of new contradictions among these laws, which were issued not as the result of realistic field studies of what is going on in the society and the extent to which it is possible to enforce these laws."

He adds, "If the goal was to seek to strengthen surveillance in all fields in order to prevent aberrant conduct and the exploitation of public property or positions, one must, first of all, clearly define the oversight agencies that are concerned with oversight and the control of aberrant conduct and define the areas of specialization which each agency engages in and the type of oversight it performs."

A Legislative Revolution

Dr Kazim considers that it is necessary to develop all the existing laws regulating oversight agency activity, define areas of specialization in order to prevent duplication and conflict, and seek to establish coordination and integration among them, while furnishing legal and procedural provisions that will enable oversight agencies to enforce laws so that they will not be mere ink on paper or mute stipulations that cannot be carried out because there are no agencies or procedures to give them the accuracy and speed they need to rule on violations and aberrant behavior. Dr Husayn Kazim adds, "If we want to present ourselves with a clear goal which we can try to reach through this legislative revolution, let us remember what President Mubarak asked of political executive leaders--that they demonstrate force and seriousness in their work and the examples they set, for all citizens are equal before the law and our standard is probity and seriousness, not frivolity, waywardness or contempt for the minds of the masses."

From a review of the economic crimes that have been unearthed recently, it appears that a large proportion of them involve what is called public property. In the records on recent cases, we can find transgressions against government land and property, interference in the international and local bidding procedures the government carries out, the unrightful use of easy loans, and other forms of conduct that impinge on public property.

National Morality

On these transgressions, Mustafa Kamil Mansur, the first deputy chairman of the Central Accounting Agency, says that the protection of public property cannot be restricted to the codification of legislation and the strengthening of oversight agencies, if the personal element of ordinary citizens and their role in protecting public property are neglected at the same time. The issue depends first of all on morality, the examples that dominate in the society, and the general climate in the government, followed by the role of legislation and the oversight agencies.

He adds, "The eternal problem public property in Egypt is suffering from is one of ownership, in the sense that the government is embodied in the ownership of public

institutions. The system by which the representation of government ownership is effected has remained a serious weak point in the economic structure in past years, and the time has now come for the form of this ownership to be clarified, especially now that we are intending to discuss a new public sector management plan." He says, "This form of ownership must be carefully defined and the body representing the government in the ownership of institutions must have broad powers to manage public property, after which it can be held accountable for any disturbances that may occur as a result of its management of these companies."

Internal Surveillance

He adds, "After the form of ownership is clearly defined, the most important ways of limiting opportunities for speculating in public property will be for executive agencies immediately to start consolidating the internal surveillance within their institutions so that government officials in various places can develop the habit of playing their surveillance role in 'controlling' activity in the government system and the public companies.

"Following this, there is the role of the external surveillance agencies, such as the Central Accounting Agency and the Administrative Surveillance Agency." In the case of the Accounting Agency, he says, "That agency is concerned with auditing public property accounts in accordance with documents and records. In the event disturbances or aberrations are discovered, the agency notifies the judiciary agencies so that they can take charge of investigating them. However, the agency's role is confined to pointing up phenomena, and does not extend to persons. Rather, this burden lies on the Administrative Surveillance /Agency/, which recently started functioning again; this can make an effective contribution in unearthing aberrant acts to which public property might be subjected."

Mustafa Kamil Mansur points out that some laws emerged in recent years which allowed public companies to take part in establishing other companies along with the private sector; one instance of this is the Investment Law. These laws have prevented the Accounting Agency's auditors from conducting surveillance over their activity, but meanwhile we consider that Accounting Agency surveillance must extend to public property, wherever it is, because the criterion is the nationality of the capital, not the legal form of its point of origin." He also is in favor of permitting the publication of Accounting Agency reports along with the agency's observations, in various countries, as is the case in other countries, so that this sort of publication can constitute a deterrent to people of weak character who are thinking of playing with public property.

A Negotiating Authority

As far as the transgressions that occur in the procedures for assigning government work to domestic and foreign companies go, the deputy head of the Accounting Agency says that resolving these transgressions could be effected by establishing a negotiating authority which could be subsidiary to the Ministry of International Cooperation in order to supervise international bidding, select the best offers, determine if they are serious, and follow up on the execution of the work assigned to

them. In this area, one could seek the aid of prominent consulting firms to help the government choose the best companies to pursue the activities the government needs.

As regards disbursing foreign loans and coping with the problems connected to them, he demands that there be a specific authority which will be responsible for disbursing those loans and following up on their execution to guarantee seriousness in their disbursement.

He says, "The phenomenon of influence-peddling, on which there has been much talk lately, does not require the codification of new laws so much as it requires seriousness and resoluteness in the enforcement of existing laws, in order that the phenomenon may be eliminated, because, when it becomes aggravated, it represents the most serious threat facing various nations, especially those that are striving to develop and progress!"

As regards customs duties, Husayn Amin, chairman of the Customs Department, says that there is no direct relationship between economic crimes and customs receipts, because these receipts consist of direct taxes imposed on imports which are paid directly or in accordance with reasonable financial guarantees. Therefore, speculation in paying these duties is almost nonexistent, as far as individuals and the private sector go. Although some problems exist in the collection of customs duties from the government and the private sector, that is not the focal point of the discussion on duties, because they are connected to government accounts.

Exemptions

The chairman of the Customs Department adds "There might be an indirect relationship between crimes of property and economic crimes and their effect on customs receipts /which are foregone/ for purposes other than those for which exemptions are decreed. In recent years I have witnessed the emergence of a number of laws permitting organizations subject to these laws to be exempted from paying customs duties on imports. For example, there are the laws on tourist activity, investment and new communities. After these exemptions have been applied for a period, in the context in which the market is now functioning, it has become apparent that these organizations are given an opportunity to put the imports exempted from customs duties to use for purposes other than those for which the exemptions were decreed.

"Therefore, the Customs Department, and a large number of financial and economic conferences, demand that these exemptions and their usefulness to the domestic economy be reviewed and that they be guided in a manner which will be in keeping with the course of activity in these organizations and will allow the government to keep its share of the taxes on these imports, so that these laws will not constitute loopholes for tax evasion and consequently lead to economic crimes!"

Smuggling, Smuggling

"The free markets, in particular Port Said, constitute an area through which adventurers and greedy persons can by various means smuggle imports into the

republic without paying customs duties. To that end, the Customs Department has recommended that a number of measures be adopted to control the departure of goods from the free zones. Among these measures are the imposition of customs duties on imports which are easily smuggled from the ports!"

Husayn Amin points out that one of the activities that are considered to be economic crimes which have an effect on the government treasury's customs receipts is the pursuit some people engage in of bringing foreign goods through avenues other than the normal government ones, thereby exploiting the country's long borders with Libya, the Sudan and Israel, in addition to the sea. Eliminating this problem will require that the efforts of a number of bodies, headed by the security agencies, be consolidated, in order to put a stop to this approach which some adventurous persons resort to, which has a negative effect on public property as well as causing other economic damage.

All the above views are ideas presented by experts and people involved in administration and finance to enable us to limit the occurrence of economic crime. There remains another aspect, which is no less important than the efforts aimed at prevention. This starts after the crime has occurred and involves the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the law. How does the public prosecutor view economic crime?

Providing Support for the Specialized Prosecutors' Offices

Counsellor 'Atif Zaki, the public prosecutor, says that the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the agencies subordinate to that receive the cases that are conveyed to them and investigate them at once. The most important of these cases are those related to embezzlement and the appropriation of public property. The Law on Criminal Procedures permits the public prosecutor to retain the property and belongings of accused persons if there is sufficient proof of the validity of the charge. It is permissible to consider the incident a misdemeanor or simply to subject the accused to disciplinary punishment, and, if the Office of the Public Prosecutor considers that the incident does not constitute any felony, it has the right to reserve the case, as happened with Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid, Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir and Na'im Abu Talib. If administrative violations have occurred, the Office of the Public Prosecutor notifies the administrative body involved so that it may adopt the measures it considers appropriate.

The public prosecutor added that the specialized prosecutors' offices, such as the Higher Office of the Prosecutor of Public Funds, the Office of the Prosecutor of Financial and Commercial Affairs and the Office of the Prosecutor to Combat Tax Evasion, receive numerous cases, investigate them and have absolute freedom in adopting the appropriate judiciary measures. Although there are competent persons in these specialized prosecutors' offices, they need support if they are to carry through with the cases imposed upon them, which are of great importance, and to keep up with the development and proliferation of economic activity in recent judiciary calendar years. These agencies will be given support in future judiciary activity. In order for the Office of the Public Prosecutor to be able to protect public property and the government's rights, it will be necessary to support and revive other oversight agencies. For example, the Unlawful Gain Agency needs

an auxiliary agency which would be available full time to examine and bring out the facts in citizens' statements, because a person who is an embezzler cannot declare that fact.

Therefore it is necessary to become acquainted with the work of the Unlawful Gain Agency. That is supposed to be one of the oversight important agencies investigating statements of wealth of government and public sector employees, members of the People's and Consultative Assemblies and private sector merchants who do not deal with the government or the public sector, though the most important group consists of government employees.

Unlawful Gain

Counsellor Rashad Mitwalli, chairman of the Unlawful Gain Agency, says that the agency's name is more inclusive than the scope of its jurisdiction since its activities are merely confined to examining declarations of government and public sector employees. Rather, another oversight /body/ must play its part alongside the Unlawful Gain Agency.

For example, 'Isamat al-Sadat, a businessman, was not subject to surveillance by the Unlawful Gain /Agency/; rather, other surveillance agencies, such as /those/ for the combat of tax evasion, the police and administrative surveillance ought to have been following his activity and its developments.

However, if you question some people about the status and activities of government employees, they might answer that the president and other officials present their declarations periodically and regularly and that the remaining government employees are most committed to presenting declarations on time. However, the odd thing for which we cannot yet find any justification is the fact that a special stipulation has been added on concerning merchants. Merchants who deal with the government and the public sector /in transactions/ of more than 50,000 pounds are requested to present a declaration to the Unlawful Gain Agency. There are many private sector merchants who deal in these figures, and more, but how can a declaration be submitted on every transaction? The solution, instead, is to look into the elements of the fortune at its point of origin only, and the development of these elements, without getting into the details stated in the declaration, so that no burdens will subsequently be placed on the merchant or the investigator.

While Law 62 for 1975 on unlawful gain is clear and explicit in spelling out who the persons who commit crimes are and what penalties they are subject to, the main criticism is to be directed at enforcement.

Different Aspects of Shortcomings in the System

Counsellor Rashad Mitwalli says that the Unlawful Gain Department has an exceptional elite of judiciary personnel but that it has yet to be provided a department which specializes in investigations or a judiciary police. This represents a pressing need which the agency has been raising with the persons concerned, so that justice may be achieved and the agency may perform its anticipated role. For example, the law makes it mandatory that a declaration be presented every 5 years,

and it stipulates penalties for people who are dilatory in doing so or who set down incorrect information. The agency cannot enter into people's consciences when they write out declarations. Thousands of complaints and fraudulent statements pour in, and the agency investigates their veracity. In view of the widespread vindictiveness and corruption of recent years, everyone's financial probity has become suspect, charges of bribery and theft have become the dominant theme in society, and citizens have started to take bold actions against the judiciary agencies. It is well known that if any law is properly executed it will realize the objectives expected of it. For example, the Rashad 'Uthman case: He was a member of the People's Assembly, and the crime of unlawful gain was proved against him. Therefore, he will be subjected to the full force of the law, now that the elements of his wealth have been examined and he has received notification from the competent agency.

In the Agency on Unlawful Gain there are 120 investigating committees, each one headed by a judiciary counsellor. The average number of declarations that are examined annually comes to 180,000.

Unlawful gain is considered to consist of any money that persons subject to the stipulations of the law acquire for themselves or for others as a result of exploitation or description /sic/ or as the result of conduct which is in violation of a legal penal stipulation or public morality.

The Administrative Surveillance /Agency/ is in charge of carrying out the research the Unlawful Gain Department assigns to it in accordance with the findings of the Investigation and Examination Authority, regarding cases of unlawful gain. If the investigation shows that strong suspicions of unlawful gain exist, the competent authority will submit the papers bearing on the president, vice presidents, members of the Council of Ministers and members of the People's Assembly to the People's Assembly, and anyone obtaining unlawful gain for himself or for others will be punished by imprisonment and a fine equal to the value of the unlawful gain. In addition, it will be ruled that that property must be returned.

In addition, anyone failing to submit financial obligation declarations by the stipulated dates will be punished by imprisonment and a fine of no less than 20 pounds and no more than 500 pounds. Anyone who purposely includes incorrect data in his declaration will be punished by imprisonment and a fine of no less than 100 pounds or more than 1,000 pounds.

People subject to the Law on Unlawful Gain must present their declarations in the January directly after the 5-year period following the submission of the previous declaration. The declaration must include the sources of increases in financial obligations.

Finally, we must refer to the Administrative Surveillance Agency, now that it has been put back into being. Broad hopes are being attached to this agency. As all people in charge of surveillance have pointed out, this agency plays a great part in unearthing aberrations and corruption, although some reservations exist on the on the fact that the agency is subordinate to the Council of Ministers. This is an executive controversy, for how can the agency oversee the executive authority

if it is subordinate to it? Can this agency operate in total independence and be subject to supervision by the judiciary, for example? Numerous questions exist; we had hoped that someone working in the agency would respond to them, but they declined!

A National Anti Corruption Campaign

Dr 'Ali Lutfi, former minister of finance, has a conception on how to combat economic crimes. First of all, he considers that the general climate which prevails in any country to a large extent influences the spread of this phenomenon, or its failure to spread.

To underline this point, what President Husni Mubarak has been saying, from the day he first assumed power, about fighting corruption and aberrant behavior, and the need for integrity, has had a great effect in limiting the phenomenon of influence-peddling and the spread of corruption--indeed in uncovering certain cases, such as those of Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy, Rashad 'Uthman and 'Ismat al-Sadat. The seriousness of this sort of crime appears when exploitation and aberrance become a general phenomenon in society, since they lead to the destruction of public property and the disruption of social justice, as well as the seclusion and introversion of honorable people.

Surveillance--Two Kinds

To make it possible to eliminate these crimes, Dr 'Ali Lutfi says that two kinds of oversight must be imposed, the first preventive, the second remedial.

Preventive oversight prevents the occurrence of economic crimes, or at least reduces their occurrence. This kind of oversight can take place by closing off existing loopholes in financial, economic and administrative laws, because it is to be observed that certain persons commit crimes but do not fall under the jurisdiction of the law, and penalties are not imposed upon them, since there are loopholes in these laws. There are many bodies and offices whose main task is to exploit the existing loopholes in laws and to point them out to aberrant persons and opportunists.

The second way to bring about preventive surveillance is to support the oversight agencies, so that they will be serious and effective in coping with aberrance and corruption in a way which will make many people hesitate before committing crimes, and to intensify punishments. Numerous penalties in the law are not deterrent, and this encourages people to commit economic crimes, since they know in advance that the penalty either will not be imposed or will be very minor. There are many financial penalties that have been in effect for a long time and in which no changes have been made. With changes in circumstances and the rise in prices, the situation requires that these laws be reviewed--for example, in a crime for which the penalty was a fine of 1,000 pounds 10 years ago, the penalty must be raised to 10,000 pounds now. It is also essential that awareness be disseminated among citizens via the media and that they be made to recognize the straight road and be aware of the various forms of punishment. Among the methods for such indoctrination is "religious indoctrination;" many individuals do not know that evasion of

tax payment means committing insubordination against great almighty God. The strange thing is that many people who have gone on pilgrimage to Mecca commit acts of insubordination as soon as they get back to Egypt by concealing the effects they have with them monthly /sic/ from customs duties. What are the imams in the mosques and proselytizers doing about these issues?

Remedial oversight consists of:

Oversight which is responsible for uncovering crimes that actually occur. A great many agencies are in charge of this form of oversight, but numerous reservations exist about the role they play. For instance:

The Central Accounting Agency: All the reports that this agency prepares on the government and the public sector must be published, so that they will not just stay within the People's Assembly! It is well known that this agency's reports go into people's desk drawers and stay completely out of the press or the opposition parties.

Administrative Surveillance: It was a great mistake to eliminate this agency, but now that it has come back (thanks be to God) the law regulating the role it plays must be restored, rather than having the old law remain, so that it may be effective.

The Anti Tax Evasion Agency: This agency will be able to play its part only if the tax community is surveyed where it exists. The Ministry of Finance started to do this 4 years ago, but the process was rapidly discontinued, owing to a number of circumstances!

It is necessary to support this agency with competent manpower and modern equipment. Consequently, when the general government budget is prepared, it will be necessary to take the radical evolution in the Tax Department into consideration, so that it can play its part while providing immunity and incentives for the department. It is necessary to review the numerous exemptions included in the Tax Law and to ascertain the importance of the goals requested of it on behalf of the domestic economy.

A National Anti-Corruption Campaign

Dr 'Ali Lutfi added, "The main persons in charge of economic crimes that have been uncovered in the recent period (and there are many crimes which have not yet been announced) are all those who have been given easy access to work by unlawful means. If these officials are punished, no one will dare to offer such easy access in the future.

"In my opinion, the greatest plague that afflicts our society in the current circumstances is the concern for prestigious positions and status."

In order to make it possible to overcome this sort of crime, it is necessary to choose leaders properly, while observing care in the president's statements, following the methods of good examples in fighting corruption and aberrance, reforming the general climate that prevails, and providing surveillance agencies that are endowed with a high level of competence."

Dr 'Ali Lutfi wonders if cleansing the climate of corruption and aberrance will have an effect on capital. But is it better for this corruption to remain, while we turn our backs on it, or for us to cleanse the atmosphere of it, concentrate on honorable people, and encourage them? While there are two schools of thought in this area, the latter notion must ultimately triumph, and everyone must take others by the hand in the context of a nationwide campaign to eliminate corruption and economic crime.

11887

CSO: 4504/115

MEETING OF ARAB INTERIOR MINISTERS DESCRIBED

Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Dec 82 p 3

[Article by Roland Delcour: "Meeting for the First Time in Casablanca, Arab Interior Ministers Adopt a Security Agreement"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Casablanca--The first council of Arab ministers of the interior was held in Casablanca from 13 to 15 December. Its purpose was to propose a security plan based on a */"global strategy"/* aimed not only at jointly organizing the control of terrorism, but also at ensuring security in its economic and social extensions.

In that context the ministers proposed normalizing legislation, exchanging information, joint planning of operations, creating a council on Arab reforms. The Arab Social Defense Organization (OADS), which was formed in 1960 and whose powers were expanded in 1967, will be strengthened by means of cooperation from the Arab ministers of labor, social affairs and justice. A technical secretariat will be created under the council of Arab ministers of the interior.

The problems of the Palestinian refugees since their dispersion outside Beirut were the subject of a special study, as well as civil defense, for which a joint Arab organization is provided for. The travel passes to be issued to the Palestinian refugees by the Arab countries will be considered the same as passports granted to citizens of those countries.

A framework accord states that cooperation is to be */"bilateral and multilateral"/*. It will include domains as diverse as circulation of goods and persons, legislation relative to border zones, control of criminality, exchange of information and documentation, exchange of experts, advisers and personnel, training of this personnel, cooperation with local communities, not to mention */"aid granted as needed to any organism or country for the purpose of reestablishing security and public order."/* It should be noted that the Arab ministers were inspired to write this agreement by the model furnished by the European interior ministers in June 1976.

8946

CSO: 4519/111

BANKING SITUATION IN BAHRAIN DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 40, Oct 82 pp 80-81

[Article: "Bahrain Financial Market: Questions About the Future"]

[Text] In October 1975, the Bahrain Monetary Agency first announced that it was prepared to grant international banks the right to establish foreign banking branches in Bahrain. When making the decision, the Bahraini authorities based it on a number of assumptions, the most important of them being that Bahrain has: A suitable location in the flourishing Middle East, a widespread air communications network, modern telecommunications, stable political climate, social acceptance and a high level of education among the work force, aside from the lack of any taxes worth mentioning. Bahrain enjoys a suitable location from the standpoint of time, falling between the working schedules of the European exchanges and the Far Eastern exchanges. All of these factors were considered very important in converting Bahrain into an international financial center.

The interest of international banking circles in Bahrain emerged in 1973 and 1974 after the large rise in oil prices and the emergence of ambitious development programs in the region. This interest increased especially after the disturbances in Beirut began, in addition to the fact that selecting Bahrain, of all places, would assure the banks of being near their clients, and consequently obtaining a share of the flow of petrodollars.

Because of all of the foregoing, Bahrain then decided to begin accepting requests to open branches of foreign banks in Bahrain on the basis of the regional free banking system. That is, the banks were permitted to carry out regional or international activities without the right to carry out local activities. Through this mechanism Bahrain strove to create a market capable, from the Gulf itself, of managing and investing the temporary surpluses which would result from the increasing oil revenues in the Gulf countries, on a basis of converting Bahrain into a fully-equipped center for discount and investment operations as well as the conversion of liquid capital into medium-term loans.

After the monetary agency provided the desired atmosphere, the success of the market hinged on the mutual fulfillment of two factors:

1. The desire of the international bankers themselves to come to Bahrain and invest the money and technical personnel necessary to establish and operate the foreign branch.
2. The willingness of depositors and borrowers to deal with these institutions on the basis of their ability to provide progressive services with competitive conditions.

The answer to the first question became clear from the first year the market was established, when the number of authorizations concluded during that year reached 32, and in June 1982 reached 65. In the first stage the list included names of a group of the largest banks operating in the United States, Europe and Canada. After six months, authorizations for new branches were discontinued during the second half of 1979. The Bahrain Monetary Agency made an exception in granting authorizations, giving first priority to Arab banks and banks of certain countries and regions not adequately represented in the market, especially far eastern banks. Banks which are wholly or partly owned by Arab shareholders currently represent about a third of the foreign branches.

As for the answer to the second question (that is, to what extent do depositors and borrowers wish to do business with the market), it is expressed clearly by the latest published statistics: They show that the total assets of the foreign branches last June was about \$57.5 billion, with an annual growth rate between 30 and 35 per cent.

Main Activities of Foreign Branches

The basic characteristics of the activities of the foreign branches can be summarized as follows:

1. The most important part of the activities of these branches is concentrated in the Arab region, where the geographic distribution of sources of foreign branch income and its utilization in 1981 shows that about 67 percent of deposits (\$38.5 billion) came from Arab sources, and about 49 percent of the loans were invested in Arab countries.
2. The greater portion of foreign branch banking activities are carried out between the banks themselves, that is, they are interbank activities. From the standpoint of liabilities, it turns out that the greater portion of income represents deposits of banks located outside of Bahrain. This latter had reached \$29 billion in June 1982. It is also worth noting that most of the market's income comes from private sector sources, while public sector deposits (the ministries, money foundations, and others) represent only a small percentage.
3. The distribution of deposits and loans among currencies shows that 70 percent of them are made in American dollars. However, the regional currencies (Saudi riyals, Kuwaiti dinars, Emirate dirhams and Qatari riyals) have begun to play an important role in operations between the banks and in loans.

5. Foreign branch operations are concentrated on short-term activities. Thus, most of the banks finance their loans and investment portfolios on the basis of the policy of borrowing for short periods. They are renewed according to a specific schedule and between long-term loans.

5. One of the important fields of branch activities is foreign discount operations in the area of circulating conversions other than the two established ones operating in the region. In addition, the majority of the branches deal in currencies with the aim of guaranteeing protection against discount fluctuations in their loan operations.

6. Bahrain has become an extremely important center for arranging joint loans on a regional basis, especially since the entry of the main Arab banks, such as the Arab Banking Foundation, the International Gulf Bank, and others.

7. The foreign branch banks also open letters of credit, issue various forms of guarantees of proper performance in transactions, and participate in joint loans and bond issues in various currencies, including Gulf region currencies.

Reflections on Regional Markets

The emergence of Bahrain as a successful and expanding banking market created complications and consequences for the local banking markets in the region, some of them positive and others which could be considered negative.

The positive consequences can be summarized as follows:

1. Instituting a financial market dealing in Eurodollars and local and Asian currencies.

2. Establishing a regional market among the banks, so that they were provided with a source of different currencies which could be used to finance the cash flow requirements at the banks and commercial institutions.

3. Increasing foreign discount operations; creating market which deals in certain regional currencies on credit; and developing the use of these currencies in international financial markets. In addition, the development of the market reduced, to some extent, the profits which are taken in currency conversions.

4. Establishing the foreign branch banks resulted in promoting the technical level of operations and of the market, on the basis of the complex organization which is required when combining short term borrowing and long term loans.

5. Providing a group of banking services to the companies and institutions operating in the region, including deposits, loans, letters of credit, guarantees, and foreign discount operations.

6. The strengths of the new market pushed the Arab banks in the region to develop their services and to advance to levels which assure them of keeping a share of the market.

7. When a number of world banks selected Bahrain as a center for their financial administration and for arranging and managing joint and individual loans in the Middle East, the Bahrain market gained an international reputation as a progressive financial market.

Negative Complications

The negative complications which arose from the development of foreign branch banks can be summarized as follows:

1. The competitive activities of the foreign branches in some markets of the region resulted in causing some damage and disruption in these markets. Some "friction" arose from this, and countermeasures were taken by monetary authorities of the countries concerned.

2. Internationalization of certain regional currencies resulted in increasing the fears of monetary authorities: That a large stockpile of their local currency would be created outside of the local market, and consequently outside of their ability to control the movement of this stockpile; its repercussions on the stability of the local currency; and the possibility of speculation.

3. The fact that the foreign branches are exempt from obligatory reserves requirements and maximum interest rate limits has enabled them to attract deposits from the local markets and reloan them for a small profit. In addition, the "briefcase bankers," as they are called, succeeded in getting into the local markets and proposing to offer joint loans, securities, etc., with better terms than the local banks could offer. This resulted in a lot of friction with these banks.

Optimism of the Future

It can certainly be said that the founding of the Bahrain market as a regional financial market in which a group of financial institutions operate has at the appropriate time to meet the new needs of the region in the economic and financial fields. In spite of several unsuitable developments, such as attempts to stir up trouble on the part of certain elements supported by Iran, and after that the Iraq-Iran war, the market achieved notable success.

However, with the development of competition and the appearance of increasing restrictions on the foreign branches within the markets of the region, the Bahrain branches which want to stay will have to search for new fields of activity. One of the difficulties which is appearing in this area is the involvement of certain foreign branches in honoring the postdated checks which were circulating in the Kuwaiti al-Manakh market. These same few

sometimes granted large loans and easy terms to Kuwaiti firms and individuals who were known to be involved in speculation in Gulf stocks. This resulted in these branches suffering significant losses which may affect their own reserves.

Out of all this, it is noted that the Arab banks grow year after year in their share of and their role in the market. There are five Arab banks which chose Bahrain as a base of operations and as a general administration center. Among these banks are: The Bahrain International Bank (with a capital of \$180 million), the Middle East Bank (\$200 million capital), the UBAF Arab International Bank (\$50 million capital), and the Arab Banking Investment Corporation (INVESTCORP, with a capital of \$125 million). The capital of most of these institutions has been offered for purchase by the general public, and it was covered many times over in most cases. However, the collapse which occurred recently in the Kuwaiti al-Manakh market resulted in a great decline in the market value of the stock of most of these banks.

In my case, it is anticipated that the Bahrain market is entering a stage of less accelerated growth after the stage of exceptional growth it has known for the past seven years. The market will not see new banks entering in great numbers, but, in spite of the decline in the region's oil revenues and the shock in the al-Manakh market, banking sources are still optimistic about the future of Bahrain as an international financial market. However, international banking agents are keeping a close watch on another aspect, the efforts in progress to restore peace to Lebanon, beginning with the capital, Beirut, and the ability which the banking sector in Lebanon will manifest in search of its former role and its distinctive position in the region. Observers expect that competition between Beirut and Bahrain will intensify when the Lebanese capital once again tries to attract world banking institutions to open their representative branches and offices and at the same time to attract experienced and highly capable personnel, especially those of Arab origin.

The role of the Bahrain market in the region will also depend on the measures which the Kuwaiti government is expected to take in the area of restricting the establishment of "paper corporations" and the circulation of the stocks of private and public Gulf-area corporations (financial and non-financial) within the Kuwait market.

End.

MO: 4.04/83

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

FRENCH TOURISM DEVELOPMENT--French tourism agents have recently taken an interest in making arrangements to convert Bahrain into a resort area, since Air France believes that the tourist industry on the island exists and meets all requirements for development and specialization for businessmen who want to relax for a day or two or for groups which have limited interests and inclinations, such as diving, fishing, or searching for ruins. Groups of travel agents who are specialists in tourism have recently visited Bahrain to study the possibilities of the job. Among these groups there were two--the first works out of the Nice area on the Cote d'Azur and the second from Singapore and Malaysia--which had previously organized several visits in cooperation and coordination with the Ministry of Information and Tourism in Bahrain. This was immediately after the display which was set up all last summer about Bahrain at the Air France headquarters in Paris. The most prominent of the project's aims is to promote an exchange of tourism between France and the Gulf area, where the residents still prefer Britain but have begun to incline toward France more than before. The French Tourism Administration will open a regional office in Bahrain, starting in January 1982. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 295, 16 Oct 82 p 41] 9605

CSO: 4404/83

BRIEFS

'LAUNDERED' CAPITAL IN GNP--A study conducted by two researchers at Bar Ilan University has revealed that "laundered" capital comprises about 25 percent of the GNP. The two researchers, Meir Unger and Ben-Zion Silberfarb, estimated the illegal economy by methods different from those used until now. They followed American researchers who have measured the scope of illegal capital according to the use of cash and the relationship between the use of cash and various economic factors, such as tax rates. The estimate by the two researchers relates only up to the year 1977, in which the scope of the illegal economy was 23.9 percent, and since then according to an estimated additional growth. The finding of the two researchers shows that the illegal economy in Israel is two and a half times greater than the estimate of the illegal economy in the United States. It should be noted that the estimate of Unger and Silberfarb is far greater than that of the Ben Shakhbar Committee (which estimated laundered capital in the years 1968-1972 at 4 to 8 percent, noting that this estimate approached that of an estimate made by Barukh Nadel, an ex-reporter for YEDIOT-AHARONOT). One of the two researchers, Ben-Zion Silberfarb, has been serving for several months as the director of the Economic Planning Authority. /Text/ /Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 1 Nov 82 p 8/ 7075

AVOCADO EXPORT PROBLEMS--The export of avocados has encountered many difficulties, because of a decline of prices in Europe and the economic recession in France, which absorbs 80 percent of the avocado export of Israel. According to the plan, the Fruit Council intended to export this year about 97 thousand tons of avocados, of which 80 thousand tons were for the French market. Until now, Israel has exported 2600 tons of avocados, receiving a price of 1,184 dollars per ton, as compared to 1,835 dollars per ton last year. The decline in the dollar price stems from the decline in the value of the French franc against the dollar, by more than 30 percent in the last year. Our reporter notes that recently advertising and sales efforts have been made in other countries of Western Europe in order to reduce dependence upon the French market. According to heads of the Fruit Council, the low prices in France may cause serious losses to farmers, and efforts are being made to increase sales in local markets. Within this framework, it was decided to declare a reduction in price, and already at the beginning of the season to sell to the consumer at a price of 32 shekels per kilogram, as compared to 22-25 shekels per kilogram last year. /Text/ /Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 1 Nov 82 p 19/ 7075

MAGNETO-HYDRODYNAMIC GENERATOR--Currently, the first industrial prototype of its kind in the world for the direct conversion of heat to electricity is being completed at the Ben Gurion University in Beer Sheba, by a magneto-hydrodynamic method. This is the fruit of the research of Professor Yermiyahu Bronover, who immigrated from the United States 10 years ago. In general, the conversion of heat to electricity is done by means of turbo-generators: hot gases surround turbines, and this operates a generator to produce electricity. This method is used at all power stations, conventional as well as nuclear, and involves large losses of energy, with the efficiency rated generally at 35 percent. By the magneto-thermodynamic method, the magnetic characteristics of liquid metals are exploited (these change with change in temperature), for the direct conversion of heat to electricity, without complicated moving parts, and the efficiency of these devices is much higher. Tests of this method have been tried in several countries in the world, especially in the United States and the USSR, but all of these devices have used heat sources at very high temperatures, of 3000 degrees. Professor Bronover's method uses a temperature of 80 degrees, and it is possible to use the heat collected in solar panels, or the heat of ground water, to achieve an efficiency at least a third higher than all conventional methods. Professor Bronover's research, which is unique in the world, is financed by the Solmax Co, in which Israeli and British capital are partners, and by the Office of the Chief Scientist in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Also participating is a giant American company which was established during World War II to aid the development of the atomic bomb. Electric and chemical companies throughout the world are showing great interest in Professor Bronover's method. /Text/ /Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Oct 82 p 9/ 7075

DECLINE IN INFANT MORTALITY--In 1981, infant mortality in the Jewish population was 12.1 per 1000, as compared to 18.7 deaths per 1000 births in the first half of the 1970's; 25.4 in the first half of the 1960's; and 38.8 in the half of the 1950's. The figures in the Statistical Annual show that even among the non-Jewish population there has been a downward trend in infant mortality. Among the Muslim population in Israel there were 24.9 deaths per 1000 births in 1980, as compared to 40.1 in the early 1970's and 46.4 in the early 1960's. The Statistical Annual also reports a substantial decline in infant mortality for the Christian and Druse population. /Text/ /Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 1 Nov 82 p 4/ 7075

UNDERGROUND FUEL RESERVOIR--An underground fuel reservoir, unusual in its size and purpose, will be built in Israel. Before the beginning of construction, several test reservoirs will be built; an experimental reservoir to prove the reliability of stone of this type. A similar reservoir will be built at a great depth, to hold liquid gas. Additional tests will be made with small reservoirs. In all, 200 drillings will be made to a great depth to locate suitable places for underground reservoirs. The reservoir will serve to store fuel ready for use. Most reservoirs store crude petroleum, since refined fuel in contact with moisture develops bacteria. Details regarding the reservoir which will be built under special sealed and dry conditions, were reported at the first Israeli convention of construction and public works engineers in Netanya. Within the framework of a survey of future innovations

In Israel, are bitumenous coal dust, which is from the power station at Hadera. This will serve as an important component in the production of concrete and cement. The dust is collected by electric filters during the production process at the power station. /Text/ /Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew
4 Nov 82 p 6/ 7075

CSO: 4423/46

EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION STUDIES 5-YEAR PLAN, INVESTMENT

Paris AL-NASHRAH AL-IQTISADIIYAH AL-'ARABIYAH in Arabic Nov 82 pp 27-29

[Article: "The 5-Year Plan and Investment Opportunities"]

[Text] The Arab-Belgian-Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce devoted the September issue, number 9, of its monthly magazine to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It contained articles and studies covering various aspects of economic, social and cultural activity in this Arab country which, despite the disasters of the occupation it suffers, is trying to move toward providing better living conditions. AL-HASHRAH AL-IQTISADIIYAH AL-'ARABIYAH, which, through the publications and studies of the Arab-Belgian-Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce appreciates the tangible activities of this chamber in strengthening the bonds of cooperation between Belgium and various Arab countries and drawing the attention of its readers to the possibility of supporting and encouraging this activity, is pleased to begin on its own by extracting the following article from that issue number 9 about the current 5-year plan and opportunities for investment in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The 1981-1985 5-year development plan draws its specific elements from the assets of the current national economy and the expertise derived from the stages of economic and social development accomplished in the 70's. Its goal over the coming years is to achieve further stages in the continued process of development within the framework of comprehensive planning, keeping in mind support for the components of Arab economic integration on the Arab level. The objectives of the plan are defined as follows:

1. Achieving an 11 percent annual growth rate of the gross domestic product by increasing production in various economic sectors. The goal of the plan therefore is:

To expand agricultural land in irrigated areas, to improve agricultural methods, to reclaim land and to develop animal resources to fill the needs of the populace for foodstuffs.

To complete mining and industrial projects which were begun during the period of the 1976-1980 plan as well as to improve the chemical industries which rely on raw phosphates and potash and to expand the cement industry and processing industries.

increase production and distribution of electric power and to improve
sources of water for purposes of agriculture, industry and home consumption.

1. Increase the income derived from the construction sector from 52 million
dinars in 1980 to 93 million 1985, that is, a 12.6 annual growth rate.

To increase income from the services sector which comprise transport, trade,
financial institutions, home ownership, public management and other social
and personal services from 471 million dinars in 1980 to 644 million in
1985 for an annual growth rate of 8.4 percent.

2. Changing the structure of the national economy in favor of the commodity
production sectors so that their share of the gross national product will
rise from 38.8 percent in 1980 to 46 percent in 1985.

3. Effective participation in concluding Arab development and strengthening
Arab economic action and development integration by coordinating regional
plans and projects and establishing joint projects which will increase bonds
among Arab countries, facilitate trade among them and improve the labor
force and the transfer of technology.

4. Increasing local revenues in the general budget so as to cover all current
expenses and to achieve an increased surplus to help finance capital
expenditures.

5. Reducing the rate of deficit in the balance of payments.

6. Providing services and public facilities to all citizens and allocating
investments in a manner which is integrated and balanced among all regions.

7. Improving the labor force by expanding the areas of education and training
and raising technical and vocational skill levels, endeavoring to achieve
a balance in quality and quantity in the labor market and to increase the
participation of women in it by providing more educational opportunities
to them.

The 1981-1985 5-year development plan is based on the assumption that the
process of social and economic development is an integrated process which is
not confined to listing projects which are intended to be begun and actions
which are expected to be taken but which also requires the adoption of a set
of policies in various fields aimed primarily of exercising a positive
influence on social and economic activities and guiding them toward effective
participation in accomplishing the goals of development.

Given the stage Jordan has reached in its economic and social evolution, this
plan requires the investment of sums exceeding the level of investments
during the past 5 years.

The accompanying table gives a breakdown of these investments over various
sectors and defines the priorities contained by this plan.

Summary of Investments in Sectors of the Plan

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Investments</u> <u>(in Billion of Dinars)</u>	<u>Relative</u> <u>Importance</u>
1. Agriculture and Cooperative	234.5	7.11
2. Water and Irrigation	521.7	15.81
3. Mining and Industry	758.8	22.99
4. Energy and Electricity	163.4	4.95
5. Tourism and Antiquities	65.7	1.99
 Total: Commodity Production and Tourism Sectors	 1744.1	 52.85
6. Business and Finance	37.0	1.12
7. Transport	545.5	16.53
8. Communications	106.8	3.24
9. Culture and Youth	9.8	.30
10. Media	7.9	.24
11. Education	226.3	6.86
12. Health	100.7	3.05
13. Social Development	15.2	.46
14. Labor Force	9.2	.28
15. Housing and Government Buildings	308.1	9.34
16. Municipal, Village and Environmental Affairs	175.6	5.32
17. Religious Endowments	6.4	.19
18. Science, Technology, and Statistics	7.4	.22
 Total: Services Sectors	 1555.9	 47.15
 Total Investments	 3300.0	 100.00

Jordan enjoys an excellent investment climate. In addition to the free economy system it follows, Jordan has an excellent strategic position among the countries of the Middle East and of Africa which qualify it to be a commercial and financial middleman among the markets of these countries. Moreover, it has a cadre of administrators and trained labor, a modern system of communications and an integrated financial system.

Law for Encouraging Investment

The basic Law for encouraging investments in Jordan is Law No 53 of 1972 and the amended Law No 60 of 1973 and Law No 16 of 1977. The goal of the law is to encourage investors--Jordanian, Arab and foreign--to invest in economic projects in Jordan. To do this, the law grants attractive terms, guarantees and tax and customs exemptions which can be summed up as follows:

1. Arab capital is treated on an equal footing with national capital and it enjoys all the rights and privileges given to national capital.
2. The government guarantees the right of non-Jordanian investors to transfer their profits, interest and capital abroad in foreign currencies.
3. Government land is provided free for economic projects.
4. Projects are exempt from income tax on profits for up to 9 years and from buildings and land taxes for up to 7 years.
5. Capital imports and equipment required for projects are completely exempt from customs and import fees.

Removing Restrictions on Control of Foreign Currency

The central bank has succeeded in gradually lifting restrictions on control of foreign currency and Jordan now enjoys free entry of funds for various investment purposes and free exit of funds for commercial purposes and other legitimate purposes, such as travel, tourism, education, medical treatment and living costs, in accordance with the measures adopted by the central bank, measures of the following sort:

1. Permitting residents and non-residents to bring in and take out unlimited amounts of currency and coins.
2. Permitting non-residents to keep deposit accounts in foreign currencies at local banks, to deposit foreign currencies in them from any source whatsoever and to draw on them without restriction. Jordanian citizens are also permitted to keep deposit accounts in foreign currencies up to 50,000 dinars at local banks.
3. Permitting Arab nationals to buy stocks and bonds issued by Jordanian corporations in any currency and permitting them to sell them and remit their value plus interest in any foreign currency without the prior approval of the central bank.
4. Exempting exporters from re-valuing Jordanian goods exported to Arab countries whatever the value and exempting re-exporters of foreign goods from re-valuing if it is not in excess of 1,500 dinars.
5. Increasing the amounts Jordanians are allowed to transfer and exempting persons making transfers from providing any documentation on the purposes of the transfer on amounts up to the equivalent in hard currency of 5,000 dinars.

Law on Companies

The current law on companies in Jordan for companies and institutions outside Jordan permits them to engage in business in Jordan on condition that they are fully recording in the register of companies as is the case with national

companies (both incorporated and regular) which are not allowed to engage in any profit making business activity unless they are recorded in the register of companies. When foreign companies are registered in Jordan, they can operate on an equal footing with national companies. The law on companies also permits foreigners to participate in national companies up to fixed percentages and they can establish their own companies.

Income Tax on Companies

Income tax rates imposed on companies in Jordan are considered relatively moderate and are based on the activity of the company. This tax is levied at a rate of 45 percent on the income of financial institutions such as banks, at 40 percent on the income of corporations and private non-industrial companies and at the rate of 38.5 percent on the income of industrial corporations.

However, it should be noted that these rates are currently being modified with the primary objective of lightening the tax burden on the shoulders of the taxpayers. These rates are applied to the profits of national and foreign companies with the exception of income earned abroad (including profits of shares and capital profits) which do not fall within the tax base. Depreciation on assets of companies is calculated using the straight line method on the basis of the original cost. Beside the income tax on individuals and companies, there is an additional tax, the social services tax which is levied at the rate of 10 percent of the income tax. It should be noted that there are not inheritance or gift taxes in Jordan and, so far, there is no tax on capital profits.

Industrial Cities and Free Zones Projects

In addition to the exemptions which projects enjoy under the law to encourage investment or any other law replacing it, projects established in industrial cities enjoy the following exemptions:

1. New industrial projects and existing industrial projects which move to industrial cities are exempt from income and social services taxes for a period of 2 years from the date they started production in the industrial city.
2. Existing industrial projects in the industrial cities are exempt from the buildings and land tax.

There is also the free zone organization which is concerned with the establishment of free zones in various areas of the kingdom. Four zones have been established to date: the free zone in al-'Aqabah, the free zone al-Zarqa', the free zone at Queen 'Aliya' Airport and the joint Jordanian-Syrian free zone. These zones store goods for purposes of transit and processing and payment of taxes and fees is suspended unless the goods are withdrawn for local use. It should be noted that permission can be granted in the free zones for the establishment of 15 types of industry broken down into 115 types of secondary industries. Also, projects, whether industrial,

material or service, which are established in the Jordanian free zones enjoy liberal exemptions from taxes and fees and other facilities that can be summarized as follows:

1. They are exempt from income and social services taxes for 12 years and all facilities in the free zones are exempt from all taxes and fees.
2. Goods arriving in and exported from the free zones are exempt from all taxes and fees and from fees for conversion of currency except for what is withdrawn for local consumption.
3. Foreign experts who are working in the free zones are allowed to be exempted from income taxes on their salaries and allowances and can transfer those salaries.
4. The free zone can rent uncovered areas, already constructed warehouses or buildings equipped especially for the establishment of industries in return for moderate annual rentals.

5359

CSO: 4404/128

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

PALESTINIAN STUDENT HEADQUARTERS--Despite earlier reservations, the Tunisian government has approved transfer of the central headquarters of the General Federation of Palestinian Students to Tunisia. The reservations arose from the special situation of the General Federation of Tunisian whose activity has been suspended for more than 10 years. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR-AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 288, 14 Nov 82 p 21] 8389

CSO: 4404/128

COUNTRY'S DIVORCE PROBLEM VIEWED

AL-NAHJ AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 728, 1-7 Dec 82 pp 3-7

[Text] One of them divorced his wife because he is a Hilali and she is a Nasrawiyah...The competition between them gave rise to a human tragedy of which the wife was the victim. Another man divorced his wife because he thought there was too much salt in his food. A third destroyed his family and home because he persisted in spending most of every night with a group of friends. And when his wife asked him to give up this despicable habit, he found no better way to resolve the problem than to let her go. A man picked a quarrel with his wife. He wanted to eat vegetables, so she went to a neighbors and "borrowed" some zucchini from them. Our friend could see in this action only a blow to his pride and he thought of nothing but divorce. Another man divorced his wife because she praised a movie actor in his presence. Someone destroyed his family after only 4 months of a fabulous marriage that cost him several million riyals. As for those who divorced their wives to make way for new wives - they are too numerous to count. And there are many such examples...many. All of them mirror human and social tragedy whose first victim is the wife and the cause the husband. The innocent children will ultimately reap its bitter harvest.

Divorce is not a problem peculiar to our Muslim society, which is conservative in its values, customs, and deep-rooted inherited traditions, but it has now become a world-wide phenomenon or, more precisely, a human phenomenon. Statistics on divorce in Christian Europe during the last quarter of a century recorded the highest rate in history, despite the fact that Christianity, the religion of Europeans, bans divorce and considers marriage a tie that God confirmed and that only God or death can loosen. Moreover, divorce there is not up to the man or woman but is a matter of law enforced by the courts. Despite all this, the inhabitants of this continent who are enjoying unprecedented economic and cultural well-being find themselves miserable to the point of seeking divorce contrary to both Catholicism and the law. It has been shown that the average number of divorced women in Europe constitutes more than 30 percent of all the new marriages every year. That is to say, one out of every three families breaks up. This proportion is much higher than in the United States and it is even higher in the Soviet Union and other countries not protected by religion or morality.

This means that divorce is not unique to us. It has become a universal problem as well.

However, we bring up the issue here for a number of reasons, including the fact that it has worsened in recent years due to many factors, such as the economic and cultural advances of the people. Moreover, we are influenced by some societies that do not attach great importance to women or to the family instead of our influencing them. But the most important thing that worries and prompts us to raise the issue is the set of values that it embraces and absolutely the most important are the values of religion, family, and country.

As for the Islamic religion, it is God's greatest blessing to this nation because it made laws and precepts for the lives of men and women at the same time, and it produced the most perfect "concept" of the form of the family on this earth. There is no man-made law here but a divine law which can never be invalidated. The increasing incidence of divorce means we have abandoned God's way in our behavior. If we pondered the precepts of religion and acted in accordance with the Book of God and the Sunna of His Prophet, we would all be the happiest of people. This is the view of Shaykh 'Abd al-Musnad when he says: "If the Muslims were faithful to their religion in their private and public lives, they would be happy and completely secure. But, unfortunately, some of them are ignorant of the principles of their religion, their obligations and duties. Islam organized the lives of married couples from the time they first think about choosing a husband or wife until they live together and have children. The Islamic concept of family life and stability rests on each spouse rendering the other his or her due with sincerity, candor, and love and not demanding what he or she is not entitled to...living a realistic life leaves no room for fantasies...mutual understanding with intelligence and wisdom of what crops up in their lives, deferring to each other and behaving humbly. They are indifferent to the behavior of people outside of their home, contented with reality, and attempt to improve it according to their capabilities. Then the wife will indeed understand what her new life means under the protection of her husband and new home because some wives think and behave after marriage as though they were not yet married. The true Islamic concept is very rarely applied to the problem of married life by the people of this modern age. That explains the situation in which they are living unhappily.

As for the family, it is the cornerstone for building the entire country. The small sound intercommunicating structures free from disease are the basic pillar of an upright, productive, and moral society because they are the structures that contribute to its development and growth and help realize its great ambitions and ideal goals. To be healthy, these structures require stable living, psychological, and family conditions. This stability cannot be achieved if the men are stubborn and tyrannical in exercising the rights God gave them so that they abuse them in a way that ends with the women getting divorced and the children becoming vagrants and disappearing. Poverty, ignorance, and disease are the family's traditional enemies in developing societies like ours. But ignorance and disease are generally not due to the first cause, i.e., poverty. God bestowed universal blessings upon this country and provided it with men who believed in their lord and we furnished them with guidance. Due to these blessings and men, a Saudi family has a better

life than the inhabitants of any other poor or Third World country can achieve. Indeed, the standard of living is considered to be one of the best among the rich and big countries. Thus, all the practical, real, and painful unpleasantnesses that can destroy a family are absent. This means that the collapse of a home and the dispersal of the wife and children are caused primarily by shortcomings of the husband or wife and not by a defect in society.

As for the country, it ultimately reaps this bitter harvest. This is what prompted us to bring up the question of divorce for study and discussion and observe it as a negative phenomenon influencing the growth of the active and moral social structures. It affects our lives by creating a misunderstanding of the divorced woman. It makes the spread of divorce a danger to the sound building of society. The tragic stories of divorce that we hear have only one meaning, namely, the flabbiness that characterizes the thinking and behavior of our people today has gone so far as to kill human feelings, emotions, and the ability to appreciate the significance of family, home, and children.

Despite all this and despite the negative effects, our conservative Muslim society has not taken any steps to restrain the divorce phenomenon and its spread. We adhere only to the Koran and the Sunna. Yet other societies have adopted countermeasures to limit divorce as a human phenomenon. They have begun to pass laws to limit the man's supremacy and his violation of the duty that God gave him to improve its use. Among these laws is an [amended] marriage contract which seeks to (challenge) the husband's right to a divorce and which in effect would be similar to seeking to bring about reconciliation when there is no longer any good feelings or affection left [between husband and wife]. Moreover, some countries have given their civil courts authority to examine a request for divorce and decide in favor of it or against it. But our society which has adopted Islam as its creed and made it an example and way of life has not imitated any of this, thereby throwing double responsibility on the man and the woman at the same time to shape their own lives and the life of their family and country without the intervention of others, even if the latter are the state itself.

The grief of divorce and its spread has special significance for us in that it is a human tragedy made by man. It also has general significance in that it has adverse and destructive effects on the country as a whole.

We are not against divorce because we cannot prohibit what God has allowed. God whose mercy encompasses everything is the one who prescribed divorce as a mercy to both the husband and the wife and a mercy to the Muslim nation as well. We have only to examine the separation rate, perfidy, disintegration, moral decline, deviation, and the foundlings with which the societies that ban divorce in the name of religion or law are teeming. We must contemplate such societies in order to appreciate the favor God has shown us. But at the same time we must understand God's wisdom concerning divorce and use it in such a way as to create a mercy for us. We must not abuse it to the point where it becomes a curse on us.

Dr 'Ali al-Hakami, dean of the College of Islamic Law of Umm al-Qura University, says: "Islam has permitted divorce - the most hateful of what is permissible - to deal with situations caused by the weakness of the human soul. It solves problems that may arise between a man and a woman and become irreparable if they do not separate. Divorce is not allowed except by religious law and in cases of extreme necessity where married life cannot continue, for example, when the husband discovers that his wife is violating lawful injunctions in her religion or morals or behavior and he is unable to reform her."

Dr Sharaf al-Sharif, a law professor at Umm al-Qura University, says: "A decision to get a divorce is possible in Islam but only in case of necessity. Divorce may be a duty if the woman is immoral or if a problem arises between the couple that cannot be resolved. This means that Islam legislated divorce in order to end problems and quarrels and cut out the root of the dispute that can become aggravated in a marriage lacking in harmony."

Dr Hamzah al-Fa'r, provost of the College of Islamic Law of Umm al-Qura University, says: "Divorce in the Sharia, as God wished, must be preceded by many things beginning with a warning, spiritual guidance, advice, and abstention in bed, then light physical abuse. After this, arbitration between the couple begins when an arbiter from his people and an arbiter from her people come in the form of a small Islamic committee to try to settle the dispute and resolve the disagreement. It is incumbent upon the members of this committee to be judges distinguished by their fairness, honesty, and good will. If they fail to settle the dispute, there is no alternative to the most hateful procedure permitted by God who says: "Those whose deviation you are concerned with, warn them and isolate them in their sleeping quarters and beat them. If they defame you, do not seek to oppress them, verily God is exalted and great. If you fear dissension between them, send an arbiter chosen by his family and an arbiter chosen by her family and if they are desirous of agreement, God will effect a reconciliation between them." What all this means is that a husband who rushed to divorce his wife is in violation of the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet.

None of the revealed religions has elevated the position of women as high as Islam. The True Religion liberated the spirit of women, enhanced their lives, and made their future secure. It granted them rights as well as duties. Even today, women in the advanced Western societies or those claimed to be advanced desire to obtain some of the status that Islam has accorded women. God prescribed marriage and put in it love and compassion and an abode for the soul. It was the Sublime One who called the marriage contract (sacred covenant) an indication of the strength of the bond that unites a man and his wife. The Prophet provided a good example by his treatment of women. He said: "Have the best intentions toward women" and "Your welfare, your welfare is for his people and I am your welfare for my people." His life with his wives and daughters was a model of pure mercy.

Islam placed women in a high place and ordered us to: "Treat them kindly, for if you hate them, perhaps they will hate something in which God has placed much good." And: "Men are the custodians of women in accordance with

God's preference for some over others and hence they are instructed to spend their wealth for good deeds represent obedience to God and in so doing help safeguard that which is only known to him."

And the Sublime One says: "Men have a portion of what they acquired and women have a portion of what they acquired."

If the True Religion outlined a clear way in the Glorious Koran, then the Prophet came to provide a proper model by himself. So do we come afterward to do what they did early pre-Islamic times?

This is the question-tragedy raised by this issue.

Women constitute half of society. Is it right for half of society to wrong the other half? They are also mothers, wives, sisters, daughters, and aunts.

The role of women in creating life is no less important than that of men, if not more so. Their role in building society is extremely important because the family and rearing of children rests on their shoulders, for a mother in this sense, as the poet said, is a school - if you prepare it (well), you will prepare a noble people.

Nevertheless, we find in most divorce cases that the woman is the victim, not because she returns to her family home after the divorce but because she is subject to harsh social judgments, to the point where she is made undersirable for remarriage or at least she does not have as much an opportunity to marry (again) as a girl who has not been previously married. What is even more unfair is that society never judges against the thoughtless husband who has no feeling of responsibility for married life and its sanctity. It's as though being a man excuses him from any responsibility for the destruction of a glorious human life that is made up of a man, a woman, and children.

A study of divorce has shown that most cases were due to the man because he did not perform his marital duties and failed to place the woman in her true framework as a mother and wife. This makes the fate of a woman after divorce a big question mark that may have its effects on the basic structure making for the stability of a society, that is to say, the marital structure.

What is stranger and more absurd is that some men take pride in the sin and apply to marriage and divorce epithets reflecting the worst level of misunderstanding of the conjugal relationship. Someone says that as far as he is concerned, marriage is like changing old shoes for new ones. He believes (what an awful belief!) it is just like taking off one's shoes and putting on others. How many innocent women have been victims of just such a frivolous and absurd belief which doesn't reflect any degree of responsibility or true comprehension of the ideal objectives of married life!

It must be admitted, unfortunately, that some of us treat women as though they were goods to be bought and sold. They do not know they are dealing not with ghosts but with souls whom God has extolled.

Although women are the main victims of divorce, it cannot be denied that some of them are irresponsible. They do not understand the nature of married life or the nature of their duties toward home, husband, and children. This lack of understanding has resulted in many tragedies attributable directly to the collapse of the family. First and foremost is that we deliver to society children suffering from paternal and familial deprivation, which leads to the total destruction of their souls.

But before we inquire about the nature or form of the solution we must find in order to limit the spread of divorce, we must first fully understand all the factors - social, psychological, cultural, economic, and inherited - that have led to the phenomenon becoming so widespread.

In this connection, AL-YAMAMAH set out to ascertain the views of a group of intellectuals, religious thinkers, university professors and students on the subject.

There were many general factors on which all agreed as well as some specific or partly specific ones mentioned by some and not by others. But what is important here is that these factors complement one another. They provide us in the aggregate with a comprehensive or nearly comprehensive list of all the basic and transient circumstances that have made divorce such a serious problem in Saudi Arabia.

Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Musnad says the most important causes of the spread of divorce are:

- (1) Remoteness from implementation of Islamic teachings and failure to apply and adhere to them in our individual and family lives.
- (2) Our society is an Islamic and Arab society with its precepts and traditions and the conjugal relationship must be based on them.
- (3) Attempt at imitating non-Muslims in their life inside and outside the home.
- (4) Some marriages are influenced by what is seen and heard concerning what non-Muslims say and do.
- (5) The fact that the husband and wife imagine a certain life that each wants to lead with his or her partner. This imaginary life cannot be effectively realized.
- (6) Failure of one of the partners to appreciate the value of married life and trifling with it on the least consequential of occasions.
- (7) The husband and wife committing sins and irregularities. This is a principal cause of the shattering of the conjugal relationship.

Dr 'Uwayd al-Mitrafi, provost of the College of the Islamic Law and higher Islamic Studies of Umm al-Qura University, says there are several contemporary factors that have helped worsen the problem:

- (1) Poor choice of wife by the husband or vice versa and rush to get married before careful investigation of the future spouse's morals and devotion to religion.
- (2) Absorption of the modern man in amassing and increasing wealth at the expense of his wife and children.
- (3) Devotion of the modern generation of young men to the pursuit of pleasure with friends in the (Bashkah) [a sort of coffee house] and totally ignoring their wives.
- (4) Superiority of one of the spouses to the other in family status, knowledge, or wealth.

Arabic Professor Muhammad ibn Raji al-Sa'idi adds the following factors:

- (1) Cultural differences between the spouses.
- (2) Material inequality between them. For example, the husband, a man of modest circumstances, marries a rich girl accustomed to a certain way of life and because of limited means he is unable to make for her the kind of life she was used to in her father's house.
- (3) Interference by the parents and relatives of one of the spouses may lead to divorce.
- (4) Leaving the house nights and returning late, resulting in neglect of obligations to the wife.
- (5) Difference in age, which is generally the result of the ambition of one of the parents.
- (6) Ideas in conflict with religion, tradition, and customs.
- (7) Marrying children at the parents' expense, sometimes without either child desiring it.
- (8) Failure of the suitor to see his fiancée (ahead of time), although Islam urges that condition of sincere intentions with the wife's family present.
- (9) Inattentiveness of the spouses to each other and their inability to keep their disputes to themselves without resorting to violence, which injures the conjugal relationship.

Professor Muhammad Ahmad 'Munshi, a lecturer at the School of Education of Umm al-Qura University, adds some other potential causes of divorce:

- (1) The husband's interest in another woman. This violates the holy bond and provokes jealousy that generally leads to divorce.

- (2) Abuse of the telephone by telephone harassments, causing jealousy and misunderstanding between the husband and wife with their telephone becoming a victim of unrestrained harassment.
- (3) Separation following a quarrel, which, if it lasts for some time, may make a divorce necessary.
- (4) Inability of either party to satisfy the (sexual) desires of the other.
- (5) More or less continuous preoccupation of the husband with his work away from his home and children and neglect of his obligations.
- (6) Failure to bear children or bearing only girls and no boys as though - may God forgive me - the matter were (wholly) up to the wife. Yet it is one of the secrets of the Sublime Creator.
- (7) Marriage to a foreign woman, which frequently fails because the difference in the nature of the couple.
- (8) The husband's frequent trips abroad unaccompanied by his wife and children. This confuses the relationship between the two parties.
- (9) Loss of love between husband and wife for some reason or another.
- (10) Interference by relatives in the life of the couple and spoiling their life by the victory of one over the other.
- (11) Marriage to more than one woman. It is legal, but the abuse of this permission sometimes results in divorce.
- (12) Marriage after a love affair because the husband believes that inasmuch as she loved him before marriage, she could have loved someone else as well.
- (13) The husband's desire for his wife's money or inheritance or her salary or his compelling her not to help her family financially.
- (14) Material well-being because furnishing a new house is easy and does not entail any hardship or difficulty for the man.

Then Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq Zafr, a professor at Umm al-Qura University, adds four other causes to the above:

- (1) Not taking the Holy Koran as a guide to life and the Sunna of the Prophet as a model.
- (2) Lack of respect of either party for the other.
- (3) Hastiness in deciding on divorce without reflection.
- (4) Destructive striving for everything that is secular and modern and the desire to possess everything.

Student 'Ubayd 'Abdallah al-Mihlawi, a young man in the prime of life, adds the following causes from the standpoint of youth:

- (1) Rashness of young persons, lack of a sense of responsibility due sometimes to early marriage or lack of intellectual, psychological, and emotional maturity.
- (2) Bad friends dazzled by the superficial aspects of modern life; they have acquired the shell of this civilization but not its content.
- (3) Living together with the husband's or wife's family or with more than one wife in one place, causing dissension and jealousy.
- (4) The wife's working and her insistence on doing so despite her husband's refusal to allow it.
- (5) Poor choice of an unsuitable wife or husband.

These are the various factors upon which a group of intellectuals whom we met are agreed. These factors can be summarized, from our point of view, in three basic arguments as follows:

First, the crude nature of some people in whose hearts are still imprinted desert life and its dullness. Their behavior and thoughts are dominated by ancient traditions in which stubbornness goes by the name of strength of character and rashness by the name of freedom. They do not realize that Islam began to honor women when it banned the burial alive of newborn girls. And even today, 14 centuries from the magnanimous call, they bury their wives alive.

Second, the stage of transformation of a civilization is always accompanied by an earthquake of social ideas and the emergence of other ideas, most of them imported or foreign. But the tremendous period of change in which Saudi Arabia is living has apparently influenced them in the wrong way so that they are impressed by everything that is spurious in modern life. One of the manifestations of this spuriousness is that a man seems to be civilized if he stays up all night and has a good time away from home. This destroys his life and that of his family at the same time. We don't want to go into full details on what happens on those evenings away from home. There is no doubt, however, that after the change sinks into the consciousness of the people, the situation will stabilize and the eager, naive flaunting of all Western and imported ideas and behaviors will halt.

Third, the element of material comfort and abundance of money have added another factor that contributes significantly to the rising divorce rate, for it is easy today for any man or youth to get married however he wishes because in every case he has enough and more to buy a new home and marry another woman.

Professor Sa'd al-Azuri, a law school graduate, says feeling at home in an enduring married life is one of the highest goals to which man aspires. A marriage contract is forever until the end of life to enable the husband and

wife to make of their house a cradle in which they find shelter and live happily in its long shadows so that they may raise their children properly. God said: "Among His wonders is that he created for you couples for you to trust in and he caused love and compassion to arise between you." God called the agreement between a husband and his wife an inviolable contract. God said: "And he took from you an inviolable contract." Therefore, if the relationship is a confirmed contract, it cannot be breached or belittled.

This then is the divorce question in its religious, social, and human dimensions. We see that it is important. It is important in this particular stage in which we are building our nation, and for this purpose we need every individual, indeed every arm and hand.

We have seen that it is primarily a human problem. We know it is a world-wide problem that has spread in striking fashion during the last quarter of a century, especially after the moral and religious collapse that occurred throughout the Western world after World War II. While the problem is acute all over the world, it must be less so in our country, although this cannot be measured, because we are a Muslim country with deep-rooted traditions. Islam must therefore be our protector against all the unexpected and evil phenomena around us.

But in spite of all this, we know that the "vessel of civilization" is the major cause of spread of divorce. At the same time, however, we must not concentrate on this factor alone and make it a clothes rack on which to hang our mistakes. This vessel of civilization must stimulate us to go beyond our mistakes, not succumb to them or make them worse because the nature of the present stages requires all of us to rise to its level. Yes, we must rise to the level of aspirations of this homeland of ours. This means we must cling to God's religion and use His Book as a guide to our conduct. Then we must "work" to provide this country with good persons since people are the most valuable investment in the development plan. How can we build a nation on the ruing of homes destroyed by divorce...with men of deformed souls, women in distress, and children orphaned while their fathers are alive?

We do not want to give "advice" to men and women. But we do want to say that we must for God's sake show regard for our homes, wives, and children. We must arm ourselves with the consciousness that rises as a result of our behavior to the level of the historic times in which we are living. There is no doubt that reading the many factors cited by the guests who discussed this issue can give us some idea of the magnitude of the problem in all of its ramifications. We have apparently done nothing today except "observe" this dear country because the problem in its true scope is like a woodworm that does not appear on the surface but is boring into the foundation. The foundation here is the family, the cornerstone for the building of society.

This is not, despite the foregoing, the last word on the tragedy of divorce. We are opening from today on the door to the dialogue on the question. Let men of religion, scholars, intellectuals, thinkers, and sociology professors join us. And with all of them we also want to hear the views of couples and of wives. The pages of AL-YAMAMAH from cover to cover are open to all of them.

THREE YEARS OF SOVIET WAR OPERATIONS EVALUATED

Kuala Lumpur ASIAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Dec 82 pp 34-36, 38-39, 43, 44-45

[Article by G. Jacobs]

[Text]

The Soviets are in Afghanistan to stay. In the military war, a prolonged stalemate exists between the Soviet and the *moujahedeen* (or *Mujahideen*). The Afghan Army has been reduced to a mere 25,000; and politically the Karmal regime has been ineffective in establishing political control even in the major population centres. However, in many respects, time, military power, and political policy are on the side of the Soviets, a conclusion that has too often not been recognized outside of Afghanistan.

The evidence that the Soviets are in Afghanistan to stay is overwhelming. For example:

- Soviet military engineers are building permanent communications facilities throughout their major military centres (Kabul, Bagram, Shindand, etc), replacing the mobile equipment which came with the "invasion" force.

- Major airfield improvements are underway, particularly at Shindand and Bagram. This includes significant construction for accommodating Soviet assault helicopter regiments and including 40 to 50 helicopter pads (revetments) at each airfield complex.

- The Soviet military is replacing rubber fuel storage bladders at the Pol-e Khomri Army logistics base with permanent underground fuel storage. Additionally, a number of hardened munitions storage facilities have now been built, particularly at Pol-e Khomri, which are designed to support both the army and the assault helicopter regiments now in Afghanistan.

- Important Soviet logistical projects now being initiated include permanent bridges across the Amu Darya River

which separates the Soviet Union and Afghanistan as well as initial site and route surveys to build the first major rail line within the country beginning at Kushka on the Soviet side of the Afghan-Soviet border link.

- A major helicopter repair facility is being built at Kabul International Airport, which serves the MI-24/MI-8 helicopter regiments primarily and a new gunship repair facility at Bagram Air Base. Other improvements include revetments for company-level helicopter detachments at Ghazni and Jalalabad.

All the above only represents the better known Soviet undertakings to establish their presence permanently within the country. There is little question that there are familiar patterns to the Soviet moves and they reflect the wars fought in Algeria and Vietnam. But it should be recognized that the Soviet leadership has yet to enter into a full-scale military commitment. Conservative estimates are that such a move would take the commitment of a 300,000-man Soviet military force and even then there would be no guarantees that the *Jamiat Islami* guerrilla force (s) could be defeated decisively.

Political/Military Motivations

The invasion, not unlike the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, in Moscow's view, was worth taking risks for as the gains promised to be greater than the possible losses. A variety of motivation-oriented explanations have been given for why Moscow felt the invasion to be necessary or justified. Some of the

arguments hold very little water ⁽¹⁾ while others attempt to explain Moscow's motivations and rationale (in any one "event") with an 'overall' explanation of how foreign policy develops in the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger's statement in 1969 typifies this approach:

"It is always tempting to arrange diverse Soviet moves into a grand design. The more esoteric brands of Kremlinology often purport to see each and every move as part of the carefully orchestrated score in which events inexorably move to the grand finale.

Experience has shown that this has rarely if ever been the case. From the Cuban Missile Crisis to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there has been a large element of improvisation in Soviet policy." (2)

Without belabouring the point too far, it is important to understand at minimum levels the politico-military perspective for the Soviet invasion. The invasion itself is not within the intended scope of this discussion, and has been well treated elsewhere. ⁽³⁾ It is my view that the "geopolitical" reason(s) were the major motivation for the invasion, spurred by the growing involvement and "opportunities" presented by Moscow's relationship with the then People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and party chairman Nur M. Taraki. Lacking countrywide support from Afghan tribal as well as local organizations and maliks, Taraki turned increasingly to Moscow for political and some military support. By December 1978, this growing relationship was consummated in the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship agreement. Economic

and political conditions continued to deteriorate during early-1979 partly aggravated by the ambitious Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin. Amin's followers "revolted" against the Taraki government's plan to dismiss Amin which ultimately resulted in the palace death of Taraki and threw the country into further chaos. And Amin unexpectedly came into full power by default. ⁽⁴⁾ Amin proved less than totally cooperative with Moscow, ⁽⁵⁾ and may well have been viewed by Moscow as being desirous of rebuilding Kabul's relationship with the West which had collapsed following the terrorist inspired death of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in February 1979. Furthermore, following the factional fighting which began in 1978, the Afghan army went into a decline. Much of the armed forces did not like the Communist-dominated PDPA that had come to power in April 1978. "Defections" accelerated at such a rate that the Army declined from its previous strength of 110,000 to 115,000 to less than 75,000. The March 1979 massacre of Soviet advisers in Herat did little to assure Moscow that their possibilities of "controlling" events in Kabul were heading in the "correct" direction. There is evidence that some Soviet units were already operating in a combat role in Afghanistan - albeit on a small scale - prior to the spring of 1979. The visit to Kabul of Soviet Army General A.A. Yepishev (Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, and Deputy Defence Minister) was quite significant. ⁽⁶⁾ Such high-level visits often herald major changes in Moscow's foreign policies and

CHART NO. 1

MAIN AFGHAN AIRFIELDS

NAME	AIRCRAFT CAPACITY	DIMENSIONS (Metres)	TYPE
Kabul Intern.	Boeing 707, IL-86	3,000 (+)	Concrete
Qandahar	Boeing 707, IL-86	3,400	Asphalt
Bagram (e)	AN-26, IL-14	3,000 +	Concrete
Jalalabad	AN-12	1,900	Asphalt
Kandahar	Boeing 707, IL-86	3,400	Asphalt
Herat	AN-12	2,500 (+)	Asphalt
Shindand	AN-26, IL-14	2,750 (est.)	Concrete
Mazar-i-Sharif	AN-26, AN-12 (?)	2,500 (est.)	Asphalt

in this case it may have firmed Moscow's decision that if the political and military conditions did not improve, "intervention" would be the planned course of action.

War on a Personal Level.

As for the conduct of the resistance, the year 1982 has seen a gradually stronger *moujahedeen* force; partly due to the increasingly repressive tactics of Soviet combat forces and partly because of continued defections from the Afghan Army. Each of the last three years, since the Soviet invasion began in late-December 1979, can be identified by subtle changes in the nature of the war. These "changes" include: 1979-1980 — Soviet control existed over most of the main highways and urban centres during the daylight hours, largely dependent on the initial invasion troops and equipment brought in to fight the guerrillas. A "settling-in" year for Soviet forces including the grounding of the Afghan Air Force; armed conflict between Soviet units and "non-cooperative" Afghan army units. For the *moujahedeen*, the first year was marked by resistance to the radical reform programmes of the Kabul government, little coordination between tribal groups, and the beginnings of a massive refugee exit from the country into neighbouring Pakistan and to a lesser extent,

Iran.

— 1981: Soviet casualties were estimated at 6,000 to 8,000 during the first year of the "occupation"; rotation of Soviet divisions began to take place from the initial elements of 7 MR Airborne divisions used in the invasion; the first severe combat tests for both guerrilla and government forces was taking heavy casualties on both sides mainly due to lack of experience of both sides in the kind of irregular warfare suddenly commonplace; withdrawal of non-essential Soviet Army units (possibly including SA-4/GANEF SAM elements, etc); an increased number of Soviet combat helicopters began to be introduced—mostly armed MI-8 and MI-24/HIND gunship types. Late in the year the Soviets introduced a small number of Sukhoi SU-25 'RAM G' heavy-attack aircraft having the equivalent weapon load of the U.S. A-10A and looking like the Northrop Corporation's A-9 entry in the AX (attack experimental) programme of June 1966; the new aircraft was given the opportunity to fly "combat" missions against the *moujahedeen* — although the mission terrain is quite unlike Central Europe environment for which the SU-25s attack capability has been designed. For the *moujahedeen*, the year represented a consolidation period in which to regroup and recover from earlier losses which were largely

CHART NO. 2

SOVIET UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN

UNIT	HOME LOC/MD ⁽¹⁾	INVASION	1980	1981	1982	AFGHAN BASING
68TH MRD ⁽²⁾	ASHKHADAD (?) (Turk) ⁽³⁾	X	(?)	-	-	-
103TD ABN GDS	VITEBSK (?) (Belor.)	X	X	X	X	KABUL
104TH ABN GAS	KIROVABAD (Transc)	X	-	-	-	-
105TH ABN GDS	FERGANA (Turk)	X	-	-	-	-
5th (ABN?) GDS	KIZYI ARVAT (Turk)	X	X	X	X	(SHINDAND?)
201ST MRD	DUSHANBE (C Asia)	X	X	X	X	QONDUZ/BAGLAN (?)
357TH MRD	KUSHKA (Turk)	X	-	-	-	-
360TH MRD	TERMEZ (Turk)	X	X	(See 108th)	-	-
54TH GDS (MRD)	KIZYI ARVAT (Turk)	X	-	-	-	-
108TH MRD	(Was 360TH)	-	-	X	X	KABUL
16TH MRD	(Elements of)	-	(?)	(?)	-	-
One MR BRIGADE	(?)	-	-	(?)	X	QANDAHAR
One MR BRIGADE	(?)	-	-	(?)	X	GHAZNI
One MR BRIGADE	(?)	-	-	(?)	X	JALALABAD
One Air Assault (?)	BRIGADE (?)	-	-	(?)	X	QONDUZ
860TH IND. MR REGT.	(?)	-	-	(?)	X	FAIZABAD
One HELO. REGT.	(?)	-	(?)	X	X	SHINDAND
One IND. ATTACK HELO REGT.	(?)	-	-	X	X	JALALABAD
One IND. ATTACK HELO REGT.	(?)	-	-	(?)	X	SHINDAND

(1) Compiled from various issues and journals, including "International Defence Review", "Asian Defence Journal", and others.

(2) MD = USSR Military District, MRD = Military Rifle Division, ABN = Airborne, GDS = Guards.

(3) Indicated home location is as of the December 1979 "invasion" date, in some cases those divisions not still serving in Afghanistan may have returned to original base location or elsewhere.

CHART NO. 3 SOVIET HELICOPTER ORGANIZATIONS

[See photo on pg. 106]

INDEPENDENT ASSAULT HELO REGIMENT -

- Regimental Headquarters
- Three (3) Assault Helo Regiments
 - (4 Flights of 4 HIND-D gunships)
- One (1) transport Helo Regiment
 - (4 flights of 4 HIP-C medium helos)
- One Aviation Service Unit
 - Aviation Flight Unit - 2 Hip, 2 Hind-C,
 - 2 Hoplites; spares section/Reserve of 12 Hind, 4 Hips.
 - Ground Control Unit
 - Signal/Communications Unit
 - Aviation Technical Unit
- One Aviation Technical/Service Battalion

HELICOPTER TRANSPORT REGIMENT -

- Regimental Headquarters
- Two or Three (2-3) Transport Squadrons
 - 4 Flights of 4 HIPs each
- One Transport Squadron
 - 3 or 4 Flights of Hook Heavy Helo's each
- One Aviation Service Unit
 - Aviation Flight Unit - 2 Hips,
 - 2 Hoplites; spares/reserve of 8 Hips,
 - 2 Hook's
 - Ground Control Flight
 - Signal/Communications Unit
- One Aviation Technical/Service Battalion

due to inexperience. Combat groups of irregulars began assaults on Soviet highway traffic, closing down Afghan government bus and other commercial traffic outside the major cities and using more effectively the weapons left by the Afghan and Soviet armies. Their ranks began to swell with further defections from the Afghan Army, as well as some troops from the Soviet side. As more Soviet atrocities became known (and more common place), defections from the military and government became more common and the defectors came with their weapons! The year ended with a growing sense of intensity—both sides were getting better organized, and the *moujahedeen* began to receive aid from the Middle East and China (anti-tank and anti-personnel mine, guns, RPG's, etc).

— 1982: By this time, the Afghan Army

was but 23 percent of it's original size, that is at the time the Daud regime was overthrown in 1978. The Soviets were using the Afghan Army as a 'spearhead' in each of their "search and destroy" operations thereby *maximizing Afghan casualties* and limiting Soviet contact until the battle was well engaged. The Soviets began large-scale operations involving BMP, BMD, BTR (personnel carriers) and medium tanks to "clear" strategic highways, *moujahedeen*-controlled valleys and the barren trails that lead to *moujahedeen* border camps in Pakistan. Reports of non-lethal chemical munitions being used by the Soviets became common. New reports began to emerge that the Soviets were using sophisticated toxic "flechette" ammunition ⁽⁷⁾ — probably with the 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds. Reports of Soviet chemical warfare became so common that a *special report* was prepared for the United States Congress, a report which indicated "that Soviet forces have used a variety of *lethal chemical warfare agents*, including nerve gas in Afghanistan since they invaded the country in 1979." ⁽⁸⁾ The Soviets also introduced and tested a number of new weapon systems for the Army; including:

— BMP 1981 model, with gas-operated 30-mm automatic cannon in the BMP turret (replacing earlier gun-missile combination).

— SAU-122 and SAU-152 SP howitzers were introduced into the Motorized Rifle divisions stationed in the country providing a new level of mobility to the "static" war strategy of the Soviets.

— AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher. A 30-mm gun system that can be operated from either hip or from a tripod

(with 30-round fed drum); the weapon is being issued at the rate of two per BTR-60-PB-equipped company. Equipped with HE and HE-fragmentation rounds, the weapon is getting its baptism of fire and doing well against fixed guerrilla defence positions.

— *RPG-18* light anti-tank weapon (LAW) introduced into the MRD and Airborne divisions. Effective out to a maximum of 200-300 metres, the weapon is a man-portable weapon with the ability to defeat prepared defensive positions and is particularly useful in mountain terrain.

— *AK-74* and *AKS-74* 5.45mm assault rifles. Now a standard issue with the infantry and airborne troops. The *AKS* version has a folding stock. Both weapons are getting introduction and testing in Afghanistan. The *RPKS-74* with a 40-round magazine is also being seen for the first time. Over-all, the weapon provides certain advantages over the older Soviet

AKM, including: greater effective range, increased lethality, improved extractor, and a high-efficiency muzzle brake which is modelled after the U.S. *M-16*. In effect, the Afghanistan war of the early 1980s is the Soviet equivalent to the war in Spain in the mid-1930s: a "testing ground" war for new Soviet military weapons!

The Logistics War. There is little question that the war has devastated the Afghan economy. The Soviets are now supplying the urban population centres with critically needed cooking oil and general foodstuffs. Current economic aid of this type alone probably costs Moscow about \$150-175 million a year. The Soviet "scorched earth" policy, the cumulative effects of an "estimated 2.5 to 2.7 million Afghan refugees" (9) now living outside the country and not tending their agricultural acreage, inefficiency within the transportation system and the effects of guerilla attacks along the roads,



Map of Afghanistan

unsuccessful Kabul government land reform efforts and the lack of motor transport within the country have all contributed in no small way to completely destroy the former Afghan economic system.

For both sides, the war is one of logistics. The Soviets must import the majority of munitions, food, weapons, and equipment that they must use. The *moujahedeen* must bring weapons and ammunition, and some food supplies (rice, sugar, cooking oil) into the country. Most of this is done by foot and pack animals over the 320-odd passes that dot the landscape of the old Durand Line border.⁽¹⁰⁾ Despite the hardships, the Afghan guerrillas are well armed and the occasional complaint from Pakistani army regulars will attest to this.

Observations made by various travelers to Kabul attest to the Soviet dependence on their Air Force to bring in major portions of critical equipment. The airfields are always crowded with AN-22, AN-12, IL-68, and IL-76 aircraft. The improved road and highway network within the country totals a little over 6,000-km⁽¹¹⁾ and only some 600 km of the highways are surfaced with concrete. There is no exact figure for the number of motor vehicles within the country but a reasonable estimate for the pre-invasion period would be 35,000 cars, 12,000 trucks, and 6,000-plus buses. Most of the trucks were under 5-ton and predominantly of Soviet or Eastern European construction with a scattering of imports from other countries. Major vehicle repairs could only be done in Kabul, Herat, or Qandahar. Mules and other pack animals are still more common in the mountainous regions than four-wheel drive vehicles. And camel caravans still work the trails of the southern and western portions of the country. Most highway routes (see chart 6), where they exist, can support a movement of 9,000-11,000 tons per day, though this figure is often significantly reduced during the wet seasons and during the winter months. Many mountain road areas are almost impassable in the winter and the arid areas of the south-west create severe heat problems for both road surfaces and vehicles. Sand and dust storms create zero visibility in this region — remember the effect of dust and sand storms on the aborted Iranian-hostage rescue mission?

Soviet doctrine as practiced in Afghanistan indicates most Soviet convoys,

with tracked vehicles in escort, move at rates of about 20 kph in daylight and around 15 kph at night. The lack of a railroad system in the country⁽¹²⁾ combined with minimal inland waterways⁽¹³⁾ which the Soviets can make use of, further limits the logistical effort to road-bound trucks and airlifts. The logistical problems to Kabul and Bagram seem to have been recognized early during the invasion for the Soviets immediately sent troops to occupy the 2,675-metre long tunnel at Salang Pass. This area is often blocked by severe winter snows, landslides, and avalanches.

While little is known of the Soviet logistical organization in Afghanistan some comments are worthwhile with regard to Soviet "Army-level" doctrine on logistical support. The "army" level of operations, as in the Afghanistan operation, is supported by transshipment centres, depot storage points and vehicular workshops. Self-sustaining supply is required for up to six days of conventional war operations. Specified "army" level support for its inherent divisions is intended to be within 150-175 kilometres distance of each other. When distances are greater than this, as is the case with Soviet units centred at Qandahar and Shindand, an advanced divisional supply base section is to be established.

The difference in Soviet practice from that of the West European armies is that "frontal" motor transport assets normally do not directly supply units further than the "army" level, meaning that the supplies and equipment are unloaded at "army" level depot locations and then reloaded and trans-shipped to a divisional location! The equivalent to the "front" (in the case of Afghanistan) is the Turkistan Military District in the Soviet Union while the "army" level mobile supply base is all of Afghanistan. Logistical headquarters for the "resident" Soviet 40th Army is at Pol-e Khomri while command headquarters is in Kabul. The organic Motor Transport Regiment at the "army" level is intended to have a one-time lift capacity of about 10,000 metric tons (estimated). Three to five days of calculated use of PGL is retained within "divisional" level depots. Again, movement is by the division's inherent Motor Transport Battalion directly to regimental units at the Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA). How the Soviets are handling this in Afghanistan is not known. How-

CHART NO. 4

MI-24/HIND-A

Photo
(MI-24/A

(or)

Photo
MI-24/"D"

Loaded Weight: "A" 8400 kg, "D" 10,000 kg

Weapon Load: 1,275 kg

Max. Fuel Load: 1,500 kg

Max. Speed: 273-295 KM/h (170-185 mph)

Cruise Speed: 225 KM/h

Combat Radius: 277 KM

Range Loaded: 475 KM

Initial Climb Rate: 914M/min.

Service Ceiling: 5,500 M

Troop Capacity: 8-10

Crew: 4

Weapon Pods: Four (57-MM x16)

ATGMS: Four (SWATTER-B)

Machine Guns: One 12.7 M

("D" - one 4 barrel 12.7MM Gatling MG)

CHART NO. 5

MI-8/HIP-C

Loaded Weight - 12,000 kg

Weapons Load (optional) - 725-800 kg

Speed: Cruise 225 KM/H (139.5 MPH), Max.

260 KM/H (161 MPH)

Combat Radius: 240 KM (298 miles)

Service Ceiling: 4,500 metres

Troop Capacity: 24 (or 12 stretchers)

Crew: 2

Weapons Pods - up to 6 (57MM x 16)

ATGMS - "E" and "F" version AT-2/SWATTER or AT-3/SAGGER

ever, it is likely they are trying to work within their doctrine that POL is calculated on the basis of "refill" (*zapravka*) requirements—that is, on a daily required number of refills allocated to each vehicle. A Soviet Motorized Rifle Division could consume from 300 to 400 metric tons of POL (petrol and diesel fuel) per day⁽¹⁴⁾ depending on the level of combat and the amount of movement required of its motorized regiments. This should indicate the magnitude of the Soviet logistical problem in Afghanistan!

Soviet System

It is important to understand the Soviet method of waging a ground war — a practice which provides much of the

basis for the failure of the Soviets in eradicating both the urban and rural Afghan guerrilla groups. Soviet ground forces are organized into three unit classifications: (1) Combat arms branch, (2) Special troops, and, (3) Service support troops. The 'combat arms' troops in Afghanistan consist of the Motorized Rifle and Airborne troops. The 'special troops' are those combat support troops within the communications, engineer, motor pool, and chemical components (variously assigned under regimental, divisional, and army headquarters). The 'service support' troops are essentially those whose functions provide technical and material support in the rear areas — medical service, topographical support,


CHART NO 8

LINES OF COMMUNICATION WAR

Highway: Termez-Jeyretan to Neehabad	Route: 4
Construction: Bituminous asphalt	Length: 80 Km
Obstructions: None	
Remarks: Key road connecting Soviet border with Afghan road systems, particularly roads to Pol-e Khomni depot and beyond	
Highway: Mazare Sharif to Pol-e Khomni	Route: 3
Construction: Bituminous asphalt	Length: 230 Km
Obstructions: 20 (+) bridges, incl Qonduz R. bridge 5 Km outside Pol-e Khomni; extensive valleys, gorges, and mountain curves	
Remarks: Major road route from border to key junction at Pol-e Khomni	
Highway: Shir Khan to Kabul	Route: 2
Construction: Bituminous asphalt	Length: 425 Km
Obstructions: 40 (+) bridges; Salang Pass 2,700 metres long, many snow galleys	
Remarks: Soviet built highway, key route south from Soviet border, however, subject to extensive guerrilla interdiction due to bridges, rugged mountain road network, and adverse conditions during winter	
Highway: Kushka to Herat	Route: 10
Construction: Bituminous concrete	Length: 115 Km
Obstructions: A few bridges, otherwise good road through open plains	
Remarks: Third main connecting road from Soviet Union to important western trade route city of Herat (centre of all major Persian-Afghan trade)	
Highway: Herat to Qandahar	Route: 13
Construction: Concrete	Length: 600 Km
Obstructions: 30 (+) bridges, including bridges over Harirod and Farah River (s). Mostly open valleys and plains, except for hills surrounding Delaram city	
Remarks: Built by Soviet Union in 1960s. Main access to major Soviet bases established at Shindand (controlling western sector of country) and Qandahar (southern sector). All roads in these two sectors are wide open and without any hill or mountain grades to restrict vehicle speed. Two lanes throughout, some areas subject to flash floods; extremes of heat conditions from summer to winter temperatures requires constant road repairs. Small earthquakes are common.	
Highway: Qandahar to Chaman (Pakistan)	Route: 14
Construction: Bituminous asphalt	Length: (est) 120 Km
Obstructions: A few small bridges, including one over Darya-ye Arghandad (river) near Qandahar. Mostly low hills and open plains all the way to Pakistan border.	
Remarks: U.S. built road, intended to provide a southern route into Pakistan for trans-shipment of trading goods out of country	
Highway: Herat-Maqandak to Kabul	Route: 12
Construction: Gravel or unsurfaced	Length: 900 Km (+)
Obstructions: Improved bridges where streams cross gravelled or unimproved dirt road sections; extremely poor road conditions throughout route	
Remarks: Only east-west central access road, however, not passable in many areas during winter due to extreme snow ice conditions, during spring and fall area is subject to flash flooding blocking access for as long as a few days. Summer heat conditions dry and dusty - any season requires four-wheel drive military vehicle use only. Mountain areas have landslides and earthquakes; very sparsely populated region.	
Highway: Kabul to Tour Khan/Khyber Pass	Route: 1
Construction: Concrete	Length: 285 Km
Obstructions: About 14 bridges, eight tunnels, all with snow galleys, extensive switchbacks. Minimal passing room in pass/gorge areas; landslides common	
Remarks: Famous Khyber Pass route to Kabul. Rebuilt in 1960s by United States. High mountains and river gorge conditions from Jalalabad to Pakistani border; periodically interdicted by guerilla groups. Previously major trade route out of country	
Highway: Jalalabad to Berg-e Matal (Asadabad)	Route: 23
Construction: Gravel, concrete, etc.	Length: est 250 Km
Obstructions: 20 to 30 small bridges, some along Darya-ye Kabul (river) which track with road route up the river valley.	
Remarks: Scene of extensive guerilla and Soviet attacks and counter-attacks. Extensive road curves common to river valley roads with rugged mountains.	
Highway: Khanabad-Faizabad-Eshkaashem-Wakham Corridor	Route: 7
Construction: Bituminous asphalt, gravel, stone, unpaved	Length: 300 Km
Obstructions: Some small bridges between Khanabad and Eshkaashem, from Eshkaashem to Chinese border extensive curves along rugged mountains of the Hindu Kush	
Remarks: Afghanistan's only access route to China. From Khanabad eastward, road becomes increasingly steep, with sharp mountain curves and deep ravines. Beyond Eshkaashem, road is unpaved to small town of Qaieh-ye Panjeh (360 KM). Mostly pack animals from here to border, in spring and fall. Light military 4 x 4 vehicles can partially use in summer (very restricted access).	



Below: Russian MICV - Close up of the BMP-76 PB showing the 76 mm gun, SAGGER ATGW and the commander and driver's positions. Right above: SA-4 GANEF which has a range of 70 km.





Left: MI-24/HIND-D gunship helicopter - note 12.7 mm Gatling gun in nose and UV-16-57 rocket packs on pylons. Above: MI-8/HIP-C medium helicopter (without pylons for weapons).



Paratroops boarding on AN-12 Club Transport aircraft. Photo: Armies and Weapons.

administration.

In general, the lower ranks of the officer corps of the Soviet army are plagued with various problems. Some of which are inherited from the nature of Soviet society itself: a lack of experience and professionalism, the lack of officer initiative on the company level and up, and a general lack of technical expertise compared with most Western armies. Within this framework operates the Soviet command, control, and communications (C³) effort. The Soviet officer is a highly respected member of the Soviet society. In addition to a significantly better pay (over 30% higher) he is accorded privileges within the military service which would not be given to his civilian counterpart. Lower ranks, including the NCOs, often lack adequate technical training which indirectly forces Soviet officers to perform many tasks themselves. Additionally, and possibly more directly affecting the combat capability of Soviet small units, is the *centralized nature of authority* as practiced in the Soviet Union. This minimises the effect of Soviet officer initiative. Orders and directives always *coming from the top* have a way of stifling personal initiative of lower-level officers. Problems occur when the orders received do not fit the tactical situation or mission which is all too often the case in a tactical (guerrilla) environment like Afghanistan. As far as the Soviet company commander is concerned he is simply carrying out orders from battalion which on its part is taking orders from the regimental headquarters. This practice differs significantly from that of the U.S. (or European) armies which are expected to carry out missions on company level. Afghanistan also brought out one of the other Soviet weaknesses—language. About 25 per cent of Soviet army soldiers do not speak fluent Russian. In addition to that a high percentage of initial invasion troops of the Soviet army were of Muslim background. Little wonder that there were reports of extensive fraternization which led to some of the initial divisions being replaced by units from outside the Soviet's Turkestan, Central Asian, and Transcaucasus Military Districts.⁽¹⁵⁾

Soviet Weapons Use

The Soviet vehicles and weapons used in the continuing 'occupation' of Afghanistan differ little from those organic to

standard Motorized Rifle and Airborne divisions. The Soviet concept of employing their forces as "weapons of mass destruction" has a significant impact on the overall performance, and mobility, of the Soviet *diviziya* (divisions). Their divisions were not designed for fighting the type of urban and rural guerrilla war that they are being subjected to. Some changes are believed to have occurred within the make-up of Soviet units; primarily substitution of more infantry in place of the FROG and anti-tank battalions within the MR Division. The MR Division can still be considered to have about 12,500 personnel and the Airborne Division about 8,500 personnel.⁽¹⁶⁾

Certain Soviet weapons have been prominently employed and includes the following under each category:

- * Tanks: Mostly T-62s. One tank regiment is reportedly equipped with T-72s.
- * Armoured Personnel Carriers: Mostly BMP and BTR-60PBs (MR units), and BMD (Airborne) with three versions of the basic BMP observed so far: (a) BMP-Sh (command version), (b) BMP-R (reconnaissance—with larger two man turret) now replacing the PT-76 in Category I MR divisions.⁽¹⁷⁾ The new gas-operated gun version of the BMP has been identified as the BMP M1981 (or BMP-80).⁽¹⁸⁾ The weapon is probably of calibre 30mm. The turret shows few modifications. However, it appears that the gunner now sits on the left and the vehicle commander on the right (standard BMP has the gunner alone in a one man turret). This new version is likely the result of operations against the guerrillas in the hills where the former AT-3 Sagger ATGM is of little use. This may also be a useful crossing and product improvement effort developed from the BTR-70 APC and adapted to the BMP vehicle. Given a passive image intensifier for the gunlayer and thermal imager for the BMP commander, the new vehicle would significantly improve Soviet night fighting abilities against Infantry/APC units.

- * Artillery: Mostly D-30 122-mm howitzers and D-20 gun-howitzers with SAU-122 and SAU-152 SP howitzers making increased appearances in SP artillery battalions. Each battalion is assigned three batteries. Most MR divisions have one organic artillery regiment equipped with 54 guns. However, the post-1980 organization of the division now has 108 pieces. While identification of specific unit equipment is impossible,

it should be noted that some of the original Guards Airborne and MR divisions are still serving in Afghanistan after having been part of the original invasion force.⁽¹⁹⁾

* **Surface-to-Air Missiles:** Various types have been seen, including: SA-4/GANEF, SA-6/GAINFUL, and platoon carried SA-7/GRAIL. The SA-4 would be normal for a Soviet Army (*ob'yedinenye*) which is normally assigned a SA-4 Brigade. This would include 27 SA-4 launch vehicles, and 24 ZSU-23 or ZSU-23-4s for site defence. This explains the continued photographic evidence of SA-4s in and around Kabul Bagram - which would be subordinated to the Soviet 40th Army command. Besides being organic at army-level, the SA-4s were deployed to discourage U.S. high-altitude missions.

Soviet Deployments

One of the more difficult aspects of understanding the Soviet war in Afghanistan is analysis of major Soviet combat units within the country. This is important because at minimum, it is an indicator of the level of Soviet "commitment" to the occupation of Afghanistan.

The accompanying chart presents a breakdown of major Soviet combat units referred to in any number of journals that have dealt with the war in Afghanistan. The Soviets appear to have withdrawn most of the original invasion divisions. Since mid-1980, it would appear that the Soviets have maintained three to four Motorized Rifle Divisions, and one to two Guards divisions (one airborne) in the country. However, the Soviets have also begun bringing in various below-division-sized units (independent regiments, brigades, etc), and begun adopting new types of organizations. Reports of Air Assault Brigade (s) indicate the employment of helicopter/infantry assault teams. The indicated Afghan basing locations must be considered tentative in some respects as information on current Soviet locations are naturally hard to come by. The exception are the reports from Afghan refugees and the occasional European journal. These are however, indicative of Soviet priorities, doctrine and combat requirements.

Conclusions

A quote from one Afghan: "Perhaps the 'Shirouvi' (Soviets) will leave tomorrow They have never stayed this

long before"⁽²⁰⁾ says a lot about how Afghans regard the continued stalemate in fighting. A number of major "search and destroy" operations were mounted by Soviet forces during 1982 including operations (begun May 17th) in the Shamali region at the mouth of the Pan-shir - the fifth operation in this region since the December 1979 invasion. Despite all these efforts, the Soviets have been unable to control these strategic valleys and plains for long periods especially at night.

The intensity of the war near the end of 1982 is markedly greater than it was two years ago. The Afghan resistance movement has proved "more resilient" than most observers expected. For the first time, individual guerrilla groups are beginning to understand the importance of "cooperation", as witnessed in their resistance during the Soviet Panjshir offensive.

While some Soviet diplomats have been quoted as admitting that the invasion was a mistake, there are other conclusions that can be made with regard to the war. The Soviet leadership is not subject to the same kinds of "public opinion" that pervades the West with regard to unpopular wars and the prolonged stalemate that exists now. Consider some of the following: - If the "resettlement" of the Afghan refugees in the Baluch and Panthan areas becomes a rather "permanent" event in coming years, the Soviets may gain the capability to exploit the ethnic minority rivalries that have traditionally set them against the Karachi government. While "separatism" for these areas has always been resisted by Pakistan, should the level of Soviet subversion rise to a level making the area 'untenable' for Pakistan, the Soviets might try and strike a deal to "ease off" the pressure and support for separatist groups in exchange for naval and commercial access to the newly developed port of Gwadar. This access would increase Soviet presence in the Straits of Hormuz and add another naval facility to those now available in the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia.

- There is yet no strong evidence to indicate that the Soviets have developed a level of operations in Afghanistan sufficient to support a sophisticated Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) squadron (or regiment) in the southern region (at Qan-

dahar in particular); the ability to make the facility "usable" to the SNA would significantly improve Soviet capability to deny Western access to the Persian (Arabian) Gulf.

— A defacto control over the Baluchistan region would allow over-flight facilities not officially available to the Soviet Union at this time. The ability to stage transports through this region would materially assist the load-carrying ability of Soviet transports engaged in any African or Middle Eastern airlift operations. Use of a major airfield complex or two in this region of southern Afghanistan would also materially help any future Soviet invasion of Iran should that contingency ever arise.

— Unlikely though it may seem, Soviet personnel are in Iran now. Seizure of the Iranian coastal areas and airfields would

be made much easier with aircraft staging from Qandahar than if the transit had to originate in the Transcaucasus or Turkestan MRs. These are some of the considerations certainly worthy of further exploration, in view of the evidence that the Soviet military has a high level of esteem with both Brezhnev and the Politburo.

To end on a final note, the following quote seems to predominate the current climate of the *moujahedeen* movement: "But travelling with the Afghan guerrillas, one cannot help but be impressed by their undaunted, simple devotion. No matter how poor or terrible the conditions, the Afghan is never alone. He still has his God. He is willing to die for his religion and his homeland. Against this the Soviets will be hard pushed for success." (21) □

CSO: 4600/159

SOVIET, AFGHAN EXPLAIN REASONS FOR DEFECTING

General Miraki Accuses Soviets of Atrocities

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Dec 82 pp 1, 4

[Text]

LONDON (Dispatches) — A general of the Afghan secret police who defected to Pakistan says the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev planned to annex or dismember Afghanistan, the British Broadcasting Corp. reported Wednesday.

It said the former officer, Lt. Gen. Ghulam Sidiq Miraki, made the disclosure in an interview with a BBC correspondent in the Pakistan city of Peshawar near the border with Afghanistan. It did not say why he had defected.

The BBC quoted him as saying he had access to information Brezhnev had instructed the leader of the pro-Soviet Afghan government, Prime Minister Babrak Karmal, to organize a congress and get himself formally elected president.

Karmal was then to announce that Afghanistan had come under threat through imperialism and call in Soviet troop reinforcements to defend its borders, Miraki was quoted as saying.

The next stage would have been an announcement that Afghanistan had decided to become a part of the Soviet Union.

The BBC said that according to the general, this plan was abandoned because of opposition from the anti-Karmal faction within Afghanistan's ruling Khalq Party.

But Miraki said Brezhnev had an alternative scheme, still current when the Soviet leader died on

Nov. 10, to put the nine northern provinces of Afghanistan under communist control, leaving the rest of the country to the Afghans, the BBC said.

It quoted Miraki as adding the Soviets were failing to suppress Afghanistan's Muslim rebels, in spite of torture, mass executions and chemical warfare.

Miraki said the guerrillas were very strong in the northern border areas and spoke of fighting between police and guerrillas on the Soviet side of the frontier last year, the BBC reported.

Miraki is the highest ranking Afghan to defect since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.

Western diplomats in Islamabad, the Pakistan capital, confirmed Miraki was a senior official in the Afghan secret police, known as KHAD, until recently.

But Miraki admitted serving in the past as a virtual double agent — working with the Soviet KGB at the same time he was a member of a Muslim rebel group fighting the communists — and his claims could not be independently confirmed.

Miraki said he worked closely with the KGB after the communists first took power in an April 27, 1978, coup. During the same period, he said he was a member of a group of the Mujahideen — the Muslim rebels.

Miraki said he learned of the Brezhnev plan from a top ranking member of government and from the Soviets themselves.

A War Marked with Atrocities

Meanwhile, Muslim rebels have stepped up their attacks against targets in Afghanistan's third largest city of Herat, near the Iranian border, western diplomatic sources said Tuesday.

Reports from Herat, a city of about 150,000, are rare because couriers must travel across the width of Afghanistan to reach Pakistan with their reports.

The diplomats said the situation in Herat, which ranks in size only behind Kabul and Kandahar, had deteriorated to the point that President Babrak Karmal was forced to cancel an overnight stay.

Karmal cancelled his overnight stay Oct. 26 following a barrage of guerrilla rockets against the Muwafiqah Hotel where he was staying, the diplomats said.

The hotel was destroyed after Karmal had left and a so-called Muslim clergyman who presented a turban to Karmal during a ceremony at the hotel was killed by the guerrillas, the diplomats said.

The same day, the city's library containing extensive communist literature was burned to the ground.

The sources said Herat continuously suffers power shortages and lacks other basic amenities.

They said the only reprisal from Soviet-Afghan forces so far was a week-long bombing in mid-November of a resistance stronghold on the edge of Herat, killing several hundred villagers.

Diplomats in New Delhi reiterated that Soviet troops burned to death 105 Afghan civilians including 11 children who took refuge in an underground irrigation channel just south of Kabul in mid-September.

The government in Kabul has denied the report and called it "fabricated." It has said the reported incident "never occurred."

But the diplomat insisted the civilians and the children were burned to death Sept. 13 in the

village of Padkhwabe Shana 36 miles (58 km) south of Kabul.

The incident was first reported by the Paris-based organization Bureau International Afghanistan which sent a three-man team to the village in Logar Province to investigate.

The team returned recently and told diplomats the incident did occur.

"They had interviewed eyewitnesses, been inside the underground irrigation channel, taken photos and brought back samples of the thick, sooty deposit now lying in the irrigation channel," a diplomat told reporters in a weekly briefing on the Afghan war.

They said the Afghans hid in the underground irrigation channel when Soviet and Afghan troops entered the village in

search of insurgents and rebel sympathizers.

The Soviet troops reportedly blocked the outlet to cause the water level in the channel to rise and when the Afghans still did not come out they poured in a liquid and set it alight, the diplomat said.

The Soviet-controlled Afghan news agency Bakhtar said "the incident was fabricated by Western media and never occurred in Logar or any other region of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan."

"It is another example of imperialist interference and intensification of psychological warfare against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and we decisively condemn it."

Private Kamal Jan Embraces Islam

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 Dec 82 p 3

[Text]

DISPATCHES — Three years of fighting against Muslim Mujahideen since Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan have cost Soviet forces 30,000 lives, a defecting Russian soldier said.

A rebel Afghan news agency based in the Pakistani frontier town of Peshawar said Wednesday that 20-year-old Kamal Jan defected to a guerrilla group near the Afghan capital of Kabul on Dec. 6.

The Afghan Islamic Press, whose reports have proved accurate in the past, gave Kamal's tag number as 51932 and said he belonged to the No. 3 Infantry Battalion northwest of Kabul in Kharkhana.

There was no way to confirm the report independently.

"I was so fed up with the behavior of Meln Chukov, my 26-year-old Soviet officer, that I decided to leave my battalion for good", Kamal, whose whereabouts were not disclosed, was quoted as saying.

"I have embraced Islam and now I am trying to become a good Muslim," he said.

He said he heard from his officers that 30,000 Russians have been killed since Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December 1979.

"Last March, I saw about 100 Russian wounded soldiers under treatment in a hospital in Kabul near Kharkhana," he said in describing the casualties.

Bodies of Russians, he said, were flown back home from Kabul in N-12 transport planes.

Some analysts estimate the Soviets have suffered several thousand deaths each year. Kamal's death toll figure appeared substantially higher than their estimates. The Soviets have never disclosed casualty figures.

Kamal said he fled his Soviet military base and was hiding under a bridge on the main highway from Kabul to the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif when a guerrilla supporter guided him to rebel forces.

He said behavior of Soviet officers was "very bad," claiming they allow soldiers to be physically abused. Kamal said many Soviet soldiers have become disillusioned

with the Moscow regime after service in Afghanistan.

"We used to hear from our Soviet officers that Mujahideen (guerrillas) chop off hands and feet of any Russian captured by them before gunning him down," Kamal said.

(Islamic Republic News Agency) — Meanwhile, IRNA reporting from Mashhad said last Wednesday that one tank was destroyed and its occupants killed in an attack last week by Afghan Muslim Mujahideen on a central concentration site of joint Soviet-Afghan government forces. The attack took place in the region of Sheikh Zainod-Din in the province of Herat.

Also in this encounter, one Afghan government officer along with his bodyguard was killed and another surrendered to the Afghan Mujahideen.

Mujahideen Suffer High Losses After Westerners Come Calling

According to a separate report from Islamabad, Soviet war planes heavily bombed guerrilla concentrations in Eastern Paktia province last Tuesday, killing at

least 12 Mujahideen and wounding 11 other Muslim fighters, the Mujahideen-run Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) reported Friday.

The massive bombing raids followed reports from western correspondents who secretly visited parts of Paktia Province last month that Afghan rebels were preparing for an offensive against Dargai district, near Khost.

The guerrillas had captured Lieza, 15 km (9 miles) southwest of the provincial capital Khost, they said after the clandestine visit.

The Soviet bombing raids set afire seven Mujahideen tents, so that ammunition burned and some explosions occurred, causing unusually high rebel losses, AIP added.

The agency said the casualties included the guerrilla group leader, Muhammad Anwar, who was a member of the Peshawar-based resistance organization Hezbe Islami Afghanistan headed by Maulawi Yunus Khalis.

Afghan Mujahideen have initiated talks to hand over another Soviet prisoner to the international committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, rebel sources said Wednesday.

The prisoner was identified as Abdul Munaf Khaiboluwich, 20, and was said to be based in Kabul, the Afghan capital, before his capture.

He would be the eighth Soviet prisoner to be handed over by the

guerrillas since the attack on Afghanistan three years ago. All of the exchanges occurred this year.

Red Cross officials could not be contacted for comment. In the past, the Red Cross has declined to discuss exchanges ahead of time for fear of jeopardizing negotiations.

Under international regulations governing such exchanges, prisoners must serve two years in a third-country jail before being repatriated to their home countries.

Guerrilla sources here said Khaiboluwich was from Uzbekistan, South-Central Soviet Asia, which borders Afghanistan, his first name indicates he is a Muslim.

VICTIM REPORTS ON TORTURE PROCEDURES IN KABUL PRISON

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 31 Dec 82 p 4

[Article by Elisabeth Holte]

[Text] Paris--"The first thing they did after I was brought into the Afghan secret police force's torture center, Sedarat'et, in Kabul was to force me to stay awake for a week to break down my resistance, while at the same time hitting me with a stick, with their fists, with a rubber club--as well as kicking me. If I tried to sleep, the six women who took turns standing guard beat me while they shouted and sang. When they failed to get me to admit that I was a member of the resistance movement, they transferred me to what we called the chamber of horrors, where an Afghan named Latif Sharifi was in charge of torture. There I was given repeated electric shocks. But it was even worse when they forced me to stand upright for 2 weeks. My legs swelled up so much that my veins burst, I developed phlebitis and it hurt so much that I could not bear to put on my stockings."

Farida Ahmadi, 22 years old, was a fourth-year medical student at the university in Kabul when she was arrested one April day in 1981 after she picked up a flyer from the resistance movement within the university area. There followed 4 months in jail without charges being brought or a trial held, subjected to more deliberate and terrible physical and mental torture than we here in Western Europe would have believed possible. After trying in vain to make her confess, the secret police, Khad, released Farida Ahmadi at the end of 4 months.

"They obviously hoped that I would put them on the track of members of the revolutionary Afghan women's movement," she says herself. It is now 2 years since she joined the organized women's resistance.

After Farida Ahmadi was released, she crossed into Pakistan after spending a month in hiding in Kabul, but during most of the past year, she has stayed in areas controlled by the resistance movement. And she will return there as soon as her trip to France and Switzerland in connection with the third anniversary of the Soviet invasion is over.

AFTENPOSTEN met Farida Ahmadi early one morning in a hotel in Paris--a tiny thin girl with short hair, wrapped up in a shawl. Dressed in black from top to toe, with long skirts covering the legs that will never be thin again after her treatment in Sedarat'et in Kabul.

"I would like to have a proper medical examination while I am here in Europe--not so much because of my own health, but so that we can have proof of the kind of torture used by the Kabul regime and its Soviet 'assistants,'" she said.

Farida Ahmadi has a few grey hairs in her black head of hair, but otherwise an apparently unharmed little creature was sitting there and telling us how the Russian occupying forces and their Afghan henchmen treat prisoners in the hope of forcing a tiny scrap of information from them.

It seems grotesque that this tiny person had to go through treatment like that.

What lasting damage has she personally received? She clenches her teeth a little and admits that her nerves have been adversely affected and that things are sometimes bad. But fortunately she has enough pills she can turn to when things get too hard. And sleeping is not that easy either. The sights from the torture chamber are replayed...and the screams.

"I will never forget the 70-year-old village woman from Paghman. Her wrists were paralyzed and one leg was paralyzed, but they still gave her electric shocks--and forced me to look on. You should have seen her eyes, full of terror and suffering. They kept it up, giving her electric shocks until she gave a shudder and fell to the floor. What happened to her later on, I don't know.

"And then there was the young teacher, Karima, who was arrested along with her 1-month-old baby. The baby was taken away from her immediately, but she could hear it crying at a distance in the prison corridor. Then one day they brought the baby into her cell, undressed it and strangled it right before her eyes. The baby turned blue.

"Then there was young Jamila, who was a typist at the court in Kabul. She became insane after they struck her with amputated human arms.

"And once when I was being interrogated, torture chief Latif Sharifi ripped an eye out of a living but halfdead male prisoner next to me as a warning of what would happen to me as well if I did not cooperate and confess."

Who was worse--the Russians or the Afghans?

"They were both the same. Actually the Russians tried to leave the real torture to the Afghans, but if they had to give up, we were brought into a Russian torturer. And then we who were tortured could not tell the difference."

6578

CSO: 3639/46

FOREIGN MINISTER ADDRESSES UN SYMPOSIUM IN DHAKA

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 27 Oct 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] Foreign Minister A. R. Shamsuddoha yesterday said he was confident that the United Nations will continue to play its role as the single most important forum for diminishing the dangers of war and destruction and restoring peace and stability in a world of conflicts.

Addressing a symposium organised by the United Nations Association of Bangladesh at a local hotel yesterday to observe the United Nations Day, the Foreign Minister said that Bangladesh is deeply concerned over the deterioration in the international scene and appealed for a lasting solution rather than a piecemeal one for the interlinked problems affecting the whole globe. Mr. Doha said that no such solution could be achieved as long as economic injustice and imbalance prevailed.

Condemning the Israeli aggression and atrocities in West Asia the Foreign Minister said that no just and lasting peace in the region was possible unless the Palestinian people could exercise their legitimate right of establishing an independent homeland of their own with Jerusalem as its capital. referring to the Gulf war the minister hoped that the UN would exert more pressures in concert with the non-aligned movement and Islamic conference to persuade both the warring parties to cease hostilities.

The minister said that the arms race was the most significant obstacle to world peace and development. Peace and development are indivisible and both can be achieved to a large extent--through effective disarmament, he said he called for united and concerted efforts in this connection to curb the arms race.

Praising the role of the world body in the socio economic field Mr. Doha said that the present world economic crisis was the result of structural imbalance and a lasting improvement in this field could only be reached through a global dialogue between the developed and the developing nations. He said that Bangladesh will continue to play its role as the chairman of Group of 77.

He said that Bangladesh is determined to play a meaningful and constructive role in finding just and equitable solutions to the problems confronting the world today.

Mr. Uno said that the UN attached much importance to the views, of the non-governmental organisations and the role played by them. He hoped that such organisations in Bangladesh would render enough contribution to the attainment of the common goal of the UN.

Prof. Kabir Chowdhury in his speech said that in the socio-economic sphere UN agencies had considerable contribution but in case of promoting world peace the UN seemed to have achieved a limited success.

Prof. Chowdhury said that since 1945, according to UN experts, 143 wars broke out. At present 50 thousand atomic and hydrogen bombs are stockpile in the arsenals of the superpowers. The annual budget for the arms race is 600 billion US dollar.

Prof. Salahuddin Ahmed in his presidential speech said that the UN was moving ahead despite its many shortcomings and it was the people that it represents that will decide the UN's future.

CSO: 4600/1380

FOREIGN MINISTER SENDS MESSAGE TO PRC COUNTERPART

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 20 Nov 82 p 1

[Text] Foreign Minister Mr A. R. Shamsud Doha on Friday extended warm felicitations and sincere greetings to Mr Wu Xueqian on his appointment as the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China reports BSS.

In a message Mr Doha wished Mr. Wu all success in his high office and expressed confidence that the very close bonds of friendship and mutual trust existing between the two countries would be further widened and deepened in the years ahead.

The Foreign Minister in his message to Mr Wu Xueqian said:

'Excellency please accept my warm felicitations and sincere greetings on your appointment as the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.

'While wishing you all success in your high office I remain confident that the very close bonds of friendship and mutual trust so happily existing between our two neighbourly countries will be further widened and deepened in the years to come to the mutual benefit of our two countries and peoples.

'I take this opportunity to convey my best wishes for your personal health and happiness and for the continued peace and prosperity of the friendly people of the People's Republic of China. Please accept Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration'.

CSO: 4600/1393

LABOR MINISTER SPEAKS ON EXPORT OF MANPOWER

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 24 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] Air-Vice Marshal (Retd) K. M. Aminul Islam Minister for Labour and Manpower said on Tuesday that at present the manpower export business had become cleaner and the process had been streamlined. There will be employment opportunities for about 15 lakh people in different countries particularly in the Middle East by 1985 he said quoting a recent World Bank survey report.

Talking to newsmen at his office chamber on the day the Manpower Minister said "if we can properly train our people, we will be able to get a good share of this employment opportunities."

Listing the measures taken up by the Government for streamlining the manpower business the Minister said, that many unscrupulous and fake manpower agents have been detected and dealt with under the existing law of the country and many more cases were being scrutinised. The cases are now being scrutinised in our missions abroad and at the Bureau of Manpower office so that innocent job seekers are not cheated by way of false no objection certificates forged passports forged visa and other documents he said.

The other steps to make the business cleaner include: Vigilance.

On activities of recruiting agencies so that prohibitive amount of money cannot be realised from job seekers the system of procurement of individual and group NOC's are being encouraged and efforts to send people abroad more through the government channel are being made the Minister said.

Besides cases which cannot be decided at the level of Bureau of Manpower office are now being referred to the Ministry for decision.

The Manpower Minister further said that there is a good prospect of jobs for teachers of English Mathematics and Science subjects in Jordan. He said that knowledge of Arabic would be required for such teachers.

Air-Vice Marshal (Retd) Aminul Islam said "we are going to set up our missions in Oman and Bahrain soon". There will be exchange of delegations with those countries for sending our people on employment in larger number he hoped.

Narrating his recent experience of promotional tour to some of the Middle Eastern countries, he said that the response had been quite encouraging.

Replying to questions the Minister said that the Government was trying to fix up the amount in case of employment through manpower agent Employment through the Government Channel does not require any money he added.

Talking about the manpower policy which is expected to be announced by the government, the Minister said that due emphasis would be given to the promotional activities of manpower export welfare of the wage earners and proper utilisations of the remittances.

The Minister said that of the total person sent abroad so far only 10 per cent people got employment through the Government channel as the government was not acting as a recruiting medium. He said that about 50 per cent obtained their employments through individual efforts--that is jobs arranged by relatives and 38 to 40 per cent went through recruiting agents.

As regards delay in processing the case the Minister said that as there were cases of forged NOCs and other documents, the Bureau of Manpower has to scrutinise the cases in detail.

He said that the Government has been trying to pursue the recruiting agents not to charge more than Taka 2000 for each case in addition to what is needed for travelling expenditure.

CSO: 4600/1402

MINISTER STRESSES NEED FOR RURAL ELECTRIFICATION

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 16 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator and Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud on Monday inaugurated an international workshop on "productive use of rural electricity" reaffirming a total commitment of the government to implement "area coverage rural electrification" programme reports BSS.

Describing electric power as the prime mover of the economic wheel, the DCMLA said electricity which is considered to be the basic input of modern economy has far reaching and multidimensional impact on various sectors of economy in developing countries like Bangladesh.

The 5 day workshop being held in cooperation with USAID and National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) USA is being attended by nearly two dozen participants from seven countries of Asia. Delegates from USA and donor agencies like USAID World Bank Asian Development Bank and Finland are also participating in the workshop said to be first of its kind to take place in a developing country Rural Electrification Board (REB) Bangladesh is hosting the workshop.

Mr Edward Gaither leader of Feasibility study for rural electrification in Bangladesh undertaken in 1976-77 and team leader of consultants for the first phase of rural electrification in the country presented a paper on total commitment to area coverage for rural electrification at the inaugural session Mr Samuel Bunker Administrator International Programme Division NRECA Washington briefed about the productive uses of rural electrification through audio visual presentation. The Chairman REB Brig Sabihuddin Ahmed gave an outline and objective of the workshop.

Air Vice Martial Sultan Mahmud said though the rural electrification programme in Bangladesh was still at an early stage its productive use and performances has far exceeded expectation. He hoped the exchange of views at the workshop will help the solutions of many outstanding problems in rural electrification common to most of the developing countries.

The DCMLA thanked the USAID and NRECA for selecting Bangladesh as the venue of the workshop and appreciated their assistance and donors' contribution in the rural electrification programme of the country.

Rural Electrification Board came into being in June 1978 and the first system was energized after two years in June 1980. Till June 1982 3420 miles distribution line have been constructed creating connection facilities for 2,13,605 families 1622 power pumps and over 600 industrial and commercial units in rural Bangladesh. The board has drawn out a master plan to develop an infrastructure of total electrification of the country in five phases over a period of 18 years ending 1995 to cover 90 per cent of the habital area.

Scheme Lauded

A strong and active productive uses programme is going to make the Bangladesh rural electrification scheme one of the most successful in the world, Mr. Edward Gaither Regional Administrator, Asia and Pacific of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) of the USA said in Dhaka on Monday.

In his paper "Bangladesh total commitment to area coverage rural electrification" presented at the international workshop on productive use of electricity co-hosted by the rural electrification feasibility study funded by the USAID in the initial days, said that programme has been so successful that the REB has developed a master plan to extend area coverage rural electrification to all rural Bangladesh. We anticipate no problems in securing continued foreign exchange funding as long as the programme continues to be successful he said.

Commending the Bangladesh schemes Mr Thomas Niblock an international consultant in his proper importance of an effective productive uses programme said that there were no two opinions about the fact that rural electrification is one of the keys to economic and social progress. There is growing evidence, he said, rural electrification by expanding irrigation has had a major role to play in the rise of faad production in many countries. In some cases village electrification proved to be one of the most effective ways to mobilize the private sector of economy and local initiative, he said.

Mr. Niblock observed that bringing of electric power to rural communities could help stimulate creativity and local private initiative and mobilize local leadership for development.

Describing the Bangladesh electrification programmes new and dynamic Mr. Niblock said by giving serious attention to opportunities for productive use of electric power and by doing a better job of documenting performance and trend by linking rural electrification to achieve important national goals Bangladesh has been able to draw attention from international lending agencies as well as national development planners.

The session was also addressed by Dr. Shvam Runguta of Asian Development Bank and Mr. John Holl World Bank resident mission in Bangladesh.

CSO: 4600/1388

ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE SLATED FOR 1983

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 Nov 82 pp 1, 12

[Text] The thirteenth Islamic Foreign Ministers conference will be held in Dhaka in December next year a Foreign Office spokesman announced in Dhaka on Sunday reports BSS.

The unanimous decision to select Dhaka as the venue for the conference was taken at the 12th Islamic Foreign Ministers conference held at Niamey Niger in August this year. Strong endorsement from Saudi Arabia, Morocco and the PLO led to this choice by universal acclaim the spokesman said.

He said this was a singular honour accorded to Bangladesh and "exemplifies the success of our foreign policy" and pointed out that in the past several attempts were made without success to hold this conference in Dhaka.

The choice at Niamey the spokesman observed indicated the respect that Bangladesh had earned in the Islamic world it is a matter of "great pride for us" that this is for the first time a conference of such magnitude is being held in this country he added.

The spokesman said that hosting of the conference in Dhaka would go a long way in further cementing the fraternal ties with the Islamic Ummah and would also promote "our national interest".

"Our healthy participation in cooperation with the Islamic countries has been widely acclaimed in the Islamic world and has significantly contributed towards the strengthening of our bonds with the Islamic brethren" he added.

The spokesman pointed out that Bangladesh's active association with various Islamic forum had also led to the establishment of the Islamic Centre for Technical and Vocational Training and Research at Tongi. The centre is expected to be completed before the conference next year and it would provide trained manpower to the Islamic world he said.

CSO: 4600/1400

ERSHAD SENDS MESSAGE ON BHASHANI DEATH ANNIVERSARY

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 16 Nov 82 p 1

[Text] Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt Gen H M Ershad said on Monday night that the aim and endeavours of Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani were to establish a real democratic, just and exploitation-free society ending the status quo.

In a message on the occasion, of the sixth death anniversary of the late national leader, Gen Ershad paid glowing tributes to Moulana Bhashani describing him as a friend in bad days and in good ones of the poor oppressed and the unfortunate teeming millions.

The CMLA said, "we firmly believe that the best way to pay respect to the great leader and evaluate his ideals and philosophy is to improve the lot of the poor."

He called upon the people to take a vow to achieve that objective on the day of observance of the death anniversary of this great national leader.

Gen. Ershad said, "I join the countrymen in expressing my deep regards to his memories" and added Moulana Bhashani was the most beloved, popular and well-known mass leader.

Bold Voice

He said that his bold and uncompromising voice against injustice and oppression would remain ever fresh in the minds of the people of Bengal.

The CMLA said that it was unparalleled in the history the way he fought all throughout his life for safeguarding the interests of the working class people forgetting his personal interests.

The CMLA said that this great leader of rare sagacity and farsightedness was a believer in the revolutionary way of life on the one hand and was one of the courageous exponents of world peace on the other. It was his urge that teaching of Islam's universal and human values will influence the thoughts, hopes and aspirations of the people of this country, he added.

Gen. Ershad said, "we are respectful to the people and rural-oriented leadership shown by Moulana Bhashani. With this end in view, we have declared jihad [as published] to weed out corruption and exploitation from the social life."

The CMLA expressed "our firm resolution to improve the lot of the people through creation of a new Bangladesh" translating the dreams of the leaders like Bhashani into reality in all fields of the national life.

He said already thana-based new administrative programmes had been launched to make the people self-reliant.

CSO: 4600/1390

ERSHAD SPEAKS AT ARMED FORCES DAY RECEPTION

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 Nov 82 pp 1, 12

[Text] The Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad said in Dhaka on Sunday that the country's Armed Forces were ever ready to resist any attack external or internal on the national independence and sovereignty reportssBSS.

Speaking at a reception on the occasion of the observance of the Armed Forces Day the CMLA said "We are always with the people and will be with them in the coming days. It is our sacred pledge."

President A. F. M. Ahsanuddin Chowdhury who attended the reception as Chief guest also spoke on the occasion.

The CMLA said that the members of the Armed Forces were promise bound to engage their total strength for the greater welfare of the people. He said that the nation had taken a vow to build a "New Bangladesh" and urged the people from all strata to extend their hands of cooperation to achieve this goal.

Gen. Ershad who is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces made a call for total dedication in the interest of the country and the people and said "let us march forward unitedly to build the country by reviving the lost spirit of the Liberation War."

Referring to the significance of the day he said that on this day in 1971 the newly built Army, Navy and Air Force of Bangladesh launched united and coordinated attacks on the occupation troops in the war fields and succeeded in liberating considerable chunk of the motherland. The CMLA said that the success of that day had helped the nation in achieving the supreme victory within a short period of time. He said at that stage of the Liberation War the people and Armed Forces fought unitedly against the occupation forces.

Gen. Ershad said that a strong bond of unity, confidence and cooperation was established between the people and the Armed Forces during the armed struggle to liberate the country. The subsequent events after the liberation of the country had made that bond more stronger, he added.

He pointed out that the armed struggle of 1971 was not aimed at political independence only and said rather the people wanted their economic emancipation side by side with the political independence. Without economic emancipation political freedom is meaningless, he added.

The CMLA said it was unfortunate that even after twelve years of independence we could not bring smile on the faces of the common people due to indulgence of trickers deception and corruption by a handful of people.

Gen. Ershad said that on March 24, the Armed Forces came forward to discharge the sacred responsibility of protecting the country from destruction. At that time it was facing extreme crisis of chaos, indiscipline and corruptions, he added. The Armed Forces, he said, took over power with the spontaneous support and cooperation of the people.

He said that after coming to power, the Government had taken various practical and people oriented measures in economic, administrative, judicial and educational fields. He said that the fruits of these measures had already started reaching the people.

The CMLA asserted that the process of achieving overall economic development and making the armed forces professionally efficient and stronger would have to be continued. He hoped that the members of the Armed Forces, especially the officers would play significant role in this regard. He expressed the confidence that they would discharge their responsibilities with efficiency honesty sincerety and discipline.

Speaking as chief guest at the reception President Ahsanuddin Chowdhury said that observance of the Day in a befitting manner would further the traditional unity and understanding existing between the people and the Armed Forces.

He said that the patriotic Armed Forces had to take over the great responsibility of running the administration at a time of extreme national crisis. Braving various difficulties and challenges they not only saved the country from an imminent disaster, but also generated new spirit in the national life, he pointed out.

President Ahsanuddin said that the people had engaged themselves in national reconstruction, with a new hope and inspiration along with the armed forces.

He expressed the confidence that the heroic soldiers of the Armed Forces who set up a great tradition of sacrifice, skill, sincerity and honesty at the time of Liberation War would be able to uphold that tradition by overcoming the present difficulties.

The DCMLAs--Rear Admiral M. A. Khan and Air Vice-Marshal Sultan Mahmud, Cabinet Ministers, members of the diplomatic corps and high ranking civil and military officials were among others, who attended the reception.

CSO: 4600/1400

ERSHAD CALLS ON PEOPLE TO EAT LESS RICE, MORE POTATOES

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 21 Nov 82 p 1

[Text] The Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad inaugurated a three day potato exhibition at the Shilpakala Academy premises on Saturday with a call to the people to change their food habits for easing pressure on rice.

The CMLA said that the country could not be self sufficient in food unless the pressure on rice could be reduced. He advised people to take potato as a substitute to rice. He said that people in many countries take rice but Bangladesh is the highest consumer of rice. He believed that if the people could change their food habit and start taking potato and vegetables, the country could save huge amount of foreign exchange as rice is the most expensive food item. To achieve this goal our people should be educated and motivated he emphasised.

The CMLA said that the production of potato in the country this year amounted to 10 lakh tons. He also mentioned that 47 lakh maunds of potato were now stockpiled in cold storages. He said that to boost potato production and ensure good price to the growers, government was trying to export potato.

After inaugurating the exhibition the CMLA went round different stalls and evinced keen interest in various preparations from potato on sale at the stalls. Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators, Rear Admiral M. A. Khan and Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud, Cabinet Members heads of diplomatic missions and high ranking civil and military officials also went round the stalls along with the CMLA.

Organised by Bangladesh Agriculture Development Corporation (BADC) the exhibition will remain open till Monday from 3 p.m. to 8 p.m. The last day will be exclusively for ladies.

About 22 stalls have been opened at the exhibition. The stalls of Lalana Chakra of Narayanganj, Home Economics College, Bangladesh Mahila Sangha, Apex Ladies Club of Munshiganj, Hotel Green, Hotel Imania of Comilla, Bangladesh Cold Storage Association Ruchita Restaurant, Navy Family Welfare stall and BADC are attracting people of all sections, particularly the housewives, with different types of dishes and items made of potato.

AGREEMENTS ASSIGNED WITH UK ON ASSISTANCE TO DHAKA

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 Nov 82 pp 1, 12

[Text] Under two separate agreements Britain will provide Bangladesh assistance worth 27.36 million Pound sterling (equivalent to Taka 106.70 crore).

The agreements were signed by Mr. A. M. A. Muhith, Minister of Finance and Planning, and the visiting British Minister for Overseas Development Mr. Neil Marten, PC MP on behalf of their respective governments at the conference room of the Planning Commission in Dhaka on Sunday.

Of the two agreements, one relates to British co-financing of 17.36 million Pound sterling (worth Taka 67.70 crore) for the Deep Tubewells-II Project with IDA and Australia. The other agreement is for a 10 million pound commodity aid grant by Britain to be used by Bangladesh for the purchase of raw materials fertilizers, components spare parts and small items of capital equipment.

Addressing a Press conference after the signing of the agreements, the British Minister for Overseas Development Mr. Neil Marten, said that Britain "is committed to support economic development efforts in Bangladesh". He noted that the British assistance to Bangladesh since the latter's independence totalled Taka 1170 crore. "This is quite a substantial amount", he felt while pointing out that his country would have certainly felt better with more assistance to Bangladesh had not "we been beset with our own economic problems including rising unemployment rates". He observed that within its own constraints, Britain had done its best for Bangladesh.

Replying to a question Mr. Marten said that Bangladesh was one of the largest recipients of British aid in Asia. "Globally speaking, we have been offering assistance to as many as 130 countries and Bangladesh is the third largest recipient of British assistance on a global scale" he told the newsmen. He noted that India and Sudan were the first and the second largest recipient of British assistance.

The British Minister pointed out that his country besides offering assistance to Bangladesh on bilateral basis, had been providing funds for the multilateral and other donor agencies including UNDP EEC etc. which provided in turn development assistance to countries like Bangladesh. He recalled that about 20 per

cent of EEC's funds for assistance came from Britain. The individual contributions of British citizens to the charitable organisations engaged in overseas development and other activities are also substantial he added.

About the two agreements signed between the two countries on the day, Mr. Marten stated that the British contributions of 17.36 million Pound sterling for the irrigation project would include a grant of 15 million pound sterling for purchase of irrigation equipment and another amount up to 2.36 million Pound sterling for consultancy services. It is proposed under the project to install 4,000 new deep tubewells to the north of Dhaka over the next four years benefiting directly 300,000 farming families through increased agricultural production and higher earnings.

The second agreement for 10 million Pound commodity aid grant will facilitate Bangladesh to meet some import requirements in sectors such as jute, steel transport engineering and agriculture he pointed out. The commodity aid grant is tied to procurement from the UK only. When asked whether the tied nature of the commodity grant would entail some extra burden on Bangladesh, Mr. Marten felt that the problems if any would be sorted out through further discussions.

About his visit to Bangladesh, Mr. Marten noted that he was much impressed by the efforts of the people here in helping themselves for boosting agricultural production. He was all praise for the Comilla-based Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD). He also spoke highly of the activities of the charitable organisations like the Save The Children's Fund.

He felt that the current development activities in Bangladesh could make one hopeful of seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. "I can see the country gearing itself up", he observed while stating that "if you succeed with stability, you have a good future". "I wish you good luck on and I shall be watching your progress most carefully", he added.

The British Minister said that his original tour programme in Bangladesh had to be squeezed owing to his return home earlier than was programmed before in connection with urgent parliamentary business. He stated that he would come to Dhaka again next year to finish his visit.

Replying to a question about the possibility of an early resumption of North-South dialogue, he felt that the issue involved many countries both developed and developing ones and an agenda had to be agreed upon for the talks to start afresh. About the new international economic order, he opted for having more patience and doing more hard work for attainment of its objective.

Asked about the possibility of any cut-back in Britain's overseas assistance programme next year in view of her economic condition, he said that there might be small increase in British assistance programme particularly through multi-lateral agencies. He added that Bangladesh being a member of the Commonwealth would continue to receive important consideration from Britain in matters of development assistance.

DHAKA, PRC SIGN TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROTOCOL

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 24 Nov 82 p 1

[Text] Bangladesh and China in Dhaka on Tuesday concluded the annual protocol for 1982 on scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries, reports BSS.

The visiting Chinese Vice Minister for Forestry Mr Dong Zhiyong, and the Secretary of the External Resources Division Mr Mofizur Rahman, signed the protocol on behalf of their respective countries. The signing of the protocol was preceded by bilateral talks between the delegations of the two sides.

Under the agreement, next year, study visits from Bangladesh to China will take place on sericulture, silk industries, mini hydro power station, biogas and renewable energy technology, handicraft and cottage industry pottery and utilization of natural gas for producing fertilizer.

In addition, China will also supply jute seeds Kenaf seeds (30 grams), jute (Corchorous SPP 30 grams) high yielding scented rice (200 grams) and fingerlings of black carp (5000 pieces).

Under the protocol, during the same period study visits from China side to Bangladesh will take place on management and utilisation of bamboo groves medium and small scale jute-textile enterprises, production technology and equipment of jute carpet backing, production and technology of chip board made of jute sticks, flood control and harnessing of water resources along the lower reaches of the Ganges River and on fishery and aquatic products, Besides, Bangladesh will supply jute seeds, white fibre jute seeds kenaf (20 grams for each species) mesta & fries of catla fishes (500 pieces).

CSO: 4600/1402

ACTIVITIES OF DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR IN MOSCOW REPORTED

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH ORSERVER in English 15 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] The DCMLA and Minister for Communications Rear Admiral M. A. Khan arrived here this afternoon to attend the funeral of the late President Leonid Brezhnev tomorrow reports BSS.

He was received at the airport by Mr Nikolai Zajchenko Deputy Chairman of the Chamber of the Soviet Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and other senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bangladesh Ambassador Mr M. R. Ahmad and other officials of the Embassy were also present at the airport.

The Soviet Deputy Chairman said that he felt greatly honoured to receive the Bangladesh leader on behalf of the Soviet Government and expressed the deep gratitude of the Government and the people of the USSR for his arrival in Moscow to convey the condolences on behalf of the Government and the people of Bangladesh of the sad demise of their great leader Mr Brezhnev.

He said that during the time of late President Mr Brehznev Bangladesh and the Soviet Union had developed close friendship and excellent cooperation. He assured that there would not be any change in the policy of friendship and goodwill towards Bangladesh in future as followed during the time of the late President.

While replying the DCMLA mentioned the close ties of friendship and cooperation existing between the two governments and the peoples.

He expressed the strong desire of the present government for further development of friendship and cooperation between the two countries in the coming years.

Rear Admiral Khan said Bangladesh shares the sorrow of the death of President Brezhnev with the people of the Soviet Union. He also conveyed the personal condolence of the CMLA Lt Gen H. M. Ershad on this occasion to the government and the people of the Soviet Union. He paid his sincere tribute to the late President Mr Brezhnev for his great contribution towards the cause of world peace mutual understanding and friendship amongst the nations of the world.

From the airport the DCMLA went to the hall of columns where the late President is lying in state and placed the wreath on behalf of the government and the people of Bangladesh. The DCMLA will attend the state funeral ceremony at 12:00 noon tomorrow at the Red Square along with other dignitaries.

A report from New Delhi says: The DCMLA and Minister for Communications Rear Admiral M. A. Khan made a brief stop over here today on his way to Moscow to attend the funeral of the late Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev.

The DCMLA who will represent Bangladesh at the funeral tomorrow arrived here this morning from Dhaka via Calcutta. He left for Moscow after the brief stop-over at Palam Airport.

CSO: 4600/1385

POOR STATE OF BANGLADESH ECONOMY EXAMINED

London ARABIA - THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Dec 82, pp 22-24

[Text]

The seeds of Bangladesh were planted by the economic imbalance between East and West Pakistan. From its inception, Pakistan faced a unique regional problem: it was, up to late 1971, the only country in the world with its two wings separated by a thousand miles. The problem of communications was made worse by the cool relations with India.

The economic structure of East Pakistan was radically different from that of the western wing. The two populations had distinct political developments.

Pakistan's economic development and growth can be divided into three phases. In the first period (1947-59), the economy was more or less stagnant. Industrialisation proceeded, but there was no breakthrough in agriculture. In the second period (1959-68), Pakistan became a model "success story" in the eyes of the Harvard economists who had helped to prepare the economic blueprint.

An average growth rate of six per cent was achieved in the second plan period (1960-64), and in 1967-68 the GNP grew by 8.3 per cent. Large-scale manufacturing maintained its rate of expansion, and the agricultural sector improved considerably.

Moreover, the structure of the economy changed significantly during this period: between 1950 and 1970, the share of agriculture in total output fell from 60 to 45 per cent, while the contribution from large-scale manufacturing (which grew three times faster than agriculture) rose from 6 to 12 per cent. At the same time cotton and wheat production, mainly in the Punjab and Sind, also increased rapidly.

These developments were based on a government strategy that placed maximum emphasis on achieving the highest possible growth rates from year to year. The high rates were made possible by the ready availability of foreign aid and the potential for substituting

imports of consumer goods by domestic equivalents.

However, the planners deliberately ignored the costs of such a strategy. The system of import controls, foreign-exchange rationing and tariffs that was devised to speed industrialisation produced highly inefficient and non-competitive industrial enterprises. As the 1960s ended, it became evident that "easy" import-substitution was no longer feasible, and that the economy was more than ever dependent on increased foreign aid.

However, after the 1965 war with India this aid was no longer freely available. The collapse of the economic structure based on the policies of the second and third five-year development plans thus became inevitable.

Pakistan's regional problem should be viewed in this perspective. "Planned imbalance" and the policy of allowing a free hand to the private sector led to the emergence of an economic structure characterised by regional disparities in production and investment. Several factors existed at the time of independence that made it inevitable that any budding capitalist would almost invariably prefer to invest in the country's western wing. A far-sighted government would have seen that if initiative was left to the private sector, the "logic of the market" would only accentuate regional disparities.

In 1949-50, the Gross Provincial Product (GPP) of East Pakistan was 86 per cent of West Pakistan's. By 1967-68, it was around 65 per cent. Per-capita income grew more slowly in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan in every year of the period - some years, indeed, saw negative rates in East Pakistan.

Not surprisingly, the structural change that took place in Pakistan was more pronounced in the west. In 1967-68, the share of agriculture in East Pakistan's GPP was 55 per cent, against 45 per cent in the western wing. That year,

manufacturers accounted for 11 per cent of GPP in West Pakistan, against 7.5 per cent in the east.

The patterns of savings, investment and trade were also quite different in the two wings. Throughout the period, East Pakistan got only 32 per cent of total investment allocations. Moreover, its share had consistently declined. The east's ratio of investment to GPP was about half that in the west. However, the disparity in savings rates was much smaller, the savings-GPP ratio in the east being about 70 per cent that in the west.

In other words, the gap between savings and investment was much smaller in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan. Indeed, Bengali economists argued that East Pakistan financed all of its provincial investment itself – and even, perhaps, provided resources for investment in the western wing.

The disparity in investment rates primarily reflected the unwillingness of the private sector to invest in East Bengal. In Pakistan's first twenty years, less than 25 per cent of total private investment was in the eastern province. Moreover, the public sector failed to fill the gap: except in the third plan period, public investment per capita in East Pakistan was about one third of that in West Pakistan.

Moreover, only a fraction of this public investment was for development purposes. Industry received only 8 per cent of total public investment funds, while public funding in agriculture was negligible. Hence the East Pakistani economy could not turn to public funds for rapid industrial or agricultural development.

The doctrine of Bengali nationalism was crucially sustained by the argument that "West Pakistan is exploiting Bengal." A group of American-trained economists methodically spread the view that a separation of the wings would be an essential first step in the rejuvenation of East Bengal's economy. Bengal freed of Pakistani thralldom would, the argument ran, become the Switzerland of Asia.

This message was carried to the villages and urban slums of the east by the socialist and communist disciples of the American-trained Bengali economists. When the Awami League took power in 1972, an influential group of these economists – including Nur ul Islam, Anisur Rahman and Rahman Sobhan – were installed as the government's chief economic advisers. What have their accomplishments been?

In 1970, the per-capita GNP in East Bengal was about 68 per cent of West Pakistan's. In 1980, after a decade of independence, Bangladesh's GDP is only 40 per cent of Pakistan's, which grew at an average rate of 4.7 per cent

during 1970-80. Bangladesh grew at the annual rate of 3.9 per cent in the same period.

Agriculture accounts for only 31 per cent of Pakistan's GNP; in Bangladesh, its share is 54 per cent. As against this, manufacturing contributes 12 per cent of total production in Pakistan and only 7 per cent in Bangladesh. Gross domestic savings represented just 2 per cent of Bangladesh's GDP in 1980, in Pakistan 6 per cent. Gross domestic investment, on the other hand, was 17 per cent of GDP in Bangladesh and 18 per cent in Pakistan.

The mismatch between domestic savings and investment – and hence the dependence on foreign investment and aid – is much greater in Bangladesh. On average, Bangladeshi exports actually declined by 1.4 per cent a year during 1970-80, while Pakistan's exports grew by 1.2 per cent annually. By whatever criteria one chooses, the disparity between the west and the east has accelerated since Bangladesh's independence.

Who is exploiting Bangladesh now? Professor Nur ul Islam and his friends need not answer this question, as they have left Bangladesh for safe jobs in American universities and international organisations. Those who remain behind, like Rahman Sobhan, assiduously cultivate links with foreign institutions, such as the University of Massachusetts and ESCAP, to keep their options open. Meanwhile, Bangladesh continues to stagnate.

The government of Bangladesh has experimented with a whole gamut of economic policies for revitalising the economy. In Mujib's days, emphasis was put on the rapid development of public-sector enterprises.

They were expected to become the economy's most dynamic sector. In fact, they became fountainheads of economic corruption, and turned in a consistently abysmal performance. Disillusionment with these enterprises became widespread in the Ziaur Rahman administration, which at the behest of the World Bank and the IMF committed itself to privatisation.

In early 1982, the IMF made it clear that unless privatisation and a gradual reduction of subsidies to key commodity producers were not pursued with vigour, soft loans and SDR-linked borrowing facilities would no longer be available. Justice Abdus Sattar's government moved quickly to appease the IMF by appointing Dr M N Huda, an IMF-World Bank protege, as the country's vice-president. Although this appointment was shortlived, the present Ershad administration will probably continue to seek IMF favour and accelerate the process of privatisation.

This process will increase Bangladesh's international economic vulnerability. Faced

with a domestically stagnant market, private firms are likely to develop an export orientation – however, Bangladesh's commodity terms of trade have declined by over 20 per cent since 1971, and there are no prospects of improvement.

"Privatisation" is also likely to mean liberalisation of controls on profit repatriation. Transnationals are strongly represented in Bangladesh and, as the chairman of Bangladesh Oxygen (a subsidiary of British Oxygen International) told the *Far Eastern Economic Review*: "All of us are making a lot of money. We operate in a sheltered market."

The rulers of Bangladesh have failed to restructure the country's economy because very little attention has been paid to the task of reorienting the agricultural sector. The flourishing economy of Bengal was destroyed by the British in the 1700s and 1800s by introducing the absentee-landlord (zamindari) system of tenure into the countryside. The system survives: absentee landlords were the mainstay of both Sheikh Mujib's Awami League and Ziaur Rahman's Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Neither party dared to touch their political or economic power.

Their domination of the Bangladeshi countryside has meant ruin for the rural economy. Bangladesh's population has grown annually by 2.6 per cent in 1970-80, while agricultural production expanded by only 2.2 per cent. This meant a decline of 6 per cent in the index of per-capita food production over the decade.

Ziaur Rahman's attempts at agricultural reforms were halfhearted and mainly cosme-

tic. His regime consolidated the hold of the absentee landlords, and channelled most of the aid funds their way. They also appropriated the lion's share of the government's agricultural credit. The poor did not benefit from government support schemes within the rural sector.

Over 45 million people – more than half Bangladesh's population, and almost 60 per cent of the rural count – are now landless, with little hope of employment in either town or country. Unemployment is high, and the income distribution pattern highly skewed. The richest 10 per cent of the population takes over 27 per cent of the national income.

Revitalisation of the economy requires, above all, the development of a new institutional infrastructure, one that can combine the people's native skills with the country's resources. These natural riches include a rich soil, abundant water and a largely unexploited reservoir of oil and gas. They can all be utilised for the benefit of the country only if new grassroots economic institutions are created to free the common people from the economic tyranny of capitalist enterprise and the state.

These new institutions must be based on the rich historical traditions of Muslim Bengal, that made Bengal the most prosperous province of Muslim India. One English visitor of the 18th century described Bengal as a "wonderful land (whose) richness and abundance neither war, pestilence nor oppression could destroy." History has shown "that he underestimated his countrymen."

Bangladesh At a Glance

Location: Between 21°30 and 27°29 north latitude, 88°01 and 92°52 east longitude

Area: 138,995 sq km

Forest area: 21,250 sq km (15 per cent of total)

Seaports: Chittagong and Chalna

Airports: Dakha, Chittagong, Jessore, Ishwardi, Sylhet, Cox's Bazar, Comilla, Thakurgaon

Communication: Road, rail and water communication exists between Dakha and other districts. Bangladesh Biman, the national airline, connects major towns and cities. From abroad Dakha can be reached by Bangladesh Birman, PIA, Air India, British Airways, Thai International and Aeroflot

Waterways: 8,436 km (during monsoon), 5,224 km (dry season)

Principal Rivers: Meghna, Padma, Brahmaputra, Jamuna, Teesta, Surma, Karnaphuli

Railways: 2,875 km

Paved roads: 11,076 km

Number of villages: 68,018

Population: 88.5 million with an annual growth rate of 2.8 per cent. Urban population 8.78 per cent, rural 91.22 per cent

Structure of Gross Domestic Product 1980

Agriculture 55.3 percent; Manufacturing 8.4; Construction 4.5; Power and gas 0.8; Housing 4.7; Trade, transport and other services 25.1

Population trends

(East Bengal 1901-51, East Pakistan 1951-71, Bangladesh 1971-81)

Population	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971	1981
Total population (million)	28.92	31.55	33.25	35.60	41.99	42.06	50.84	73.96	88.5
% increase	-	9.09	5.39	7.07	17.94	0.28	20.87	44.29	19.7
Crude birth rate	49	49	49	49	-	62	58	53	45
Crude death rate	37	37	30	30	-	49	32	12	18
Expectancy of life at birth	-	-	-	-	32	32	48	53	46
Persons per square mile	381	630	668	715	841	841	923	1300	1400
Persons per square mile of cultivated area	-	-	-	-	-	1200	1400	-	-
% rural population	97.57	97.46	97.36	96.98	96.64	95.66	94.81	-	-
% urban population	2.43	2.54	2.64	3.02	3.36	4.34	5.19	-	-
Religion									
% Muslim	66.07	67.19	68.10	69.46	70.26	76.85	80.42	-	83.21
% Hindu	33.00	31.54	30.57	29.36	27.97	22.04	18.43	-	15.54
% Others	0.93	1.27	1.33	1.18	1.77	1.11	1.15	-	1.25
Language									
% Bengali	-	-	-	-	-	98.16	98.43	-	99.01
% Urdu (and Hindi)	-	-	-	-	-	0.63	0.60	-	0.57
% Others	-	-	-	-	-	1.21	0.97	-	-
Age Structure									
% under 15 years	42.11	43.33	42.25	40.93	41.23	41.50	45.10	48.91	46.00
% 15-29 years	43.46	52.60	53.70	55.53	54.82	53.50	49.70	46.49	49.38
% 60 years and over	4.43	4.07	4.05	3.54	3.95	5.00	5.20	4.60	4.62
Total dependency ratio	1.00	0.90	0.86	0.78	0.82	0.87	1.05	1.15	1.02
Median age	18.49	18.04	18.56	18.93	19.07	18.44	17.53	17.00	-

Population Trends (Continued)

Sex structure

Rural sex ratio (males
per 1000 females)

1026 1036 1047 1050 1060 1085 1060 1050 -

Urban sex ratio

1364 1373 1340 1364 1729 1507 1423 1326 -

Literacy

% male literates

10.00 13.90 15.35 15.45 18.80 25.60 31.45 - 33.5

% female literates

0.55 1.00 1.73 2.89 5.00 6.32 10.65 - 11.4

CSO: 4200/282

PAPER REPORTS 'EXCLUSIVE' INTERVIEW WITH MUHITH

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 14 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Article by Hossain Khasru and Musleh A. Tarek]

[Text] At a time when the official projections about the forward movement of the economy has lost much of its validity and relevance in the face of continuing sluggishness of the economy. Finance and Planning Minister A. M. A. Muhith remains as optimistic as before.

He is optimistic on two counts: the upsurge in economic activities will steadily begin, as anticipated before, from the current month and the public sector development program with its greater accent on rural upliftment activities would succeed in bringing about the desired change in the investment pattern.

In an exclusive interview with HOLIDAY last week, the Finance and Planning Minister gave a review of the performance of the economy over the first four months of the current fiscal year while stating that the economic resilience during the upcoming months would largely depend on the investment activities in the private sector.

Mr Muhith noted that the revenue collections of the government during the first quarter of the year till September, '82 were at the level of 22 percent of the annual target. Though there has been a slack in the import trade, the revenue collections had not fallen much below the quarterly target, he felt.

The realization of taxes on untaxed income under martial law regulation-V and the collection of duties on carried-over imports of the last year made sizeable contributions to the national exchequer in the form of revenue receipts during July-September period of the current financial year, he added.

About the production performance, Mr Muhith observed that the production levels in jute, textile and fertilizer factories had maintained an uptrend during July-September period this year. But the production in cement and also in engineering sectors had slowed down.

Food

He admitted that the loss in food crop production due to drought and flood had caused a setback in the agricultural sector. Efforts are being made now to recoup the loss through increased production of boro and wheat crops, he said.

About the wheat cultivation program, he however, said that there existed the problem of availability of seeds while mentioning that the "seed problem is there in the subcontinent this year."

The finance minister said that in view of the food production loss, the government was now working on a 15.23 million production figure, instead of the earlier projected one at 15.5 million, for management policies in the food sector in 1982-83.

Asked about the success in overall credit operations in the agricultural sector, he noted that the target for credit disbursements in the agricultural sector was deliberately kept higher at the level of Tk 800 crore for 1982-83.

The related disbursements last year were made at less than Tk 400 crore, he pointed out. Some measures have now been taken to simplify the disbursements of credit to the farmers, he added.

Funding Crisis

Mr Muhith stated the government had withdrawn the credit restrictions in July last. But, he felt, the credit operations had not been satisfactory due to poor response of the private investors and operational constraints on the part of the banking and the financial institutions.

About the operations of Bangladesh Shilpa Bank (BSB) and Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Sangstha (BSRS), the Finance and Planning Minister said that faltering performance in making payment of overdues to the external financiers and problems of management had caused the funding crisis for these two institutions.

About the development activities, he stated that an amount of Tk 138 crore was disbursed during the first quarter of the current financial year for the autonomous bodies out of Tk 931 crore under the annual development program.

He admitted that the development spending under ADP had not picked up during July-September period this year as the exercises had to be carried out for major sectoral adjustments even after the announcement of the development program of Tk 2700 crore in July last.

He noted that unlike the case in the past, there would be no revision in the overall size of the ADP this year.

(To be continued.)

CSO: 4600/1399

PAPER DISCUSSES ROLE OF BANGLADESH MILITARY

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 31 Oct, 7, 14, 21 Nov 82

[Article by Mahfuzullah]

[31 Oct 82 pp 1, 8]

[Text] Now that the chief martial law administrator has given the indications of a probable political arrangement, it has become obligatory to discuss the politico-military reality of Bangladesh. The indication was, however, expected much earlier.

The policy statement by General Ershad, just after the proclamation of the martial law was a clear indication in this direction. The reasons for the proclamation of the martial law, if now misunderstood, was the failure of the constitution to accommodate the aspirations of the armed forces. Hence, it was believed, the armed forces would concentrate on evolving a constitutional formula, before opening up so many fronts of reforms and reorganization.

Before discussing the structural dynamics of the Bangladesh army, we should also take into consideration the steps taken to rejuvenate the economy and administration following the takeover of March 24. The cosmetic changes, organized to give a new look to the whole nation and the society could not achieve the desired goals.

The euphoria which could release the forces of change was almost absent for which, even till the last week of August, it was a state of hopelessness, lack of communication between the people and the administration and stagnation in economic field. And there were reasons to believe that, stakes of failure would be very high.

It cannot be denied that the martial law of 1975 and of 1982 are in essence different, so far as the institutional aspect of the armed forces is concerned. In 1975 there was the threat of army being disbanded. Being deprived of the rights and privileges, they demanded boots and uniforms. Since the changes of 1975, the armed forces have overcome the institutional problems.

Judging externally, this time it seems to be the total commitment of the armed forces. In 1982, it was not a group of officers, but was led by the chief of

the army. It can be safely said that the army is in a better shape today and no officer in the army would repeat the mistakes of the past, as the experiences are bitter for all ranks and sections of the armed forces.

Since the independence of Bangladesh, the levels of national expectations have fluctuated again and again. This prompted the different conscious institutions of the country to initiate the process of change from their own socio-political bias. But all these attempts failed to deliver the goods. The economic situation of the country is the best basis of this argument.

Economy

The economic performance since the proclamation of the martial law this time, is also not different from our past experiences. Though readjustments and pruning were done, available information shows poor performance in the implementation of development program of 1982-83 during the first quarter of the year.

The instruction on fund release procedure and finalization of ADP were delayed, and as a result about a month and a half were lost.

Moreover, the public as well as the private sector failed to participate in the economic activities. Though the absence of the private sector participation can be rationalized, the performance of the public sector demands official explanation.

The complete lull in the public sector has resulted, for the first time since 1972, in surplus in the exchequer. The borrowing by the government on account of the public sector in the first quarter of 1982-83 is lower compared to that of 1981-82.

The foreign aid situation is also not encouraging. Though there is more commitments of food aid and project aid, the commodity aid situation is depressing. The depression would have been the same, if the civilian administration could continue. Now the responsibility has befallen the shoulders of the armed forces.

Such a situation for an under-developing country like Bangladesh calls for a political framework, in which the total population can participate. This sense of participation, though made different for the people in uniform, has changed dramatically in the war of liberation in 1971. Because, the emergence of this army is linked with the emergence of this country, this army cannot behave any more like a conventional standing army. Nor there is reason to believe that it can behave totally as a people's army, though the homogeneity of the country would deter the armed forces from behaving totally irrationally.

The State and the Military

Traditionally and historically "speaking, the statecraft and the society in this part of the globe was never free from a military bias in the political

system. The system has not changed much over the last hundred years, i.e. the state remaining the source of power. Army being the organized institution in a society suffering continually from chronic disorder was always the last bastion of power for the general population.

But the emergence of Bangladesh has made the obligations different for the armed forces. Though in the initial days there were attempts to subvert the sovereignty of this institution, the transformation through which our society went, also affected this institution.

The formation of this new republic had also impacts on the formation of the army as well. These are 1) the social, cultural, religious, ethnical homogeneity of the country was reflected in the different ranks of the army 2) with the changing national aspirations, the army did not remain the representative of the elite class of the society 3) with suspicious neighbour around, the national sentiment of preserving the national independence and state sovereignty was also prevalent with the armed forces 4) the economic dependence has affected the army organizationally 5) the resource constraint of the country also affected the development of the armed forces.

In the context of Bangladesh, the army is now identifying the present military rule to be a people's martial law. The complex issues are: what are its strength, what are its weaknesses, from where it derives its power?

Organically, the military is not linked to the industrial-technological complex which is absent here. The relationship of the military to the technological order is the decisive pivot at the level of advanced weaponry.

Before detailing out, we should keep in mind that the army was twice-formally involved in running the state machinery. These participations by the army in the civilian process made them conscious about the following requirements: determining all the specific tasks to be done, establishing the order in which these tasks should be performed, specifying the resources required for each task.

[7 Nov 82 pp 1, 8]

With the changing concept of national defense, which is very much applicable in the case of Bangladesh, the national role of the army has changed. One might, argue against the participation of the army in politics, but the reality has changed over the last few years.

As the emergence of the army is directly linked with the emergence of this republic, there should not have been any confusion that the army here would also behave like all other armed forces in the Third World countries.

From 1974 to 1981, there were numerous attempts by the army to seize power. But only two attempts succeeded. The political environment, which was prevailing outside the cantonments in 1975 and 1982, made the process of seizure more convenient for the army.

For the same reasons, the Chittagong mutiny of 1981 failed. But one thing is very clear from all these attempts, i.e. the process of reversal was never very strong. There have been reversals, but the fundamental commitment remained the same.

In this context, the nature of the state power should also be taken into consideration. If the state behaves as the sovereign state, the army would also behave as the sovereign army.

The military origin of this country does not determine the limits of its democratic process. This should come as no surprise, for the democratization within the Bangladesh army got the wind quickly since 1975.

This democratization has given them a more stronger sense of belonging affecting the performance. It cannot be denied that, this performance, in most cases was given the political approval. The armed forces performing as the representative of national interest are aligned with well-articulated trends in the political process.

The Bangladesh society of today, is broadly divided into two main groups one, living in the rural areas and comprising 90% of the population, and the other living in the urban areas, comprising rest of the population and enjoying all benefits of modern living available here. This economic disparity combined with the homogeneity of our society directly affects the recruitment of the armed forces. For which the armed forces cannot any more behave as the elite force, though financially they are comparatively well off.

Aspirations

But how far can this army go in realizing the objectives of an independent nation? The world economic distribution of today, as is known, has identified the categories: the first, the second and the third. In the first world, the capitalist system of society and production has set the rule. The relationship between the economy and the polity was reversed in the second world.

And in the third world, the relationship of political, economic and military formations defines the character of state power and hence set different standards.

In the context of Bangladesh, as the majority of the population live below poverty level, the social aspirations are limited. The existing anomalies of this society had actually gagged the normal life of a citizen. The growing consciousness to remove the anomalies was not only limited to civilian life only.

The two crises points, at which the seizure of power became inevitable, needs detailed study. But in both the cases, "the armed forces offered its services for elevating the overall condition of the country."

The political parties considered these attempts as transgression in the national affairs. But for convenience of our discussion, we should also quote "the identity of a soldier was wrongly translated. That he is a human being first, Bangladeshi next and then only a soldier was conveniently forgotten. Soldiers this time came with the promise of removing the ambiguities and doubts in their identities and hence their role in the national affairs."

[14 Nov 82 pp 1, 8]

The procedural arrangement through which the armed forces assume the responsibility of running the state machinery, depends mainly on the contradictions prevailing in a particular society. And the effective handling of the contradictions can to some extent provide the continuation of this rule. In such a situation, identification with the aspiration of the people are not enough to protect such rule.

The modern state machinery, incorporating different power groups does not necessarily allow peaceful coexistence of these groups. So which was a reality in the sixties, gradually faded in the seventies. This is also applicable in the case of Bangladesh.

The takeover of 1975 resulted in the happy formation of a bureaucratic-military alliance. The period following the August 15 change was the formative stage of these groups. In the process of development, these groups developed as institutions providing the state with more effective instruments of oppression.

And when the political activities were allowed, the armed forces had to step back. Though the government of late President Ziaur Rahman tried to safeguard the interests of the armed forces by having more retired army personnel in the tribal jirga called BNP, the arrangement was not enough to the concerned group.

The sense of alienation suffered by the armed forces could be one of the reasons for the statement issued by Gen. Ershad on November 28 last year.

Power Alliance

The politics of army takeover here has changed with the behavioral pattern of this institution. But events show that the formation of a new power alliance has been delayed.

The absence of a power alliance necessarily shifted the responsibility of all reforms and reorganization to the armed forces. The implementation of these programs need wide participation of the broad masses of the people. But to bridge the communication gap between the people and the armed forces a new formation is required.

In the absence of a new power alliance, it seems that the armed forces would get totally involved in the process of reforms. But the structural dynamics of the armed forces limit that participation. The problem confronted by the army at this stage, apart from the political one, is of managerial problem.

With independence, Bangladesh did not inherit a big structure of efficient managerial class. Though the existant mini-managerial class was modelled after the colonial style, the transitional society was aspiring to free itself of the colonial hangover.

The compromises reached or arranged to protect the managerial class did not produce the desired result. For an emerging country like Bangladesh, as was the case in other Third World countries, such problems need political consideration of the highest order, which includes the complexities of accelerating and fast developing machinery for running the state machine.

Upgraded Thanas

The mass participation process which has supposedly started with the opening of the upgraded thanas, poses a new question. Though the thana administration will be controlled by the elected people, what is going to be the form of the government at the national level? How the aspirations of the armed forces would be accommodated at the highest level of administration.

The present trend of the thinking in the army leadership gives us a different picture of the situation. This briefly is, "politicians, technicians, specialists and generalist civil servants have not learnt to accommodate or to respect the peculiar contribution of each other in the cooperative endeavour of the government. Such a situation encourages loyalty to a class or service instead of loyalty to an organization, its programs and objectives."

If this is the assessment of the situation, one might think that the lack of trust and cooperation between these groups would thereby render the administration less effective in solving national problems.

The absence of a consensus on national issues in this country has made the situation complicated. The objectives of politics and the statecraft are not very clear. It cannot be denied the power group controlling the state machinery would want perpetuation of their rule. But at the cost of what?

The desire expressed by Gen. Ershad to accommodate the aspirations of the armed forces in nation building logically demands the integration of the armed forces with the masses. If that is the sincerest desire of our armed forces, then the process would call for a more realistic approach.

The question then would be, can an army like ours with institutional bias go for such an integration which was possible only in the case of a people's army. We do not argue that this is not possible. If that is to be achieved, the army will have to go through a new orientation. And once this institution is integrated with the aspirations of the broad masses of the people, the constitutional problem would be solved.

[21 Nov 82 pp 1, 12]

[Text] The seizure of state power by the military in Bangladesh has drastically changed the political dynamics of the society. On the one hand, the power-seizure

has limned [as published] the relative obsolescence of the extant political instruments as the repository of popular and political authority. On the other, it has pushed the military into an optional situation, which is basically political, but cannot be sustained without the active participation of the general masses.

The latter seems somewhat contradictory. Yet it is the reality of the current historical period in Bangladesh wherein the military putsche was spurred by the military's urge to have "a constitutionally-secured political role in the statecraft."

This surely runs counter to the time-worn ethos and practices of the political parties. Consequently, though inoperative, the political parties would continue to trigger off dissent, and for the moment fragmentary agitations in sensitive areas like the universities and legal precincts.

While the validity of such agitations in terms of democratic mobilisations is yet a distant logic by the look of things, there is also no reason to believe that the armed forces can positively overcome the problems of initiating a political process of its own without being explicit about it.

The military has designed its actions in the vanguard of statepower in such a way over the last months, that one has reasons to believe that they have already planned the political action. But what appears like ditherings on their part to come out with the constitutional and political formulations would invariably render the action-programmes of the regime in terms of substantive reforms and structural changes in the administration perfunctory.

The alternatives open to the armed forces are not too many if we follow the logic of its take-over. While the fundamental question of evolving a process of transfer of power is still out of bounds, the nature and form of the political process—call it participatory democracy or else—is yet an unclear vista for the nation to judge or debate, accept or reject.

Hence it is time to come clear on the issue, and more so when the armed forces have already gone ahead with a politics in the shape of its reform and action-programmes.

Estrangement from state power in this country is not a new phenomenon. It is perhaps more common than sustenance. The inherent limitations of the political processes unfolded during the two past regimes prove the point eloquently enough. These processes, alternating between absolute one-party rule and a dissimulated personal dictatorship, could never ensure the channelisation and absorption of the emerging new social forces and the institutional forces into a coherent system.

Resultantly, the extant systems were torn by negation leading to violence of various forms, and destability of a fast-changing society. This negation is still quite evident in the present dispensation of the military in respect of the civilian sector as it was with the political parties in their negation of the military's urges.

But a consensus on the national imperatives can perhaps bring about a realistic adjustment in the now-or-never political process. The imperatives of modernisation and progress, the identification of the commonality of aspirations among different social forces and institutional organs and the inescapable need to provide the minimum guarantee of existence and justiciability to the broad masses will help all in this comprehension.

In other words, a positive consensus on the road to building an independent national economy, elimination of the vestiges of feudalism in agriculture and land, and acquiring a technology of its own could form the basis of such identification.

Once that is done, the modalities of political, functional and structural readjustments would become easy to evolve. Otherwise, the interest-groups which are inimical to such national aspirations would try to blockade the course of natural events. One thing must be clearly noted that the steering of forces and events to the desired national goal cannot be left to spontaneity. Nor can it be achieved by command.

For the moment, the military's search for a popular base for present and yet-undeclared future programme cannot be a oneway pursuit. The class-forces which have emerged over the years have and will have definite bearings on the determination of political and the system of the country. As much as these social forces are open to accommodation, they are also the ones affected directly by the failures of the economy and absence of rights.

Following the emergence of Bangladesh, the nation witnessed a proliferation of armed wings of the political parties of securing the political goals, and stakes of power of different political creeds. This, in itself, had a spill-over effect in the societies and the extant institutions as a whole, and thereby led to constant explosions and destabilisation.

The military has also claimed that one of its principal objectives is the containment and democratization of both political and military violence. Coupled with its vanguardist claim to running the affairs of the state, the military has now its obligation to meet politics on its own initiative and from their own standpoint, it should initiate a politico-military dialogue. Perhaps, that would be one solution to what General Ershad termed as the politico-military problem.

CSO: 4600/1398

ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA ANTI-DHAKA STANCE SCORED

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 31 Oct 82 p 1

[Article by Shamim Hussain]

[Text] Sunday, the weekly magazine of the Ananda Bazar Patrika group of Calcutta, has once again carried an anti-Bangladesh canard. This time, it has entangled a Bangladeshi diplomat while reporting an espionage case.

The diplomat, Mahmuda Begum (Huq), first secretary in the Bangladesh High Commission in India, was transferred about six months ago. It was a routine transfer. But for Sunday it was not.

In its October 3-9, 1982, issue, it wrote: "For the first time in the history of independent India, a senior IAS officer of Tamil Nadu cadre, Mr Veliappa, has been subjected to an enquiry regarding his involvement in an espionage case. Mr. Veliappa is the chairman of the Rural Electrification Corporation under the central government, and is in a post which takes him to all the sensitive border areas including the North East and Sikkim. It is learnt that Mr. Veliappa was very friendly with Mrs Mehmooda Begum, First Secretary in the Bangladesh High Commission. The Indian Government has been suspicious of the lady's activities since she was found very close to a Western agency. It was for this reason that about two months ago, Mrs Mehmooda Begum was politely told by the external affairs ministry to leave India. After her departure, the names of those who were close to Mrs Mehmooda Begum were scrutinised. Among them was Mr Veliappa. The inquiry is still going on."

The Ananda Bazar Patrika group has many a time in the past come out with news and comments about Bangladesh totally unfounded but sensational.

The anti-Bangladesh propaganda and even its attempts at character assassination are well-known. What is perplexing is the silence of our foreign office over such a report. So far as we know our foreign office has not come forward with any contradiction to the news item.

Will it not be befitting on the part of the foreign office to give a clarification?

CSO: 4600/1398

FOOD-FOR-WORK PROGRAM WHEAT REPORTED MISAPPROPRIATED

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 31 Oct 82 pp 1, 8

[Article by Musleh A Tarek]

[Text] Over three hundred cases of misappropriation of wheat provided for the projects under the food for works program (FWP) are now pending for disposal with different courts in the country and many are under investigation by the police and anti-corruption department.

It is learnt that in most of the cases, union council chairmen and members have been implicated while some government officials who are also reportedly involved are at a safe distance and could not be charged with the offense.

Competent circles maintain that many cases of misappropriation of wheat were not recorded by the relevant authorities in spite of specific allegations during last FWP season.

At the end of last year the government introduced a device called "legal bound" to prevent pilferage of wheat under FWP. According to the bond the person concerned is required to furnish a commitment for proper utilization of wheat allotted for his project.

FWP was introduced in 1975 with a view to providing relief to the rural destitutes through their participation in development activities including food production in the countryside during the dry season, from November to May.

Under the program, the workers are given wheat as their wages.

The sources providing the major portion of wheat to the program include USAID, World Food Program, Canada, UK, and the EEC countries.

Since the introduction of the program, over 10 thousand schemes have been approved by the government and about 15 lakh tons of wheat allotted for their execution.

A source maintained that the program has been to the advantage of a section of people involved in preparing, approving and implementing the projects thwarting its main objectives.

It is learnt that in the past most of the schemes were taken up without any viability study, and fertile agricultural lands were brought under the schemes for canal digging or road construction which produced no tangible result. The affected people, whose lands were taken for the schemes, were not paid any compensation at times.

It is alleged that many schemes were prepared with definite promise of cash or material benefit for the concerned people but an unholy alliance, formed by corrupt government officials from thana to higher levels and a dishonest section of public representatives, ate up the bigger quantum of the promised benefits.

It is believed that officers of foreign monitoring agencies also manipulate figures for personal benefits.

Presently, Bangladesh is considered one of the largest operators of FWP. It is estimated that in the current fiscal year Bangladesh would receive aid to the tune of 3 lakh metric tons of wheat including 1.33 lakh tons under the World Food Program, 120 lakh tons from USAID/Care, 33 thousand tons from Australia, 10 thousand tons from Canada, and 5000 tons each from the UK and FRG.

For the last dry season, the relief and rehabilitation division approved around 3000 schemes and allocated three lakh tons of wheat for distribution. The last year, some of the donors for the first time permitted the government to sell portions from their donation to generate fund to meet the expenses for constructing bridges, culverts, or sluice gates.

It is learnt that the rural development and cooperative division has already prepared different schemes for the food for works program beginning from November 1 this year.

CSO: 4600/1398

SHEIKH HASINA REPORTED TO ATTEND BREZHNEV FUNERAL

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 16 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] Awami League Chief Hasina Wajid attended Soviet leader Brezhnev's funeral in Moscow yesterday amidst conflicting reports in Dhaka if there was a party decision in favour of attending the ceremony.

Dr Kamal Hossain, a member of the Awami League presidium told NEW NATION "the question of Awami League leaders attending the funeral of Mr. Brezhnev does not arise".

Another presidium member Abdus Samad Azad, however, told NEW NATION, "a presidium meeting decided in favour of attending the funeral ceremony."

Hasina's younger sister Rehana living in London when contacted over telephone confirmed that her sister had left for Moscow on Saturday.

The other two leaders of the Awami League, Abdus Samad Azad and party Secretary-General Abdur Razzaq who were to join Hasina in Moscow could not proceed to the Soviet capital because of non-availability of airlines ticket.

An important party source told NEW NATION last night that Hasina telephoned from London some of the party leaders seeking their advice about attending Mr Brezhnev's funeral. The leaders, according to his information, agreed with her suggestion of attending the funeral.

The sources said it was not mandatory for Hasina Wajid to seek party advice on such issues.

CSO: 4600/1391

OFFICIALS STUDYING ABROAD ASKED TO RETURN

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 19 Nov 82 pp 1, 12

[Text] The Government has decided that action would be taken under MLR 9 against the persons who have been staying abroad for one year or more on completion of their training without government permission, according to a Press note in Dhaka on Thursday night, reports BSS.

However, the government will take a lenient view against those who have stayed for less than one year without permission and if they return to the country within a months of issuance of this Press note by the Establishment Division.

The Press note said a good number of officers from government, semi-government and autonomous organisations went to foreign countries through the government with scholarships from the international agencies or foreign governments or on deputation.

Besides the administrative officers they also included a substantial number of doctors, engineers, teachers or technical experts.

The Press note said that the objective of sending them abroad was that after returning home their knowledge and experience gathered through training would be applied in different uplift activities in Bangladesh universities and college which will be of immense help to the overall development of the country.

But, it said, the government had noticed with regret that some of them had shown indifference to the administration's sympathetic attitude, they have been staying abroad for quite a long time after the training. As a result the development activities have been suffering on the one hand and the educational institutions and different welfare programmes are being hampered on the other.

The country and the nation are deprived of their knowledge and experience in this way and the money spent on account of their salary and training is going to be a total wastage the Press note said.

CSO: 4600/1392

KHAN TALKS TO BSS ON RETURN FROM BREZHNEV FUNERAL

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 20 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Soviet Union has expressed its "willingness" to help Bangladesh in its efforts for economic development and promotion of bilateral ties for mutual benefit, the DCMLA and Minister for Communication Rear-Admiral M A Khan said in Dhaka on Friday.

On his return home after attending the funeral of Soviet President Brezhnev in Moscow, the DCMLA told BSS that his talks with the new leadership there were "fruitful". Admiral Khan hoped his visit to Soviet Union would further strengthen the relations between the two countries.

While in Moscow, the DCMLA met the new Communist Party Secretary-General, Yuri Andropov, Railways Minister, Mr. I. G. Pavlovsky, First Deputy Foreign Minister Maltsev and Admiral of the Soviet Union Admiral Gorrshkov and exchanged views with them. He had gone there to represent Bangladesh at the funeral of President Brezhnev on Monday.

DCMLA said the Soviet Minister was appreciative of Bangladesh's role in the Non Aligned movement and congratulated Bangladesh on her election as Chairman of the Group-77.

Our support to the right cause of the Palestinians against Israeli expansionism was praised, he added.

Admiral Khan said he also conveyed the desire of the Government to have the best of relations with Soviet Union based on sovereign equality and non-interference in each other's affairs. Dhaka's initiative to have the best relations with neighbouring countries and those in the region was also appreciated, he added.

DCMLA said in his talks with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister he also referred to the visit of Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt-Gen. H. M. Ershad to India and Nepal as "a measure of our initiative to have the best of relations with neighbouring countries and those in the region."

Admiral Khan said he had fruitful discussions with the Soviet Railways Minister on possible cooperation and collaboration for the development of "our railway system".

During his stay in Moscow, the DCMLA addressed a large number of Bangladeshi students studying in the Soviet Union in a meeting held at the Ambassador's residence. He explained to them the present situation in Bangladesh and the government's efforts to improve the life of the people in various fields.

Prior to his departure for Dhaka the DCMLA was seen off at the airport by Mr Nikolai Mikhailovich Zaichenko, Deputy Chairman of the Chamber of the Soviet Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and other high officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Earlier message adds: Rear Admiral Mahbub Ali Khan, Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator and Minister of Communications met Mr. Yasser Arafat in Moscow on November 15.

The DCMLA, who attended the funeral of Soviet President Brezhnev, expressed his great pleasure and happiness in meeting Mr. Arafat and conveyed the best wishes of the Government and the people of Bangladesh and the CMLA Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad.

Bangladesh Ambassador in Moscow Mr. M. R. Ahmad was present during the DCMLA's meeting with the PLO Chief, Mr. Yasser Arafat expressed his gratitude to the CMLA the Government and the people of Bangladesh for extending their strong and brotherly support to him and the Palestinian cause.

Mr. Arafat conveyed his thanks to the CMLA through the DCMLA for extending the invitation to him to visit Bangladesh. Mr. Arafat accepted the invitation with thanks and said that he would visit Bangladesh at the earliest opportunity and at a convenient time to convey his gratitude to the people of Bangladesh.

The DCMLA also met President Ziaul Huq of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Turkey and discussed with them matters of mutual interest.

CSO: 4600/1395

DHAKA-BEIJING FRIENDSHIP BODY MEETS, OFFICERS ELECTED

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 21 Nov 82 p 12

[Text] The biennial general meeting of the Bangladesh-China Friendship association was held at the Zia auditorium of Shishu Academy on Saturday afternoon with its President Mirza Golam Hafiz in the chair, says a Press release.

The meeting elected a 150 member executive council including 19 office-bearers unanimously for a term of two years.

Mirza Gholam Hafiz was re-elected President of the Association. The meeting elected nine Vice-Presidents; Secretary-General Treasurer, three Assistant General Secretaries, Chairmen and conveners of two subcommittees.

The agreed panel of the office-bearers and Executive Council members was proposed by Mr Mohammad Toaha and seconded by Kazi Zafar Ahmed.

Vice-Presidents are: Ali Ashrat, Mr Anwarul Amin, Mr Kamrul, Islam Kazi, Zafar Ahmed, Mirza Abdul Halim, Mr Mohammad Toaha, Mr Shamsul Huda, Mr Mr Sirajul Hossain Khan and Dr Taveb Ali.

Secretary General: Mr. Shamsul Alam Sikder;

Treasurer: Mr Lutfar Rahman, Assistant Secretary General: Mr Sharif Harun, Mr. Deedar Bakth and Mr. Tofail Ahmed Mava.

Cultural Sub-committee Chairman: Mr Nazmul Huq Nannu, Convenor: Mr. Azizul Islam Kajal;

Publication Sub-committee Chairman: Abdul Matin, Convenor: Miss Rita Rahman;

Prominent among the members of the Executive Council are: Mr. Ataur Rahman Khan, Mr Nurur Rahman, Dr Abu Mahmood, Mr Abdul Matin, Mr Gaziul Huq, Mr Sunil Gupta, Dr Faziul Karim, Mr Sirajul Huq Mantoo, Mr Gias Kamal Chowdhury, Mr Motahar Hossain Siddikv, Mr Faiz Ahmed, Khandkar Ali Abbas, Mr Mustafa Jamal Haider, Mr Shafiqul Gani Sawpan and Mr Amanullah Kabir.

The meeting considered and approved the reports of the Acting Secretary General and the audited accounts of the Treasurer.

A resolution paying glowing tribute to late Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani who was the founder patron of the Association was adopted at the meeting. One minute silence was observed to pay respect to the late Moulana.

Besides Mirza Ghulam Hafiz the meeting was addressed by Mr Ataur Rahman Khan and Kazi Zafar Ahmed.

Mirza Ghulam Hafiz announced that a Friendship Foundation would be established soon for promoting and expanding friendship between the peoples of Bangladesh and China.

Mr Ataur Rahman Khan said the friendship between the peoples of the two countries would be further strengthened in the years to come.

Kazi Zafar Ahmed said China is the trusted friend of the struggling people of the world and had always extended support in safeguarding and consolidating our national independence and sovereignty.

CSO: 4600/1396

OPPOSITION PLANS RALLY AGAINST TIN BIGHA CORRIDOR

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 21 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] The horizon over Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves are being overcast with shadows following a fresh move of Indian Forward Block and some other Opposition parties to stage violent demonstration against Indo-Bangladesh accord on the Tin Bigha corridor.

According to information received here those Opposition Parties chalked out a programme to rally at least one lakh demonstrators at the Tin Bigha corridor during the first week of December to undo its lease agreement. These parties also planned to take an Indian Parliamentary delegation to the Tin Bigha corridor from New Delhi to mobilise opinion of the parliament members against the lease agreement. Indian vernacular daily Jugantar and weekly Sambar in their recent issues carried these news items giving wide coverage.

Due to this fresh move of the Indian opposition parties, the people of Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves have been terror stricken again. Amar Roy, MP of Indian Forward Block, meanwhile, held a Press conference at Mohakaram (Secretariat) recently and said that the Indian citizens would never allow Bangladesh to take possession of the Tin Bigha corridor. He further reiterated that Indian peace loving people will resist execution of the corridor lease agreement at the cost of their lives. He opined that if the lease agreement was executed Indian Kuchlibari, Dhaprahat will become enclaves with the result that about 50,000 population would be trapped, he argued.

He demanded immediate annulment of the corridor lease agreement and threatened that the Indian people would never allow the lease agreement to go unchallenged. Mr. Bibut Kanta Sastri, President of Central Janata Party, alongwith Mr Monomohon Roy, Secretary of Janata Party of West Bengal and Mr Bidesh Ranjan Mojumder, President of Darejeeling district Japata Party, visited Tin Bigha, Dhaprahat, Kuchlibari and Mekliganj recently and held a meeting with Opposition parties and condemned the lease agreement and urged upon them to organise huge movement against the Tin Bigha lease.

CSO: 4600/1397

PRC MUSLIM DELEGATION LEADER SPEAKS AT RECEPTION

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 27 Oct 82 p 8

[Text] Leader of the visiting Chinese ulema delegation Mr. Abdur Rahim Latib said people especially the Muslims of China and Bangladesh are closely knitted by traditional friendship dating back to thousand years. He hoped the existing bond of friendship between the people of these two countries would be cemented further in future.

Mr Latib was speaking at a reception accorded in the honour of the delegation by Dhaka Municipal Corporation yesterday at the lush green lawn of the historic Lalbagh fort built by the famous Moghul governor Shaista Khan.

Maj Gen. Mahmudul Hassan, Administrator of the Corporation welcomed the visiting ulema delegation. The function was also attended by the Minister for Education and Religious Affairs Mr. Abdul Majed Khan, nominated commissioners of the municipality and the officials of the Chinese Embassy in Dhaka.

Leader of the Chinese delegation in reply to the address welcome said he was overwhelmed by the love and affection shown to them by the people of Bangladesh at every place they visited and asked the gathering to accept the love and affection they are carrying on behalf of the 1.30 crore Chinese Muslims for the people of Bangladesh.

Mr. Latib said brotherly relation between the people of China and Bangladesh started developing thousand years ago when a scholar from this part of land Atish Dipankar Srijnan visited China. Since then, he said, this relation between the people of these two countries further developed with the visit of honourable persons from one country to the other. The visit of Abdur Rahman Kashgari, a scholar from the western part of China to Bangladesh played a role in developing brotherly relation between the Muslims of these two countries, he added.

He also expressed his respect for the patriotism of the Bangladeshi people.

Mr. Latib presented a packet to the Administrator of the Corporation describing it as a token of love from the Muslims of China.

Fa Hien's Visit Recalled

Earlier in his address of welcome Major General Mahmudul Hassan said relation between China and Bangladesh strengthened on the basis of brotherhood and mutual Friendship after the visit of Fa Hien to Bangladesh and Atish Dipankar Srijnan to China. He said economic and social relation brought these two countries closer. Relation between Dhaka and Beijing is eternal and the present visit of the Chinese ulema delegation will open a new era of relationship between these two countries.

On behalf of the citizens of the Metropolis the Administrator presented insigna of the Corporation to the visiting delegation members.

CSO: 4600/1380

BANGLADESH, THAILAND AGREE TO EXPAND TRADE

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 15 Nov 82 p 1

[Text] Bangladesh and Thailand on Sunday signed an agreed minutes envisaging further expansion of trade between the two countries reports BSS.

The agreed minutes came on the concluding day of the four-day visit of the three-member Thai delegation led by Thai Commerce Minister Sqn. Ldr. Punnamee Punsri. Before signing the agreed minutes both sides reviewed the bilateral trade between them. Bangladesh Thailand trade agreement was signed in 1977.

Mr. Shafiul Azam Minister for Industries and Commerce and visiting Thai Commerce Minister Sqn. Ldr. Punsri signed the agreed minutes on behalf of the respective Governments.

During the review talks there was completed understanding between the two Governments on measures to increase and diversify trade between them for their mutual benefit a Press release issued after the agreement said. It said both sides further agreed to review the implementation of the trade agreement as often as possible. Both parties agreed to exchange trade information and trade delegation both at official and businessmen level.

Bangladesh and Thailand agreed in principle that there is scope for joint ventures and joint investment including those in the export processing zone at Chittagong the Press release said.

During their stay in Bangladesh the Thai Minister called on the CMLA Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad DCNLA Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud Foreign Minister A. R. Shams-ud-Doha and Food Minister Air Vice Marshal (Retd) A. G. Mahmud.

The Thai Minister for Commerce left Dhaka on Sunday after a four-day visit to Bangladesh.

CSO: 4600/1385

UN DELEGATE TELLS BANGLADESH STAND ON NAMIBIA

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 15 Nov 82 p 8

[Text] Bangladesh has urged the international community to vigorously oppose the unlawful designs of the South African racist regime against Namibia reports BSS.

Speaking on decolonization at the fourth committee meeting here last Thursday the Bangladesh Permanent Representative at the United Nations Khwaja Wasiuddin expressed concern at the continued racist policy of South Africa.

He said more than two decades had passed since the declaration on decolonization was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1960. Still he said, we find that colonialism persists in Southern Africa where the racist Pretoria regime in total defiance of UN charter and the demand of international community is pursuing repressive measures against the people of Namibia.

Khwaja Wasiuddin said that Bangladesh believed that the intransigence and dilatory tactics of racist Pretoria regime should not be tolerated any further. Time has come for all of us to act and we must act decisively and expeditiously, he said adding any further delay in this regard would bring more misery and sufferings to the oppressed people of Namibia.

Referring to the question of Western Sahara the Bangladesh representative said that Bangladesh consistently welcomed and supported initiative taken by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on this particular question and added that Bangladesh would welcome the United Nations to closely cooperate with the OAU in order to facilitate the implementation of their decision. Bangladesh representative appreciated the vital and significant role being played by the UN educational and training programme for Southern Africa and said that international community is extending voluntary financial assistance and scholarships to the refugees of Southern Africa for education and training. He said that additional financial support was necessary to make the programme meaningful practical and successful.

The Bangladesh representative opposed the inclusion of the question of East Timor in the agenda and objected to any discussion on this matter because this was an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Indonesia.

CSO: 4600/1385

UN DELEGATE SPEAKS IN COMMITTEE DEBATE ON NAMIBIA

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 28 Oct 82 p 1

[Text] Ambassador to Zimbabwe Mr S R Karim has reiterated Bangladesh's full commitment to the cause of decolonisation and called for implementation of declaration on Namibia ruled by South Africa, reports BSS.

He told a UN committee here that despite termination of South Africa's mandate on Namibia in 1966 its people were still subjected to most ruthless exploitation both of human and natural resources. He called for immediate compliance of the UN resolution on it.

Participating at a meeting of the 4th committee of the UN dealing with foreign economic interests impeding implementation of declaration against colonialism, Mr Karim said South-West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) was the representative of the Namibian people.

Speaking as a member of the delegation Mr Karim said Bangladesh unequivocally stood on the principles of the UN Charter and General Assembly resolution and wanted immediate steps to implement the declaration.

He said all the countries should refrain from supplying South Africa with equipment and materials and regretted despite the arms embargo, South Africa received support which was used to oppress the people of Namibia.

CSO: 4600/1382

UN DELEGATE MAKES STATEMENT ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 15 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bangladesh has urged the United Nations to act decisively without further delay to restore the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and save them from the ignominy of occupation.

This was stated by Col. Abu Nayeem Amin Ahmed, a member of Bangladesh delegation to the 37th session of the United Nations General Assembly while making a statement in special political committee on the question relating to United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees here on Friday.

The Bangladesh delegate emphasised that solution to the Palestinian question could be found only by recognising the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine to the self-determination including the right to establish a state of their own in their homeland. It was not relief but the right of self-determination that could bring and restore human dignity to the suffering Palestinians, he added.

Terming Israeli aggressive and expansionist policy as main obstacle to the solution of this problem, he said that Israel should desist from removing the refugees and from destruction of their shelters. He reiterated Bangladesh's strong support to the right of displaced inhabitants to return to their homes or former places of residence in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The Bangladesh delegate also said that Palestinian refugees had every right to receive revenues from those property and compensation for its destruction. He also supported the establishment of a fund for the receipt of income derived from such occupied property.

CSO: 4600/1387

NEGATIVE EVALUATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 14 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Article by Kazi Montu]

[Text] The Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) has failed to make substantial contribution to the enhancement of agricultural production despite disbursement of huge credit over the last decade.

The total amount of money distributed among the farmers through the IRDP came to Tk. 119.94 crore during a period of about ten years ending on July 30.

But the coverage under the programme in the decade has remained limited to a small fraction of cultivators as it could not attract them because of its built-in defects.

An evaluation of the agricul- [as published] IRDP has been submitted to the Agricultural Ministry along with a package of recommendations.

According to the paper, there has been little or no service to the landless peasants for whom the programme is meant, although a large number of them has been mobilized in the primary cooperative societies under the IRDP.

The IRDP was created in 1972 with 33 Thiana Central Cooperative Associations (TCCA's) and 5680 Krishak Samabaya (KSS). The number of TCCA's has expanded to 350 and that of KSS to 48,600 over the last decade.

The members of village-level KSS have increased from 1.4 lakh in 1972 to 19.6 lakh as on July 30 in 1982.

The IRDP-sponsored agricultural credit comes through Sonali Bank to the TCCAs for lending to the KSS which finally disburses loan among the farmers.

It may be pointed out that the IRDP credit is most liberal one provided to the members of village-level KSS without security for agricultural production.

But the landless peasants for whom the credit is meant have hardly derived its benefit as the members of the managing bodies of the TCCAs are mostly big farmers, concerned circles maintain.

Allegation is there that the TCCAs have been made business centres for fertilizer distribution and stores for various materials by the affluent members of the TCCAs' management.

Overdues payable by the recipients of the IRDP agricultural credit have kept on piling up over the decade as in most cases they have utilized the loan for the purpose other than what it is meant for.

However, due to poor recovery the outstanding money to be cleared by the members of KSS stands at Tk 47.75 crore including overdues of Tk. 28.76 crore against 300 TCCAs on account of short-term loans against seasonal crops as on July 30 this year.

Recovery percentage has gradually slowed down over the last ten years--100 percent in 1973-74 and 1974-75, 99 percent in 1975-76 and 1976-77, 95 percent in 1977-78, 90 percent in 1978-79, 75 percent in 1979-80, 51 percent in 1980-81 and an unbelievable small figure of 4.43 percent in the current year.

It is evident that the repayment of credit up to the desired level under the programme has not been achieved. The only arrangement for repayment of old loans is made every season from new loans sometimes by flouting the agreed eligibility criteria for TCCA.

But initially it was planned that by regular recovery and active recycling of seasonal crop loans under a supervised system the volume of credit would remain within a reasonable amount of revolving allocation.

It may be noted here that Sonali Bank finances TCCAs at concessional interest rate of 7.5 percent which is 3 percent below the existing bank rate.

But the member farmers, it is learnt, are to pay 17.5 interest rate while outsiders get agricultural loans at the rate of 12 percent interest direct from the banks.

Knowledgeable quarters mention that since the servicing of loans at TCCAs level are done by the persons employed by the IRDP and their recurring expenditures are borne by the government the concessional interest rate to TCCAs would not mean any welfare for the people.

There is a sort of dual administration in the management of the IRDP which is allegedly obstructing the IRDP to effectively influence the local directors of the TCCAs, who are mostly big and affluent farmers having business and political interest in many cases.

It is gathered that the IRDP has virtually no legal right to have control over the affairs of the TCCAs except by posting a project officer, a deputy project officer, an accountant and other employees. The project-director acts as member-secretary of the bodies' board of directors.

It is learnt that there has so far been no detailed study for ascertaining how much of the overdues are going to be bad debt, how far the loans have generated extra income to the farmers, specially the poor farmers, the utilization of credit and the actual reason of failure in timely recovery of loans.

CSO: 4600/1384

BANK GIVES STATISTICS ON REMITTANCES FROM ABROAD

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 16 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] The homeward remittances by Bangladeshi nationals working abroad have now recorded a steady uptrend. Despite the prevailing low premium over the official exchange rates of currency, the remittances continue to come in increasing volume.

According to Bangladesh Bank statistics, the remittances by Bangladeshis working abroad during January-September period of the current calendar (1982) totalled Taka 738.16 crore.

Such remittances during the whole of the last calendar year (1981) stood at the level of Taka 620.77 crore. If the current trends continue for the rest of the year, the remittances in 1982 are likely to exceed Taka 1000 crore.

The highest amount of remittances so far this year was recorded at Taka 112 crore in September last. The remittances totalled Taka 547.07 crore during April-September period of the current calendar year (1982) as against Taka 303.04 crore during the corresponding period last year (1981).

Meanwhile the discount on remittances in the form of foreign exchange over the official rate of exchange has now fallen from an average of 15 per cent now due to upward adjustment of the value of taka in terms of dollar and pound sterling and sale of Advance Import Permit (AIP) under the Wage Earners Scheme (WES) at rates more or less at par with the official rate of exchange. But lower discount rates have not affected the flows of remittances.

Explaining the reasons for higher volume of remittances despite low discount rates, the authorities of the Bangladesh Bank told this correspondent that the absolute rates of exchange for foreign remittances under the WES had gone up over the recent years along with the currency rate adjustments at official rates. The AIP rates were maintained on an average at the rate of Taka 21.50 per dollar and Taka 38 per pound sterling last year. The same rates now stand on an average at Taka 23.20 per dollar and Taka 39 per pound sterling.

The authorities of the Bangladesh Bank further point out that the Bangladeshis working abroad particularly in the Middle East had maintained the flows of

their remittances in a steady manner and there was no cause for "obvious socio economic linkage factors" to apprehend any disruption in the flows of such remittances. According to the available statistics the remittances from the UK constitute now only 25 per cent of the total remittances to the country. The remittances by Bangladeshis from Saudi Arabia alone account at present for 30 per cent of the total remittances.

The concerned circles note that increasing number of Bangladeshis going abroad particularly in the oil rich Arab countries over the recent years have led to higher volume of foreign exchange earnings for the country in the form of remittances.

When asked whether the lower discount would induce remittances of money by Bangladeshis through unofficial channels, i.e. through hundi the competent authorities told this correspondent that such remittances through unofficial channels would in any way involve the payment in Bangladesh currency. With effective check on smuggling under invoicing in case of imports and over invoicing in import deals, the scope for remittances through 'hundi' remains minimal, the same authorities observe while pointing out that there was hardly anything out that there was hardly premium on remittances by Indian and Pakistani nationals from abroad to their respective countries.

The official channels for remittances by Bangladeshi nationals working abroad include the following forms: bank draft telegraphic transfers mail transfers postal transfers travellers cheques currency notes etc. Such remittances are broadly classified into two categories: Wage Earners Scheme and direct Taka draft. The Wage Earners Scheme (WES) introduced in 1975-76 allows a Wage Earner to import certain items listed under WES or send the foreign currency home through bank drafts to be sold in auction. Any importer buying the currency (called advance import abbreviated ALP and still compressed I.P.) opens his letter of credit for importing items under the WES import list. Under direct draft system introduced afterwards to offset inconveniences in IP a wage earner or his beneficiary takes the currency to a bank which exchanges it to Taka on the basis of preceding day's IP rates and give a Taka on the basis of preceding day's IP rate and give a Taka draft to be encashed at home. Postal money orders are also computed on the same basis.

The remittances by Bangladeshis working abroad totalled Taka 1707.26 crore during the period from 1976 to 1981. According to the Bangladesh Bank sources the remittances in real terms (i.e. in dollar terms) recorded an increase of seven to eight per cent during January-June period of 1982 over the corresponding period last year. The recent trends in remittances indicate a more favourable growth in real terms.


The Bangladesh Bank is now considering steps to ensure quick disposal of accumulated stocks of foreign currency notes (sold by Bangladeshi nationals working abroad) with the commercial banks. There is no restriction on purchase of cash foreign currency notes by the commercial banks from the Bangladeshis working abroad the Bangladesh Bank sources told this correspondent.

CSO: 4600/1388

EFFORTS TO DISCUSS FOREIGN INVESTMENTS DISCUSSED

London ARABIA - THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Dec 82, p 25

[Text]

 Bangladesh has a liberal attitude towards private enterprises and the government welcomes foreign capital investment in both private and public sector industries.

In the private sector, foreign equity participation in industries is encouraged in areas where technical know-how is not locally available, where technology involved is complicated, where capital outlay is large and in industries based on local raw materials and export orientated industries. Technical collaboration in various forms without equity participation is allowed in almost all types of industry.

Foreign private investment in association with the public sector is allowed in the following industries: paper and newsprint; iron and steel (excluding re-rolling mills and iron billet mills); ship building and heavy engineering (including machine tools and assembly manufacture of cars, buses, trucks, tractors, and power tillers); heavy electrical industry, minerals, oil and gas; cement; petrochemicals (fertiliser, PVC, ethylene and synthetic fibre), heavy and basic chemicals and basic pharmaceuticals, shipping; forest extractions (mechanised).

In the case of new investments, foreign collaborators are generally required to provide the foreign exchange components of the capital costs of the projects for import of plant and machinery. The terms and conditions determining the equity participation including management contracts are decided on the merit of individual projects. In cases where the requirements of foreign exchange for import of plant and machinery exceed the amount desired to be invested in the form of equity, the foreign investors are required to meet the shortfall on long term loans.

The government of Bangladesh has declared that it has no intention of nationalising private

industry. A law to promote foreign investment and protect the interests of foreign investors has already been prepared, and is awaiting enactment.

The government permits repatriation of capital invested including capital remittance of all post-tax dividend on foreign capital and remittance of approved royalty and technical fees. The government allows a tax holiday for five years for developed areas and nine years for development and priority development areas.

Other incentives granted to foreign investors include:

- 15 per cent import duty on capital machinery for industries in developed areas, 5 per cent duty for development areas and 2½ per cent duty for priority development areas and export-orientated industries;
- 5 per cent duty for capital machinery to be imported by overseas Bangladeshis;
- Exemption of tax on interest on foreign loans;
- Liberal depreciation allowances;
- Relief from double taxation in case of foreign investors of the country with which Bangladesh has an agreement to that effect.

Other concessions include: income tax exemption to foreign technicians employed in approved industries for a period of three years; remittance of 50 per cent of the net monthly salary of foreign nationals subject to a maximum of £200 per month; remittance of savings from earnings, retirement benefits and personal assets of individuals on retirement/termination of service; availability of long-term credit facilities from industrial financing institutions; no limit on the percentage of Bangladeshi capital in industry where foreign investment is approved; tariff protection to the "deserving" industries.

Exporters receive additional incentives. These include: loans up to 90 per cent value of the letter of credit from commercial banks; lower interest rate (presently 10½ per cent) on pre-shipment and packing credit; income tax rebate up to 25 per cent on export of non-traditional items; additional transferable export performance licence (XPL) to exporters of some items (currently numbering 74); state recognition in the form of awards and trophies to successful exporters.

Foreign investment is concentrated in the food manufacturing, chemical, pharmaceutical and engineering industries. Leading British firms in Bangladesh include BOC International, Burmah Oil, James Finlay, Fisons, Glaxo, ICI, Metal Box, The Rank Organisation, Unilever and the Wellcome Foundation.


The government has run up against opposition from transnationals. Earlier this year attempts at restructuring the pharmaceutical industry and regulating the supply of drugs was strongly opposed by the transnationals.

CSO: 4200/282

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE, ITS BACKGROUND EXAMINED

London ARABIA - THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Dec 82 pp 25-26

[Text]

 Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khilji, whose armies came to Bengal in 1194 CE (591 AH), is generally regarded as the Muslim general who first brought Islam to the western region of Bengal. With his conquest, Muslim settlement in Bengal began to flourish: in the early 1200s, Sonargaon and Salgaon became seats of Muslim governors, and as the Delhi sultans grew weak Bengal's governors waxed independent. Several dynasties assumed kingdom powers, in particular after the death of Delhi Sultan Ghiasuddin Balban in 1287 CE (687 AH), when Bengal became virtually independent.

In the early 1300s, Muslim troops entered eastern Bengal and crossed the Brahmaputra into the Sylhet district of Assam. By 1576 the Emperor Akbar annexed Bengal and the Mughals became supreme there. A number of Muslim sults, such as Shahjalal, Bayazid and Shah Makhdum, settled, preached and died in Bengal.

Also during this period there was a rapid growth in the number of conversions. Both high-caste Hindus (for example, the 15th century CE Hindu King Jadu governed Bengal as Ala-ud-Din Muhammad Shah) and low-caste were converted, leading to the present-day preponderance of Muslims in the region.

Bengal saw glorious times under Muslim administration. Under the Ilyasids (1345-1414 and 1437-87), the Islamic arts, sciences, commerce in textiles and foodstuffs flourished. In the early 1400s, Ghiasuddin Azam renewed old diplomatic and cultural ties with China, and the growth of the port of Chittagong helped increased trade with the Far East. By 1594 Bihar was annexed with Bengal and the Awadh troops added to the Bengal army. A particular Bengali literature evolved through these centuries, and royal encouragement was

seen in Nurat Shah's patronage of a Bengali translation of the Mahabharata.

However, the next two centuries saw fratricidal strife among Bengal's Muslim rulers, and this paved the way for British penetration into India. The first British factory in India was established at Surat under the authority of a farman (edict) of Jehangir, who died in 1613. In 1634, Emperor Shah Jehan granted a farman and in effect another factory was established at Balasore (Bengal) in 1642.

In 1652, Gabriel Boughton, a surgeon of the East India Trading Company, won favour by curing members of the emperor's family and obtained permission for unlimited trade in Bengal, free of customs duty. Another Boughton cure for the royal family of Shuja, a son of Shah Jehan who was subahdar (governor) of Bengal, won for the Company further favours, as well as permission to establish another factory, this time at Hughli.

However, the next subahdar, Shayesta Khan, an uncle of Aurangzeb, foresaw the future consequences of all this and expelled the Company from Bengal in 1686. Aurangzeb also ordered its expulsion from all his dominions, but this order was withdrawn. In 1690, the Company was allowed to resettle in Bengal, under the same Shayesta Khan.

In 1698, the Company was granted permission to purchase from zamindars the right of the talukdari (land-holding) of Calcutta, Sutanati and Gobindpur, at an annual rent of only 1,000 rupees. Then another East India Company surgeon, curing the Emperor Farrukhsiyar, won for his masters the privilege of free trade and permission to purchase the talukdari right of 38 village near the three already bought.

This type of transaction was resented by the next three subahdars of Bengal, and a period of struggle between them and the British

ensued. Finally, after its victory on June 23, 1757 at the battle of Plassey, the Company administered Bengal in the name of puppet Muslim rulers.

The Muslims' defeat at Plassey saw the eclipse of their power in Bengal, and political and economic suppression ensued. The Company's next victory at Buxar in 1764, was a mortal blow to the Delhi emperor. In Bengal the effect was grievous, as Muslims there were brought to their knees. The Company's commercial Residents and their officials established a monopoly on collecting land revenue in effect. Bengali Muslims were deprived of their traditional employment and pauperised. Due to the private trade of the British, the East India Company suffered many losses, and these were compensated for by making Bengal pay extra taxes and levies.

Nazimat and toujdari (judiciary) functions were taken away from Muslims, and in time both the Muslim aristocracy and the professions were almost extinguished. Also, forced cultivation of indigo by European planters was extensively practised in Muslim areas. The landed aristocracy had disappeared under the impact of the "permanent settlement" act and the Resumption Regulation (whereby "free grants of land were made by the government").

The British forced the largely Muslim weavers to supply goods at prices 15 to 40 per cent below market rates. Later the production of finished goods was discouraged, to assist the sales of Manchester textile mills. Thus, export of manufactures from Dacca fell from 1.2m rupees in 1799 to 0.35m rupees in 1813. Loss and loss of the famous Dacca muslin was made, until it disappeared altogether by the 1880s.

Muslim Bengal's socioeconomic structure therefore suffered a long and persistent erosion, ending in its total disruption. Of the decay and widespread deprivation and humiliation, this caused, even Hunter could write: "The Muhammadans have suffered most severely under British rule. 170 years ago it was almost impossible for a well-born Musalman in Bengal to become poor. At present, it is almost impossible for him to continue rich."

For its part, the peasantry was subjected to the tyranny of the indigo planters. In the autumn of 1859, workers on the big Lower Bengal plantations refused to sow indigo and rebelled. The Muslim peasants who took part in the "indigo riots" were mostly followers of Haji Shariatullah, who taught that foreign rule was unacceptable to Muslims and called for holy war. The riots left a deep imprint on the Muslim mind, and found a place of pride in Bengali literature, poetry and popular history.

The revolt of the peasantry sparked wide political consciousness in Bengal. In 1880,

Nawab Abdul Latif established the Muhammadan Literary Society of Calcutta, which helped to create a Muslim Bengali elite class. In 1877, Syed Amir Ali started the central Muhammadan Association in Calcutta, which submitted to Lord Rippon a memorandum detailing Muslim grievances.

Then in 1906 the All India Muslim League was formed in Dacca, with the objectives of establishing a political association for the protection and advancement of Muslims and "to respectfully present their needs and aspirations to the government." The drafting committee that framed the League's constitution included three leaders from Bengal.

In 1913, the League demanded a system of self-government appropriate to India and in this year Muhammad Ali Jinnah joined it. At this stage Muslim Bengal joined the struggle for Khilafat Movement (which fought for the preservation of the Ottoman caliphate) and pan-Islamism. In 1940, during the Lahore Session of the Muslim League, Fazl e Huq, Bengal's chief minister, moved the historic Pakistan resolution.

In the 1946 election, the role of Muslim Bengal was unambiguous: the League's most spectacular victory was in Bengal, India's largest Muslim province. The League's Legislators' Convention then met at the Anglo-Arabic College in Delhi and repeated the demand for Pakistan. Before the Convention was dissolved, the League party members in the central and provincial legislature took an oath "pledging to undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice which may be demanded for the attainment of Pakistan." More than 200 members attended from Bengal, a train being chartered to bring them.

After the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, East Bengal became the centre of struggle between secular and Islamic elements. The Muslim League, a broad-based nationalist party, came to be dominated by secular politicians and the ulema were thrust aside. But it was never willing to lay aside its Islamic mantle, as this remained its only popular platform.

The struggle against the Muslim League effectively became a struggle against Islam. The main opposition groups – the Awami League and the National Awami Party – were anti-religious parties seeking to foster loyalty to Bengali culture and downplay the importance of the religious links with the western wing of the country. Secular groups largely succeeded in reducing the political influence of the Islamic parties of East Pakistan (particularly the Jamaat e Islami), which were also being persecuted by the Muslim nationalist rulers of Pakistan.

The first three years of Bangladesh's independence proved a severe trial for Muslim

Bengali: Almost all the Muslims who had fought to protect Bengal's Islamic identity in 1947 were Bengali. The Awami League, enthusiastically supported by the communists, organised a series of organised terror against Bengali Muslims. Many died, and thousands were forced to flee the country. Some Islamic workers are returning.

However, Bangladesh has witnessed an Islamic renaissance. On the national level, this was seen in the Islamic Council School, the Islamic students' organisation, which has taken up the challenge of combating nationalist and socialist ideologies in Bangladesh's schools and colleges. At the village level, the Bangladesh Masjid Mission has established itself in thousands of rural centres. The Islamic Foundation of Dacca has produced over a hundred books on Islam in Bengali, and has set itself the task of uprooting anti-Islamic influences.

Bangladesh's cultural life is gradually being permeated by Islam. There is a spontaneous

and refreshing rekindling of interest in Islam among all sections of Bangladeshi society.

At the political level the Islamic Democratic League, which was established in 1976, and the Jamaat e Islami, which had been proscribed in 1972 and recreated in 1979, are steadily gaining ground. The Jamaat is focusing its activities in Bangladesh's villages and on widening its rural political base.

During 1980-81 the Islamic Democratic League and Jamaat found it difficult to coordinate their policies - something many party workers believed to be essential. However, Maulana Abdur Rahim, the IDL's president, and Qurban Ali, its vice-president, have initiated moves to bridge the gap and establish durable links between the two Islamic parties.

The influence of Islam in Bangladesh is increasing. There is a need to deepen both cultural and political work, to assert the people's Islamic identity and increase the social power of the country's Islamic institutions.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPINGS

Bangladesh National Party (BNP): created by Ziaur Rahman. It polled 66 per cent of the votes in the presidential election last year. It combines a large number of factions including both "rightist" and "leftist" elements and has support from within the army. General Ershad mediated to prevent a split in the BNP before the 1981 election.

The Awami League (AL): Sheikh Mujib's party, now led by his daughter, Hassina Ward. It contains many factions united on the basis of a commitment to Bengali nationalism and friendship with India. It gained 25 per cent of the vote in the 1981 election.

Jamaat e Islami: Banned in 1972, allowed to re-emerge in 1979. Its leading national figure, Professor Ghulam Azzam, has not yet been given Bangladeshi citizenship although he has been in the country for more than seven years. The Jamaat calls for the Islamisation of Bangladesh and draws its support from students and the urban poor.

The Left: includes a wide assortment of

political groupings, the most prominent being the Jatva Samajtantrik Dai (JSD) formed in 1973 and led by Major Jahl. Other leftist groupings include the Communist Party of Bangladesh (Mont), the East Bengal Communist Party (M-L-Toha), the East Pakistan Communist Party (M-L-Huq) and the National Awami Party.

The Left generally is deeply divided between the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions. It sees guerilla struggle as the main vehicle for political change in Bangladesh.


Islamic Democratic League: Formed in 1976 and led by Maulana Abdur Rahim. It unites groups that opposed the revival of the Jamaat e Islami in 1979 and the old Nizame Islam party. It also enjoys the support of the main body of Muslim League workers.

Student groups: Students play an important role in the country's politics. The main student groups are the Islami Chatro Shibr (Jamaat e Islami), the Chatro League (pro-Awami League) and the Chatro Union (pro-Moscow Left).

EXTENT OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE SURVEYED

London ARABIA - THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Dec 82 p 29

[Text]

 The Communist Party of Pakistan was founded in 1948 from those sections of the Communist Party of India functioning in areas that became Pakistan after 1947. The CPI's activities had centred mainly on Bengal, where a predominantly Muslim group of activists operated from Calcutta. By partition, however, the movement was largely under the control of Hindu politicians; many of these left for India in the early 1950s, taking an estimated two-thirds of the party with them.

In 1954 the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) was proscribed. It had few members and was organisationally very weak. Forced to work in secret, there was little coordination between the different factions and little activity generally; for example, no regional or national meeting was held after 1953. In 1970, say party sources, there were 2,500 members in Pakistan; other estimates put the figure at no more than 700.

The CPP had limited involvement in the trade union movement. Most of its members were teachers, from all levels of education. Their greatest influence was among students. At the International Meeting of Communist Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 5-17, 1970, the unnamed delegate of the Communist Party of East Pakistan declared: "Though our party is very small and inexperienced, we have a good hold on the student community and our influence amongst the workers also is growing. We have a hold on the national democratic movement."

During the Pakistan period, communists were at first involved in the movement to create dissatisfaction with the Muslim League government. The Muslim League became deeply divided soon after independence. This conflict led to the formation of new political parties. The Pir of Manki Sharif withdrew from the League to form his rival Awami

League. In East Pakistan, the communists and others reacted sharply and formed the Awami Muslim League.

The communists pursued a dual strategy of working secretly on the one hand and using the legal political platforms on the other. In East Pakistan they began to operate within the Awami League. However, after its victory in the 1954 elections, the schism in the Awami League between the more progressive section and the rest became pronounced.

The progressives denounced the Awami League as a vehicle of the rising "Bengali bourgeois." In July 1957, the National Awami Party (NAP) was formed under the leadership of Abdul Hamid Bhashani. An old peasant leader, Bhashani was primarily concerned with his campaign for democratic rights and greater autonomy for East Pakistan, and with his work for the peasants. He defined NAP as a broad-based social democratic party and admitted that it contained members of the CPP. He denied being pro-Beijing and rejected the concept of a communist Pakistan. Nevertheless, many of Bhashani's statements revealed pro-Chinese sentiments. His faction of NAP provided the only legal means of political expression for those on the far left.

In the 1960s the Sino-Soviet dispute created a rift within the underground CPP, which was divided into a pro-Chinese and a pro-Soviet faction. NAP itself was formally split along Sino-Soviet lines in 1968.

In October 1969, an extreme Maoist faction led by Abdul Martin appeared within Bhashani's NAP. It then became evident that a second division was emerging in NAP. Muhammad Toaha, secretary of the Bhashani faction, criticised a group of Maoists in the party who were "too advanced for the present situation;" the "type of bloody revolution they wanted" was not (now) possible. Maoists who were

said to advocate the violent revolutionary methods of the Naxalites in India were also attacked by Bhashani.

A moderate faction within the Bhashani NAP was led by Moshur Rahman and Anwar Zahid. Both the moderates and Maoists strongly opposed Toaha's position as general secretary.

After Bangladesh's independence, the pro-Moscow Communist Party led by Moni Singh began working openly. Professor Muzaffar Ahmed, president of the pro-Moscow NAP, also started reorganising his faction. The pro-Moscow groups worked in three ways: some infiltrated the ruling party of Sheikh Mujib, Moni Singh's Communist Party began a cadre-based movement and also tried to exploit Sheikh Mujib's popularity by making an alliance with the Awami League; and Muzaffar's NAP attempted to develop into a mass organisation.

Those who infiltrated the Awami League could attain important positions and create a strong pro-Moscow lobby within the party. This lobby, now led by Mohiuddin, is trying to increase the Awami League's commitment to Moscow.

Moni Singh's Communist Party and Muzaffar's pro-Moscow NAP formed an alliance in 1974 with Sheikh Mujib's Awami League. They failed to gain any substantial benefit from it, and neither party has gained a substantial increase in members. Both parties are faction-ridden. In the last general election Muzaffar stood as a presidential candidate

with the backing of all pro-Moscow factions - he polled just 100,000 votes.

The state of the pro-Beijing factions is even less auspicious. In the 1970s the pro-Chinese Communist Party split into two factions. In the early 1970s Seraj Sikder, who had organised a terrorist movement in the country, was killed by the Mujib government. His group split into three factions, the most permanent being led by Abdul Haque and operating clandestinely in the eastern rural regions.

The communists have also attempted to infiltrate the army. The years 1974-75 saw hectic activity. The communists recruited two influential officers, Colonels Tahir and Ziauddin to their cause. Both sought to re-organise their units along communist lines and to indoctrinate the rank and file. After the second coup in 1975 Tahir became the most important military leader in Bangladesh. He led the units which deposed Khalid Musharraf.

Within three months Zia was firmly in control. He had little difficulty in purging the army of communist infiltrators. Ziauddin was killed in 1976 and Tahir executed in 1977. The communists have not regained their influence.

The ease with which Ziaur Rahman combated communism in the Bangladesh army illustrates the isolation of these groups in the country. Recruitment has virtually stopped. Disillusionment has spread due to communist setbacks in southeast Asia: the war between Vietnam and Kampuchea, the reverses in Burma and the cessation of the struggle in Thailand are all ominous developments.

COTTAGE INDUSTRIES REPORTED IN SEVERE CREDIT CRISIS

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 24 Nov 82 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Small and Cottage Industry in the country is still beset with severe credit crisis with gap between requirement and availability during 1982-85 standing at about Taka 1233.96 crore.

According to a study by Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC), the requirement for credit during 1982-85 is Taka 1310 crore from the public financial institutions for a total projected investment of Taka 1635 crore in order to generate employment for 4.60 lakh persons.

Details of this study show that for development of 40 thousand traditional cottage industrial units during the SFYP with employment generation target of one lakh persons and investment of Taka one thousand crore, the requirement of credit is Taka eight hundred crore. For the development of 1.5 lakh units under off-farm income generating activities with employment generation target of three lakh persons and investment of Taka 335 crore, credit requirement is Taka 300 crore. For the development of three thousand modern small industrial units with employment generation target of 60 thousand persons and investment of Taka 300 crore, the credit requirement is Taka 210 crore.

As against this requirement the present availability of credit from different sources is only Taka 76.04 crore. These are 3rd IDA credit of Taka 66 crore; NORAD credit Taka 6.60 crore; USAID credit Taka 1.17 crore credit from UNCDF grant Taka 2.20 crore and IRDPDANIDA credit Taka 0.07 crore. The credit from UNCDF grant is still under negotiation.

According to BSCIC source, besides these credit line, there is another "credit line, in theory available" for both small and cottage industry called "special credit programme". The original allocation for this programme was Taka 6 crore, which was subsequently increased to Taka 11.75 crore. The money was originally intended for operation on revolving fund basis. But due to poor recovery--about 30 per cent--the money is not being used as a revolving fund and all credit operation has been suspended.

The promotion and development of Small and Cottage Industry (SCI) in the considered as vital for economic development of the rural areas, could not make

any headway mainly because, the entrepreneurs of small and cottage enterprises do not have access to normal institutional arrangement, most of the study on the subject concluded.

With a view to solve the credit problem, the BSCIC has suggested a special credit line for small and cottage industry with the organisation playing a central role in selection, disbursement and recovery of loans.

According to the suggested special credit line for loan administration the obligation of the BSCIC will be: to scout for entrepreneurs; to obtain and supply loan application form to the entrepreneurs and help them filling up the forms; submit application to the concerned bank with recommendation; to help the bank manager to process the application and appraise the credit; to supervise credit after loan sanction; to provide post-investment services and help bank in loan recovery.

The responsibility of the bank under the suggested credit model will be: to receive loan application only through the BSCIC extension staff; make technical, economic and financial appraisal with the help of the BSCIC officials; examine credit worthiness of the entrepreneur; process sanction of loan; supervise credit use with the help of BSCIC officials recover credit with the help of BSCIC officials and recycle the fund recovered.

The period of loan, according to the suggestion will vary on the nature of the project and the eligibility criteria. However it has been suggested that in case of modern small industry fixed capital loan may be made available for a maximum period of 15 years with grace period of three years. In case of cottage industry the fixed capital loan may be made available for a maximum period of five years with grace period of 12 to 18 months.

Working capital loans will be advanced for a period of one to two years taking into account each enterprises cycle of production and marketing of products.

The suggestion also incorporated provisions for security and documentation, interest rate bad debt coverage review system and incentives.

The small and cottage industries in the country are in dire need of both investment capital and working capital. The SFYP made a target for creation of employment for three to four lakh people and allocation was Tk. 225 crore in the public sector and Tk. 500 crore in the private sector.

Subsequently the allocation has been revised to raise the private sector investment to Tk. 680 crore while the public sector investment was reduced.

CSO: 4600/1404

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY--The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh have decided to appoint Mr. Humayun Kabir at present Ambassador of Bangladesh to Iran as Ambassador to Republic of Turkey says a PID handout. Born in 1938 Mr. Kabir obtained Master Degree in English literature from the University of Dhaka in 1959. Subsequently in 1962 he obtained Master Degree in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Boston USA. He served as Second Secretary in Dakar First Secretary in Madrid before returning to Headquarters in 1970. He was Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Dhaka from 1972-75 and Minister in Bangladesh Mission in Washington from 1975-79 before being appointed as Ambassador to Iran with concurrent accreditation to Syria and Lebanon. He is married and has three children. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 24 Nov 82 p 1]

NEW FRENCH AMBASSADOR--The new French Ambassador to Bangladesh Mr. Samuel Le Caruyer De Beauvais presented his credentials to the President Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Chowdhury at the Bangabhaban in Dhaka on Tuesday morning says a PID handout. Presenting his credentials the Frency envoy said that he would endeavour his best to promote further the existing bond of friendship and understanding to the mutual benefit of both the countries. The President reciprocated the sentiments expressed by the envoy and assured him of all possible assistance and cooperation in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities during his stay in Bangladesh. Earlier on arrival at Bangabhaban the envoy took the salute presented by a smartly turned out contingent of the President's Guard Regiment and inspected the guards. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 24 Nov 82 pp 1, 8]

NEW NIGERIAN ENVOY--The new High Commissioner of Nigeria Mr. Theo Olade Asiwaju-Dada presented his credentials to the President Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Chowdhury at the Bangabhaban in Dhaka on Wednesday; says a PID handout. Presenting his credentials the envoy said that he would strive his best to promote further the existing bond of friendship and mutual understanding between the two countries. The President reciprocated the sentiments expressed by the envoy and assured him of all possible cooperation and assistance in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities. The envoy on arrival at Bangabhaban was presented with a salute by a smartly turned-out contingent of the President's Guard Regiment. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 25 Nov 82 p 1]

NEW HUNGARIAN ENVOY CREDENTIALS--The new Ambassador of Hungary in Bangladesh Dr Ferenc Turi presented his credentials to the President Mr Justice Ahsanuddin Chowdhury at the Bangabhaban in Dhaka on Monday, says a PID handout. Presenting his credentials the envoy said that he would strive his best to promote further the existing bond of friendship and mutual understanding between the two countries. Reciprocating the sentiments expressed by the envoy the President assured him of all cooperation and assistance in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities during his tenure of service in Bangladesh. Earlier, on arrival at the Bangabhaban the envoy took the salute presented by a smartly turned out contingent of the President's Guard Regiment and inspected the Guards. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 16 Nov 82 p 1]

INVESTMENT CORPORATION FUNDS--The Investment Corporation of Bangladesh (ICB) disbursed an amount of Taka 9.96 crores to 83 projects during the year 1981-82 and committed financial assistance of Taka 7.32 crores against 28 applications during the same period. This was revealed in the Annual Report of the Corporation which was presented for approval of the Board of Directors of ICB on Thursday. The meeting of the Board of Directors was presided over by Mr Mansurul Karim, Chairman of the Board of Directors. Mr A. K. S. M. Taifur Hussain Acting Managing Director of the Corporation presented the Annual Report and accounts before the Board meeting. The Investment Corporation of Bangladesh till June 30, 1982 committed financial assistance of Taka 67.33 crores to 235 projects and disbursed Taka 48.50 crores to 177 projects. The Annual Report said that during the year 1981-82 18 ICB financed projects have gone into commercial operation thus taking the total number of projects in commercial operation to 100. During the year 1981-82 three companies offered shares of Taka 84 lakh for public subscription which were subscribed to the extent of 74 per cent. So far 13 companies offered shares for public subscription with average public subscription of 61 per cent. The Board also approved the declaration of eight per cent final dividend on the first ICB mutual fund for the year taking total dividend declared to 20 per cent. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 20 Nov 82 p 3]

EXPORT STATISTICS NOTED--The export earnings of Bangladesh during July-October period of the current fiscal year recorded increase compared to the earnings of the corresponding period last year according to Export Promotion Bureau sources in Dhaka on Monday reports BSS. The sources said the total exports during July-October 1982 stood at Taka 473.36 crore which was Taka 79.55 crore more than the export earnings of the July-October period last year. Out of the total export the share of jute items was 58.14 per cent and that of non-jute items was 41.86 per cent the sources said. The principal items which marked an increase in the export earnings of this year include raw jute goods, leather, frozen food, tea, ready made garments, newsprint paper and allied products agricultural products chemical and pharmaceutical products specialised textiles and household linen and engineering products. The export earnings in respect of frozen foods, tea and agricultural products exceeded their average target for the July-October period this year. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 16 Nov 82 pp 1, 8]

AIR FORCE EXERCISES--The second phase of the Bangladesh Air Force Summer Air Defence Exercise concluded at different BAF bases and other Units amidst great enthusiasm, says an ISPR press release. Highlights of the exercise included Para dropping at Comilla airport, maritime surveillance in the Bay of Bengal, close air support, ferrying of personnel and stores and other logistic support activities. Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud, Chief of the Air Staff and Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator on the concluding day of the exercise on Monday visited different batches of BAF detachments in the dispatched sites. Later Air Vice Marshal Sultan expressed his satisfaction and congratulated the BAF personnel for their high morale and overall performance which culminated in making the exercise a success. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 27 Oct 82 p 3]

WEEKLY NEWSPAPER SUED--General (Retd) M. A. G. Osmani has filed a case in the Press Council against the Editor of weekly SANGBADIK says a Press release of the Council. It has been alleged that weekly SANGBADIK in its issue of September 7 published a news item captioned 'Sattar Osmani Ajana Taithya Janaben' in which it was stated that he had held a clandestine meeting and a confidential discussions with the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The news item according to him is totally false and tendentious says the Press release. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 15 Nov 82 p 3]

NEW PRC AMBASSADOR--China has appointed Mr. Xiao Xiangquian as its new ambassador to Bangladesh an official announcement said in Dhaka on Sunday, says BSS. A university graduate Mr. Xiangquian was born in April 1981 in the Liaoning province of China. He served successively as Deputy Secretary General of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs chief representative of the liaison office in Tokyo of the Sino Japanese memorandum trade office of China and Counsellor of Chinese embassy in Japan. Mr. Xiangquian also served as Deputy Director of the Department of Asian Affairs and Director of the first Asian Department in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 Nov 82 p 1]

CSO: 4600/1401

REVOLUTION SEEN SURVIVING DESPITE TRIBULATIONS

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English No 80, 5 Dec 82 pp 3-4

[Article by Ibrahim H. Alkali]

[Text]

CAN the Iranian revolution survive? — Yes, I think so. Let us consider first, the strength and organisation of various dissident movements in and outside Iran, that may likely threaten the survival of the Iranian revolution. It is known for example that America is most likely than not, responsible for the escape from Iran of former President Bani-Sadr and terrorist Mujahideen leader, Rajavi. The unashamed and seemingly unruffled and obstinate Bani-Sadr is still calling himself "president of Iran in Exile."

There is evidence also that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the world's two super-powers, are trying to undermine the Iranian revolution through their various imperialist and neo-colonialist manoeuvres. For instance, the U.S., along with France, among other countries, are said to be supporting the terrorist Mujahideen. On the other hand, Time magazine reported on page 13 of its November 8, 1982 edition, that a Soviet KGB agent, 35-year-old Vladimir Kuzichkin, "was responsible for organizing hundreds of agents, within Iran's outlawed communist Tudeh Party" according to British sources.

But despite these anti-revolutionary moves, the Iranian people do not seem deterred. In fact, their isolation by the superpowers and other powers has made the Iranians more self-reliant.

The Iranians are trying very hard to be self-reliant and self-sufficient. For example, reliable Iranian military sources disclosed that they manufacture their own weapons, including guns, rifles, sub-machine guns, ammunitions, and even war aircrafts. The military sources added that Iran does not rely on any country for its weapons, not in the least any of the two super powers.

A second issue relevant to the survival of the Iranian revolution has to do with the question of who succeeds Imam Khomeini. Some fear that with the death of Khomeini, the Iranian revolution would collapse. It is however, my belief that the issue of succession would be smooth. For instance, Ayatollah Montazerri is currently being tipped as Imam Khomeini's successor. It was learnt from reliable sources that Montazerri has already been picked and approved by Khomeini. Nonetheless Iranians do not generally even consider Khomeini's absence from his dynamic role as the spiri-

tual leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite his old age. Since they know that death is inevitable however, and that Imam Khomeini would leave the scene someday, Iranians have attested to their commitment and proven by their actions, that they would continue from wherever Khomeini leaves and along his lines and principles.

Furthermore, the Iranian people's commitment to the survival of their revolution is very strong. They feel very strongly about their stand against American imperialism and neo-

colonialism in particular and western neo-colonialism and imperialism in general. They have also shown and proven by their actions that they do not in the least intend to deviate from their cause and that they are leaving no stone unturned, not only to ensure the continued success of their Islamic Republic. Revolution and victory in the gulf war at all costs, but also to fight by whatever means at their disposal, American, Western, and Eastern imperialism and neo-colonialism. A cross-section and sample of both civilian and military Iranians interviewed proved this fact.

Like other Iranian military men, a military spokesman and member of the Iranian regular army said that he is not afraid of death, adding that: "I am ready to die. In fact I wish that I were dead." Doubtless, America has used the late Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, and he was nothing more than a mere puppet of the American regime. The cohesion and unity of the people, as well as their high morale and high spirit, also plays a part in the survival of the revolution.

At downtown central Tehran, the entourage of foreign reporters met with a number of Iranians who had gathered for the purpose of remembering and celebrating anniversaries of the death of their martyrs and heroes who were either killed in the war or innocent victims of the revolution.

Pictures and posters of the martyrs were displayed on walls and poster stands as an exhibition to passers-by, in addition to those of Imam Khomeini in particular and leaders of the Islamic Republic and Revolution in general which were pasted, hung on, and which adorned the walls of all public places, government offices and ministries, business establishments, restaurants, cafeterias, kiosks, and private and official residences, etc.

Except for the usual vehement shoutings of anti-American, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist slogans, the reporters were well-received by the courteous and receptive Iranians, wherever they visited. Shouts of the anti... slogans, rent the air when the foreign reporters, accompanied by their domestic counterparts,

visited the Tehran prison where they held a press conference with the Prosecutor-General of Tehran and the man in charge of the prison. The in-mates treated the foreign reporters — most especially directed to the American reporters — with "a heavy dose" of the usual anti... slogans. On another occasion, while visiting the Teheran cemetery, the reporters got another heavy dose of anti-American slogans, this time from a middle-aged woman mourner who couldn't control her emotion and probably thought that the reporters were all Americans. The woman just couldn't bring herself to stop her aggressive anti... bellows even after she was informed that the reporters came from different countries including America. The reporters were later on — just before they left the cemetery and the agitated woman protester — to learn that the woman had lost a relative in the war.

Former United States president, Jimmy Carter, has revealed in recently published extracts from his book of memoirs that U.S. agents posing as journalists or businessmen, went in and out of Iran freely throughout the hostage crisis. He also said that dropping the atomic bomb on Tehran was also considered.

Residences and offices of the leaders of the Islamic Republic and top government officials are under very tight security by members of the Islamic Republic's Revolutionary Guards.

Among the Ayatollahs killed so far, is Ayatollah Ashrafi, whose martyrdom came after a grenade attack in the main mosque of Kermanshah, where he was the Imam, on October 15 this year. His successor, who was recently appointed, is Ayatollah Janati.

Most Arab countries including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, are supporting Iraq. The Egyptian foreign minister, Kamal Hassan Aly, was recently quoted in Kuwait as saying that Egypt will not "stay passive" in the event of an Iranian attack on another Arab country in the oil-rich Persian gulf region. "We regard any expansion of the war as a serious development, in which case we would not stay passive." Aly said in an interview with Kuwait's independent newspaper, Al-Anbaa, "we are against aggression on any Arab

state. For that reason we have been supplying Iraq with arms" Aly added. He urged a unification of all mediation efforts by "Islamic" and non-aligned countries to bring the 25-month-old gulf war to an end.

Recently, the foreign ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran officially protested to the Saudi Arabian government over the maltreatment, abuse, and attack of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca and Medina. Some of the pilgrims were also tortured by the Saudis in jail. Many were imprisoned and some were deported back to Iran before they even performed the Hajj. While undergoing the pilgrimage, the Iranian pilgrims had staged a peaceful demonstration and protested strongly against the imperialist and neo-colonialist forces, which the Saudi authorities didn't like, saying that religion shouldn't be mixed with politics. The Iranians however, believe that the two cannot be isolated from each other.

In another development, Iran has recently announced that it will provide funds to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), if the United States withdraws its contributions, over Israel's expulsion from the two bodies. Also Iran's representative at the United Nations, Dr. Saied Rajai, recently rejected a UN call to halt the fighting with Iraq, saying the UN remained a silent observer when the Iraqi Ba'athist forces occupied Iranian territory for two years.

On Friday Sept. 8, 1978, known as "Black Friday" by Iranians according to reliable sources, the late Shah Reza Pahlavi ordered his air and ground forces to shoot at people in the streets. At what is now called the "Shahada square" in Tehran, it is estimated that from 3,000 — 6,000 Iranians including women, children, and the aged were massacred. That was three days, according to competent sources, after the Iranians had celebrated their Eid-il-Fitr.

Iranians had earlier grown discontented and disenchanted with the Shah's regime. They carried pictures of Imam Khomeini on placards and banners declaring for an Islamic Republic. The

Shah's regime imposed martial law. But by that time the Iranians were too committed and there was no turning back for them. Thus they broke the martial law and trooped en masse to Tehran streets; intensifying their agitations for an Islamic Republic led by Imam Khomeini. This precipitated the notorious and infamous action by the then regime, resulting in the killing of thousands of innocent Iranians.

The house of the late Shah's cousin, Mahvi (who fled to the United States at the outset of the revolution) was confiscated by the Islamic republic government and turned into a hospital for crippled and paralysed Iranian soldiers and other victims of the war. While at the hospital, the foreign reporters were taken round the various wards and got the rare opportunity to talk to some of the patients, who were mostly paralysed or semi-paralysed. A semi-paralysed patient wounded about five years ago, seeing this reporter was the only black person in the group, called him, held his hand, and had a heart-to-heart talk with him. Smiling and baring his soul, he revealed to the reporter through an interpreter as follows: "Always remember and never forget that black people and white people are the same, despite what is happening in the world today with the white South African apartheid policy and discrimination towards the blacks and racism practiced by America for instance," he said, adding that "Islam is totally against racism in all its ramifications."

Another military man, a member of the revolutionary guards made a similar comment to the reporter with equal show of emotion. Generally, the Iranians seemed very interested in the black African reporter from Nigeria, probably more than the other foreign reporters. One of the patients in the hospital, a military man paralysed on both legs told the reporters in an interview that he was serving in the Iranian airforce as a member of the anti-tank squad paratroopers. He said that he got wounded while in action in the western province. The patient said that whenever he gets well enough, he

hopes to work for the state. At the physiotherapy section of the hospital, where many of the patients are gradually gaining back their walking abilities, the reporters talked with some of the patients. One of the victims of the war, Abbas Bahmanyani, is doing well.

Another patient, Gasershirin, from the western province, also paralysed on both legs was unable to walk with or without the help of crutches, when he was brought into the hospital some months ago. He is now ably walking with crutches after three months practice in physiotherapy. A physiotherapist in the hospital told the reporters that Gasershirin — wounded while fighting in the western region — would be able to walk eventually. Rahman Alizade, 21 years old, a casualty from Khorramshahr, was engaged in the volunteer army before he was wounded and almost completely paralysed in all his limbs, as a result. Another paralysed patient, 17-year-old Mohammad Jangravi, is now gaining back the control of his paralysed limbs after constant physiotherapy exercises.

During their visit to the hospital, the foreign reporters' group met with another group, a women's Islamic Society group of the Lavizan area near Tehran. The women group were in the hospital to see the patients.

In addition to its primary function, the hospital is also trying to rehabilitate the patients and make them useful to themselves and to the society. A workshop has been set up, where they are provided with various services. They include a library, a typing pool, sewing, painting, and electronic lessons.

Foreigners coming into Iran are very carefully screened before they are allowed into the country. Also, Iranians are not allowed to leave the country, except for some authorized government officials, a few aged and very sick people who may need to leave Iran for special medical treatment abroad. Iranian students studying in overseas

countries who may have come home for their holidays, and few businessmen may also be allowed out.

At around 7 O'clock in the evening of November 4, the reporters visited the Tehran central prison where they held a press conference with the Prosecutor-General of Tehran, Sayyed Assdollah Lajavardi. From all indications, the prison, whose inmates are mostly teenagers — was more like a reformatory than a prison; for the prisoners are not really imprisoned. They are allowed to go about the prison freely. The foreign reporters were dumbfounded when they met the prosecutor-General himself leading the inmates to a prayer — the maghrib or late-evening prayer.

The prisoners also surrounded the reporters and socialized with them. Except for the usual anti... slogans, which were as usual shouted vehemently, the prisoners were very courteous towards the reporters. A reliable source revealed to the reporters that Mustafa Eriazarion, Bani-Sadr's former close aide, counsellor, and right-hand man, was among the prisoners and was observed to be shouting the usual anti... slogans even more vehemently.

Asked what executions have taken place recently and how many, the prosecutor-general replied that none have taken place recently except for the two terrorists who had earlier assassinated eight people. Asked how many people have been executed so far since the beginning of the revolution, the Prosecutor-General replied that from 1500 — 2000 anti-revolutionaries have been executed or killed in street fighting. On the criteria for execution, the prosecutor-general said that according to Islamic law, anybody who kills another person should be killed.

On the punishment meted out to those engaged in adultery, prostitution, or drugs, he responded that people in prostitution, and drugs are executed because they are "corrupt on earth", which is against Islam. As for the adulterers their punishment is usually 100 lashes of the cane—a special one for that matter.

"Harrd" is the punishment meted out to murderers, adulterers and such serious criminals. For adultery to be proven, there needs be four witnesses. If their witness is false, the false witnesses would themselves get 80 lashes of the cane.

Stereotypes

The prosecutor-general listed two groups of Iranian people who are against the Iranian revolution and therefore deserve to be punished for their actions. They are (1) the Corrupt on Earth, and (2) Those who take arms against the revolution. However, such a group of people may not be executed if they are found to be "useful" to the revolution, i.e. if they promise not to do it again.

The prosecutor-general gave the example of a convicted Iranian pilot who was sentenced to death, but a few minutes before execution, he repented and was immediately released. The Iranian high court has empowered and permitted the director of prosecutions to stop any execution if he is satisfied with the prisoner's repentance.

Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, former Iranian foreign minister, who was executed sometime ago, was also an inmate of the Tehran prison before his execution. Ghotbzadeh, a U.S. agent, like Bani-Sadr, had planned to bomb Tehran during the Friday prayer with more than two million people in the congregation.

Conclusion

From all indications, it seems to me and I feel very much convinced from my observations and talks with a cross-section of Iranians from all walks of life, that their revolution will more than survive--it will succeed. Of course that would however, depend a great deal on the continued sustenance of the current zeal, determination, and undaunted commitment of the Iranian people to their cause--for freedom from domination, complete independence, autonomous revolution and continued success of their unique Islamic Republic. As long as they hold to their honest intentions, belief, philosophy, and ideology, with the necessary vigour, they will continue to triumph! --They will indeed succeed!!...Yes, methinks they will succeed!!!

CSO: 4600/162

ECONOMIC ADVANCES REPORTED IN VARIOUS SECTORS

Imports to Keep Increasing

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Dec 82 p 1

[Interview with Prime Minister Musavi]

[Text]

TEHRAN, Dec. 15, IRNA — Prime Minister Musavi said in an interview published here today that despite an increase in Iran's foreign reserves the government would continue its policy of restricting luxury and non-essential imports.

He also said that the government had proffered favorable terms on its oil exports to Third World nations since it believed in using oil as a political weapon.

Musavi said in an interview with Persian Kayhan that the country's foreign reserves had increased recently. "But this will not delude us nor make us disregard the (import) principles which we believe in."

He said that a great portion of the reserves would be spent on basic products including fertilizers and insecticides. "According to the government's policies goods which are not considered essential requirements will not receive foreign reserve allocations," he said.

Concerning the government's oil export policy, the prime minister said, "We now use oil as a political lever all over the world." He added that the government had approved a plan to consider a percentage of its oil sales for the Third World countries "with favorable terms."

Government Factories Successful

On various other economic issues affecting the country Musavi said that as the head of the cabinet he did not share the view of some government critics who believed that state-run factories should be sold to the private sector.

"There are currents across the country trying in some way to show that the government has been unsuccessful in managing the factories (which it controls)," he said. He added that figures showed exactly the opposite. A look at the activities of the government owned factories indicated that during the past year all units showed considerable growth and some of them had even recorded a profit despite banking problems and other financial difficulties.

He said that after the Islamic Revolution factories which had been abandoned by large capitalists were taken over by the government and the government was forced to shoulder the previous owners' huge debts. However he also added that despite financial problems inherited from the past and shortages of raw materials these factories were gradually overcoming their problems.

No Need for Americanized Managers

Musavi said that there still existed naive or biased persons who preferred arrogant and Americanized factory managers. "I think that anyone who talks about the return of these kinds of individuals should be questioned about his past as well as his relatives ... I do not think that the revolution will retrogress therefore ... it is better for these individuals to be in foreign countries and be in the service of Uncle Sam."

Speaking about the economic aggressions of the governments and economic sanctions against Iran, he said that the industrial units of the country were now trying to solve their own needed spare parts as well as necessary repairs independently.

He said that reports indicated that industrial units in the country have decreased their dependence on imported raw materials which previously ran as high as 80 per cent but was now at 40-50 percent and declining.

On foreign trade Musavi said that in all economic agreements the government takes into consideration the political consequences of its actions to make sure that it does not lead us towards foreign domination.

He said that trade would not be limited to any specific market and the government would make its purchases from different countries in order to attain the best price.

"What is important for the government and the people is that its policy is aimed at furthering its goals to attain independence and this belief has created a healthy relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other coun-

tries. Everyone is looking at us as an independent and strong force which is firmly attached to its principles," he said.

While pointing out that Iran still had significant economic relations with large industrial countries nevertheless he added the volume of trade between Iran and Third World countries is constantly increasing and at the same time moving away from the super-power poles.

Increase in Pipe, Gas Capsule Output

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Dec 82 p 2

[Text]

Production of Shomal Pipe Factory Boosted 55 Percent

RASHT, Dec. 13 (IRNA) — Owing to efforts made by the committed Muslim workers of the Shomal pipe-producing Factory of Rasht, in Gilan Province, a total amount of 1,976,726 kilos of various kinds of pipes and joints were produced during the first eight months of the current Iranian year. This was announced by Brother Mazhman, the executive director of this industrial unit in an exclusive interview with IRNA's correspondent in Rasht, the capital of the province.

According to Brother Mazhman, this figure shows an increase of 55.6 percent as compared to the factory's production in the identical period last year. He said it was predicted that the above-mentioned figure would amount to 2,096,126 kilos by the end of the current Iranian year.

The executive director of the Shomal Pipe-Producing Factory also remarked, "To boost the production and increase the efficiency of the factory three machines; a compounder and two generators long in disuse were repaired and put into operation. At present the repairs of various parts and machinery for this factory are carried out by its own personnel and over 50 percent of the spare parts needed by the factory are produced in the country.

In order to prepare grounds for self-sufficiency, he said, a central laboratory will be established in the near future to give service to the "Shomal" plastic and pipe producing factories.

Asked about the quality of the factory's products, the executive director stated "In comparison to the internal products, the products of this factory are at a high level of quality and as compared to foreign products they equal them."

In reply to a question on the future plans of the factory, Brother Mazhman said, "With plans that are under way a new production line will be added to this factory in the near future to produce very large pipes which will be used in constructing sewage networks."

Over 196 Thousand LPG Capsules Produced in Press Cylinder Factory of Gharvin

ZANJAN, Dec. 13 (IRNA) — Owing to efforts of the committed Muslim workers of the Press Cylinder Factory of Gharvin (northern Iran) a total number of 196,460 liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) capsules were produced and supplied to the LPG distributing companies of the country by this factory during the first seven months of the current Iranian year, it was announced by the director of the Press Cylinder Factory of Gharvin in an exclusive interview with IRNA.

According to the factory's director, this figure shows an increase of eight percent as compared to the whole production of last year.

Asked about the date of establishment and the rate of production of the factory, the director said, "With a primary investment of 200 million rials this factory has officially started to work since 1977. At the present time it produces about 40 percent of the country's total production of LPG capsules with a daily production of 1,800 capsules."

In reply to a question concerning the process of providing the raw materials of the factory the director remarked, "About 90 percent of the raw materials needed by the country are imported from Japan, Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and Italy. Therefore our best efforts are aimed at severing this dependence and on the basis of this aim our experts and technicians have succeeded in producing some parts of these capsules saving a total of 95 million rials of our currency every year."

Emphasis Put on Agriculture

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 26 Dec 82 p 3

[Speech by Minister of Agriculture Salamat]]

[Text]

TEHRAN, Dec. 25 (IRNA) — Iran's economy in the past was based on oil exportation but now the emphasis has been shifted to agriculture. Therefore a five and a ten year program has been prepared to augment the agricultural yields.

This statement was made by Mohammad Salamat, Minister of Agricultural and Rural Development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a press interview here today.

Salamat further said that regarding various agricultural products, namely beet sugar, cotton, apples and summer crops, a bumper harvest was realized this year (March 21, 1982 - March 20, 1983). As of the end of Azar (Dec. 21) a total of 1,187,000 tons of wheat had been purchased from farmers out of which 1,810,000 tons had been purchased by the central rural cooperatives of Iran.

The sugar beet yield is expected to be more than 4 million tons this year of which 2,700,000 tons has already been delivered to the country's sugar factories. Last year beet production yield was

2,900,000 tons.

He further added that unginned cotton amounting to 2,081,000 tons was delivered to the cotton ginning factory of the country, whereby 72,000 tons of carded cotton will be manufactured.

Pointing to the yield of fruits and summer crops, Salamat said, "We had a really good yield of these crops, and as a result of this we were able to export 200,000 tons of apple."

Agricultural produce exports amounted to 39 percent of Iran's over-all non-oil exports last year, while this year agricultural exports amounted to 63 percent of total non-oil exports.

Concluding, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development said that various government organizations are in the process of importing cows from abroad. About 5,000 milch cows had been imported and till the year 1365 (March 21, 1986-March 28, 1987) the same quantity will be bought every year and this program will make Iran self-sufficient in Dairy Products.

More Copper Production

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 26 Dec 82 p 2

[Text]

KERMAN, Dec. 25 (IRNA) — The Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex production will soon reach 300 tons per day from a present 145 tons thanks to the round-the-clock efforts of its staff. Announcing this the Managing Director of the complex, Hassan-pour further called on the government authorities to establish subsidiaries needed by the complex so that it could export some of its production.

Wednesday heralded the first anniversary of work resumption at the complex and was joyously celebrated by a great number of its experts, engineers, technicians and workers.

With the starting of the copper

refinery section of the complex the factory's efficiency will increase by more than 100 percent from a current production of 145,000 tons to 250,000 tons a year. The copper refinery is the last phase of the production line and the complex's increased efficiency has been made possible with the installation of a P.R.C. system. The exploitation of this refinery will commence in July, 1983. With the completion of this factory 1,000 tons of sulphuric acid will be produced daily.

Meanwhile, the anode section of the copper melting furnace of the complex was inaugurated on Nov. 19 and produces anode ingots with a purity of 99.70 percent.

Oil Reserves to Increase

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 26 Dec 82 p 3

[Text]

TEHRAN, Dec 25 (IRNA) — Exploitable Iranian oil reserves will increase to 16 billion barrels with current extensive plans to insert natural gas in oil wells. The plan would not only make use of wasted natural gas, but it would also decrease Iran's needs for expensive oil pumps in the future.

In order to implement the project the Iranian Oil Ministry has done extensive research work to use domestic capabilities and technicians to increase current pressures in the oil wells by re-inserting natural gas into the wells.

The exploitation of the oil wells during the decades have gradually

decreased the amount of pressure being exerted by natural gas, which also surfaces along with oil. With the re-insertation of the natural gas, the current pressure in the oil wells will reach their original levels.

Iran can exploit only 20 percent of its oil reserves with current methods but with the implementation of the plan Iran can exploit an additional 16 billion barrels.

In the years between 1971 and 1975, nearly 70 percent of the natural gas was burned at the oil fields and the remaining 30 percent was used in the oil industries. Later some amount of the gas was exported to the Soviet Union, but nevertheless some 50 percent of it was still being wasted.

In the first five-year plan, the Islamic Republic of Iran intends to implement this plan in eleven oil fields and experts predict that 40 to 120 million cubic meters of natural gas will be used per day according to the plan. Currently, more than 151 billion rials (1.8 billion dollars) has been estimated in budget for the project and some 75 billion rials (0.9 billion dollars) has been allocated for the necessary projects underway. The Oil Ministry has a total of 12 related projects and some of these projects have been completed. A number of them will be completed during the next 12 years.

CSO: 4600/178

PRESIDENT OF TURKEY TO VISIT

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Dec 82 p 1

[Text]

General Kenan Evren, President of the Republic of Turkey has said he would visit Pakistan again later this month to meet "my brother President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq".

He said this in an interview with the representative of the Turkish service of Radio Pakistan at the Karachi Airport here on Sunday on his arrival from Ankara for an overnight stay while on his way to Beijing.

The Turkish Head of State, who leaves Karachi on Monday morning on an official visit to the People's Republic of China, said he was very happy to be back again in Pakistan, a brotherly country".

Gen Evren said he had brought the best wishes of the Turkish people for the people of Pakistan.

Earlier President Evren was accorded a red carpet welcome when he flew into Karachi on Sunday.

He was warmly embraced at the Karachi Airport by the Acting

Chief Martial Law Administrator and Begum Iqbal Khan as soon as he alighted from the Turkish Airlines Boeing 707.

The Turkish President, who is accompanied by his daughter and an official delegation, was later introduced to the Governor of Sind, Lt-Gen S.M. Abbasi, senior representatives of the three Services, Sind ministers Mr Justice Syed Ghous Ali Shah, Syed Ahad Yusuf and Mr Dost Mohammad Fairi, Karachi Mayor Abdus Sattar Afghani, high officials members of the Majlis-i-Shoora and members of the Turkish Embassy and Consulate.

Two children dressed in traditional costume presented bouquets to the Turkish Head of State.

The Turkish Airliner touched down at the Karachi Airport at 4.15 p.m.

Later the Turkish President and members of his entourage drove in a motorcade to the Sind Governor's House.

CSO: 4200/233

ZIA'S REMARKS ON POLITICAL SET UP QUOTED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 2 Dec 82 p 34

[Article: "Chicken & Egg"]

[Text]

Q: There have been some suggestions that you want to institutionalise the military's role in Pakistan's politics. You clearly want the army to have a permanent role.

A: I feel very strongly about the military's permanent role in politics but I do not want to take any unilateral action. If we at all do something it will be with the consensus of the people, consensus of those who have some opinion on this. And, maybe, who knows, we may allow this for the next elected representatives to think about. Or perhaps I'll do it before then.

Q: Would there be any army-backed party?

A: No, we don't want the army to get involved that much in politics. We haven't got a very clear concept of what we want to do. But what I want is that the military hierarchy should be in the picture.

Q: Does that mean army generals

will be allowed to join political parties?

A: No, at the top level there would be some institutional arrangement. Maybe a war council or a council of ministers, perhaps an advisory body or defence committee of the cabinet, or may be a defence council where the army hierarchy can go and submit their view. But it would be upto the Government to accept or reject (their ideas). In the interim period, however, we will have this advisory body Majlis-i-Shura.

Q: How long will this 'nominated' and 'advisory' parliament go on...

A: Well, until we decide to... hold the elections.

Q: When would that be?

A: When I find the advisory bodies have failed.

Q: A chicken and egg situation?

A: Yes, exactly... from an interview given by Gen. Ziaul Haq to Asif Shamil of ASIaweek.

CSO: 4200/231

IMF TEAM STUDYING SITUATION FOR LAST INSTALMENT OF EXTENDED CREDIT

Karachi DAWN In English 13 Dec 82 p 1

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Dec 12: The last instalment of the extended fund facility amounting to about 500 million dollars is expected to be available to Pakistan very soon after Mr Andrew Crocker, International Monetary Fund's area specialist, arrives with his team here on Monday to update the IMF report on the nation's economic situation.

Pakistan was allowed by IMF the extended fund facility of the value of 1.7 billion dollars about two years ago to enable the country to overcome its nagging balance of payments gap. The IMF had also recommended certain measures which included increase in service charges, reduction in the element of subsidy and liberalising imports.

Pakistan is said to have carried out most of these recommendations apparently to the fund's satisfaction. However, the merchandise account deficit continues to be unfavourable and in fiscal 1981 the gap in trade account rose to a record of 1.6 billion dollars the substantial overseas Pakistanis' remittances notwithstanding.

It is said that Mr Crocker will hold talks for about three or four days with the Secretaries of Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs Division after which he is expected to submit to the IMF headquarters his assessment later this month, updating the IMF's September 1982 report.

The last instalment of about 500 million dollars out of the offer is expected to be made available for the period until Dec 31, 1983.

CSO: 4200/233

ISLAMIC SECRETARIAT OFFERS JOINT VENTURE

Karachi DAWN In English 13 Dec 82 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec 12: The Islamic Secretariat has evinced keen interest to set up joint ventures with Pakistan in 62 different kinds of industries and employing Pakistan expertise therein. Pakistan in response has sent some proposals to the Islamic Secretariat.

This was disclosed here on Friday at a Radio Press conference by the President of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Abdul Qayyum Bhatti.

Answering to a question, he said joint ventures were necessary for transfer of technology to Pakistan and added that both America and Canada were studying the possibilities of collaboration with Pakistan in various fields.

Trade delegations from both countries had visited Pakistan in the recent past to explore such possibilities.

Mr. Bhatti said high profit rates on deposits under various government schemes were a hindrance in promotion of industrialisation in

the country and added that the Government should take necessary measures to persuade the people to invest in industries.

The LCCI President was of the opinion that excessive controls and lengthy procedures for seeking permission and lack of necessary infrastructure were also a big impediment in the way of industrialisation. He stressed the need of simplification of all procedures.

Answering to a question, the LCCI President said the LCCI had submitted various recommendations to the Deregulation Committee, headed by the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission Dr. Mahbubul Haq, for lifting of unnecessary controls and simplification of the procedures.

Mr. Bhatti said industrial peace was maintained during the past few years but added the industrialists should be given the right of retrenching the people who did not work.—PPI

CSO: 4200/233

MARTIAL LAW URGED FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 2 Dec 82 pp 12, 13

[Text]

SYED Mohammad Iqbal Shah, President, Bata Mazdoor League, has, in a statement, called upon the Government to enforce a Martial Law order regulating the facilities and terms of employment available to workers.

Such a Martial Law order, he said, should stop the employers from withdrawing the facilities available to workers at present by virtue of law, agreement, custom or usage. Syed Iqbal Shah added that already the employers were withdrawing some of the facilities available to the workers, thus paving the way for industrial unrest.

He further said that the facilities being withdrawn by the employers had been obtained by the workers after a long struggle. It would be a great tragedy if the workers were to lose their rights under a Martial Law

regime. Besides, the employers were also refusing to implement the labour laws, he added.

The Bata Mazdoor League President said that the employers were being encouraged in their present policies because of the unconscionable delay in the formulation of a new labour policy.

He said employers were openly flouting labour laws. One instance of this was provided by the management of Bata Shoe Co. (Pakistan) Ltd., which did not allow paid leave to its sales staff on Allama Iqbal's birthday and on the occasion of the two Eids, and allowed only two days leave instead of three.

He said that employers could be made to respect workers' rights only through a Martial Law order.

CSO: 4200/231

LONG RANGE CONSEQUENCES OF INDIA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Dec 82 p 9

[Article by Zahurul Haq]

[Text] WHEN Pandit Nehru posed to President Ayub Khan, the rhetorical question, "Defence against whom;" to the latter's offer of a common defence pact, the pertinent answer (whatever else it was) should have been, "Defence against ourselves!". President Ayub should have said that, not in what normally would be interpreted as a defence mechanism against self-immolation, but in the precise sense the words imply — a common defence arrangement ruling out war between the two countries.

In military terms, this may have meant a moratorium on arms build-up, reduction in and a ceiling on the quantum of armed forces, inspection, if necessary, of each other's arsenals, and withdrawal of armies from the border. All these conditions, in some form or other, are necessary pre-requisites for an understanding. President Zia-ul-Haq's offer of a No-War Pact to India, when reduced to a military explanation, would probably incorporate these requirements. But Mrs Gandhi would rather have a treaty of friendship, like India has with other countries, saying it would fulfill the purpose of a no-war pact. Her allergy to a non-aggression arrangement probably springs from the subtleties of long-term di-

plomacy that keep a country's option open as much as they do not pre-empt, in abundant caution, the right of future generations to change their mind.

As both Pakistan and India are undecided on what precise appellation their mutual friendly intentions should bear, I am proceeding, on my own, to call it 'entente', resisting the usual follow-up word, "cordiale". This is because cordiality is implicit in an entente; otherwise, the arrangement would have to have another definition.

Undoubtedly, an entente between the two countries would be the most significant international development of the decade on the Asian continent. Its local and global repercussions, and potential to change the power balances and the Indian Ocean's geo-politics, are matters which could fill volumes. Here, I shall attempt only to identify and, where necessary, discuss, in some detail, the perspectives of such a development and the dimensions of its political fall-out.

Suspicion

First, looking inward to an accord's chances of success or failure and ability to penetrate the public psyche, one cannot ignore that for a long time the two countries' foreign policies were constructed on mutual suspicion. Foreign policy, as a subject, is a multi-dimensional formulation, not necessarily regional in outlook. Pandit Nehru, articulated a mix of philosophies that produced, for one, and ideologically worthy organisation called

the Non-Aligned Movement. However, regionally, Nehru's initiative was in the nature of a rebuff to Pakistan's pact-making. He frustrated efforts by some NAM countries to bring Pakistan into the orbit of the non-aligned grouping. Because mini-wars were even then being fought between Third World countries, Nehru's reasoning was lopsided. If more power was to be given to NAM's elbow, it should have been keen to draw more countries to its fold. In this way, nations fearful of hostile neighbours, could have been reassured. On the other hand, NAM's founders could have set an example of international peace. India could have negotiated over Kashmir and Nasser would not have sent his troops in aid of South Yemen.

The mechanics of an Indo-Pakistan accord would require the existing pluses and minuses between the two countries to be identified, not with a view to throwing discussion into a confusion of polemics and unalterable postures, but with the determination to tackle the problems and find their solutions. Within the sub-continent, two philosophies have been clashing and coming to blows; two life-styles have not found an equation; two minds have not discovered a meeting ground. Our troubles could be a reflex of deep psychic factors. They are, as much, born of historic animosities whose continuance is as ridiculous as trying to reverse the passage of time.

But of one thing, I am sure, we in Pakistan and India are convinced. Whatever the differences, they will have to be sorted out by our generation, our dying generation, which has witnessed the crises and which, from sentiment of the compulsions of geo-politics, is willing and able to forge a friendship. Future generations cannot be condemned to live in the fear of shadows they did not create, of a past they had never seen.

Pluses & minuses

Earlier I had talked of the need to identify the pluses and minuses. I shall give a more understandable meaning to the pluses by calling them 'commonalities'. The common problems of the two countries are socio-economic: population explosion; insufficient food, shelter and clothing; lack of a strong industrial and manufacturing base;

need for sophisticated technology; a hunger for destructive weaponry; not enough scientific advancement; massive poverty. These problems, generally, are common to most Third World countries.

To Pakistan, added to these problems is the prospect of our dams silting up, much of our productive land destroyed through erosion and salination, our mountains denuded of forests burnt away as fuel, our energy requirements disallowed by international conspiracies and the ecological balance upset by over-utilisation of natural resources that may produce unpredictable calamities.

In India the almost three per cent annual increase in population will, in 25 years, combine diminishing returns from land with a perpetual famine (F.A.O. study). Labour strikes, nihilism, student unrest, separatist demands and dilution of central authority will follow. The First and Second Worlds may go up in a nuclear bang but the Third World of Pakistan and India is, as likely to go down in a morass of want and penury.

The prevailing economic order designed for the Third world by the First and Second Worlds aims at depriving the former of the power to bargain in trade and fall into a death trap of unrepayable debts, losing all freedom of action and room for manoeuvre. If these realities were meaningfully pondered by the two countries in the context of an intended entente and on the philosophic plane, they would go along with Professor Abdel Malek of the Tokyo U.N. University that the reason why the Third World cannot come into its own is because most of its member countries are still searching for their identity. They may have got rid of imperialism and foreign armies but they are still hagridden by the notions, concepts, categories, theories and systems of thought in which the Western world expresses its historic hegemony in intellectual terms.

Pakistan's Islamisation which many abroad regard with some amusement, has, in fact, opened an in-depth dialectical dialogue between Western and Oriental traditions. India's spiritual philosophies and astronomical skills have often cut through the pats of violence and despair and raised will-power to the pedestal of meditative sobriety and intellectual creativity. Bet-

ween them and Islam's mathematical and scientific achievements is a commonness of spiritual and historic lessons that can help overcome any morbid turn the economies of the two countries may take in the near future.

Much depends on whether each of us goes it alone or in constructive collaboration. Must thinking in either country be so politically oriented that it dominates our attention to the exclusion of all else? Within the hundreds of millions who live on the subcontinent are tens of millions who are educated enough to know the name of the game. They must feel embarrassed at being manipulated by the traditional hegemonists like pawns on a string.

Of course, India and Pakistan have to fill the resource gap, the energy gap and the defence gap and to do so they must find the means and the money. Their need to acquire advanced technology is undeniable and no country in a position to supply it should try and trade it with the carbon monoxide of hegemonism. But, equally, with this gap filling, there is another, yawning gap the two nations have to fill — the gap of exemplary international conduct of mutual amity that gives a message to the world of our spiritual strength and the Orient's philosophy of high morality. Will the walls of suspicion between us crumble, or have we sat on the fence so long that "the iron has entered our soul"?

At the leadership level there are some plus points between President Zia and Mrs Gandhi. Both have ample home support. Whatever his enemies may say, President Zia is respected in Pakistan for initiating the Islamic system and maintaining security. This is how India should look at him. The important thing is to accentuate the 'positive'. If India chooses to emphasise the so-called 'negatives', the negotiators will part company in high blood pressure.

Mutual respect

The achievement of top-level respect is a must for any entente. There have never been, in history, bonds of mass affection between peoples of two countries. Understandings and agreements have flowed from State-to-State arrangements. Unless leadership in both

countries can match pious declarations with mutual respect, India's Subramaniam would repeat his dictum that "if an agreement could not be reached at the ministerial level, it could hardly surface in a meeting of Secretaries".

President Zia-ul-Haq made two significant points, one in an interview to Indian journalist Sarin, and the other, recently. To Sarin he listed, among requisites, the importance of helpful thinking by India's "opinion-makers". Since 'opinion-makers', including Indian civilians and retired generals vie with each other in intellectual exercises usually reserved for parliamentary debates, let us hear what they have to say:

Subramaniam: (Head of Defence Studies) — "Let us do to Pakistan what Israel did to Iraq".

Serving Civil Servant to Foreign journalist. — "In the 1971 war, we divided Pakistan. But we divided the wrong part".

Major General (Retd) Palit. — "We could easily eliminate PIN-STECH, but the fall-out would render the Pindi area uninhabitable for a thousand years".

The second point made by President Zia after his recent return from abroad was that Kashmir will not be put into cold storage if a No-War Pact emerged. In saying this the President was asking Mrs Gandhi to begin talking about it.

Kashmir must have primacy in Indo-Pakistan negotiations. India appears to believe that with more contacts between the two peoples and extensive trade and economic collaboration, Kashmir will become secondary. Will it? India probably thinks it is an emotional and spiritual issue. It may be for India, but for Pakistan, it is a vitally economic one also.

(The writer is the author of "Pakistan's New Horizons" and "Future Trends in the Indian Ocean Area.")

OFFICIAL POLICIES SEEN AS UNDERMINING CULTURAL VALUES

Karachi DAWN in English 8 Dec 82 p 7

[Text]

Speaking at a film-land function in Karachi, the Federal Minister for Culture was reminded of how the VCR has become a deadly poison for our "pakeeza" culture. He also said that the Government was striving to contain its vicious impact. For the moment, however, the VCR is winning and nothing would testify to this disquieting fact better than the state of our films. But VCR is not the only challenge that our films have to contend with. Censorship policies of the Government, coupled with the inherent weaknesses of our cinema, have done a lot to push the staple entertainment diet of our people to its present artistic abyss. The Federal Minister also reiterated the present

regime's resolve to establish an Islamic society in Pakistan and made it clear that the films could not be allowed to affect our sense of direction. There is need for definite clarifications about the scope and limitations of our performing arts in the new cultural dispensation. For it is not just the cinema that is gasping for breath. Our performing arts, particularly the theatre, have not really had an opportunity to take root and it is difficult to visualise how they can be promoted in the present circumstances. The de-certification of the cultural landscape has become the abiding anguish of our intelligentsia. It extends to literary pursuits and sources of creativity in several aspects of our life.

VCR, thus, has invaded a culture that has had no defences of its own. Consequently, the surrender has been abject. It is leading to an atomisation of our middle-class social life. Whatever little support was available for quality entertainment has almost been eroded. At one level, the VCR also symbolises the declining values of our acquisitive society. It has become the new status symbol. But it is the cultural dimension to which we are referring now. If the Government is to make a serious attempt to counter the VCR invasion, it should first resolve fundamental issues about our cultural identity. Doubts about the tangible aspects of the Islamic culture that the Government would like to promote have to be removed. The national policy on culture has

been in the making for too long. The manner in which cultural activities are discouraged in our educational institutions offers little hope for an environment in which the spirit of our

nation could find true artistic expression. The films in particular offer an immense potential for clean entertainment that would also raise the standards of popular taste. We

have commented before on how the cinema can also effectively serve to extend the boundaries of social awareness.

It has to be noted that, while the films produced in the country and imported from abroad increasingly reflect the inhibitions of the higher cultural authorities, the VCR allows an unrestrained flow of international pot-pourri. Yet it is typical of the reigning popular taste that in both cases, a certain Gresham's law operates: bad films have driven the quality fare out of circulation. The dual culture flourishing in our country has the worst of both the worlds. A proper strategy is required to deal with this situation. The first task is to create and support an educated public. The media should be allowed and encouraged to work towards laying the foundation of a cultural infrastructure. We need to have a viable publishing industry. There is need for improving the availability of good literature and other reading material. Promotion of serious theatre, can nurture artistic creativity and talent. A system of institutional support for artistes and performers of merit is necessary. There should be higher rewards for writers, artists, directors, musicians and performers, so that they are encouraged to pursue the goal of excellence in their respective fields. But equally this will require artistic and cultural freedom. One does not know if the Ministry of Culture has pondered these and other relevant question. It is not enough to know that the VCR is undermining our cultural values and that our cinema has been drained of artistic merit and entertainment value

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR SIND PREPARED

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 82 p 7

[Text]

SUKKUR, Dec 9: The Sind Minister for Industries, and Finance, Mr Ashraf W. Tabani, told a Press conference here on Wednesday that the Sind Small Industries Corporation had prepared a three year plan for industrial development in the province which involved a total outlay of Rs. 282.84 million including Rs. 225 million in the private sector and Rs. 67.84 in the public sector. This plan was spread over three years of 1981-84., he added.

Mr Tabani disclosed that the private sector investment in the plan for 1981-82 envisaged an investment of Rs. 50 million. He disclosed that so far sanction for 95 projects, 78 of them for the rural areas had been given. The total investment in the private sector in these projects was Rs. 66.67 million in the first year of the plan.

This investment, he pointed out, was 33 per cent higher than the investment envisaged in the plan which he observed was a good achievement.

Mr Ashraf W. Tabani disclosed that the trades for which sanction had been given included rice husking and milling, poultry farming, re-rolling, marble and glass products, oil expelling, wheat and grain milling, dal milling, ice and cold storage, furniture making, allied engineering, shoe making, food products, cotton waste cleaning, ready made garments manufacturing, woollen carpets, hard

board making and printing.

The Sind Industries Minister said that the new projects would provide 1400 new job opportunities. He said that the Small Industries Corporation plan also envisaged the establishment of three industrial estates at Dadu, Shikarpur and Kandhkot in Jacobabad district.

Industrial estates

He said that the Federal Government had granted a five-year tax holiday for the industries to be set up in Dadu, Shikarpur and Kandhkot industries estates with a view to encourage the entrepreneurs in this backward area.

Mr Tabani disclosed that an artisans colony with 75 quarters had been established at Bhitshah where the artisans of Bhitshah, Khanot and Hala would be settled.

The Sind Governor is expected to inaugurate this colony at the end of this month when the artisans would be given allotments. The allottee artisans will be given allotments on easy terms and they will be required to repay the cost of their quarters in 20 years, he said.

The Minister disclosed that 25 carpet centres and one garment making centre had already been set up in the province where the artisans children were given training in their crafts.

For the provision of marketing facilities to the craftsmen, handicrafts centres had been set up — two

located at Karachi and one each at Sukkur, Khairpur and Moenjodaro.

He said that during the last year goods worth Rs. 2.5 million were purchased from the craftsmen. He said that a design centre had also been opened at Karachi to educate the artisans on new designs and modern patterns of artisanship.

Excise tax

Mr Tabani disclosed that the Excise and Taxation Department had recovered Rs. 6.2 million as taxes throughout the province during the year 1981-82 which was 10 per cent above the budgeted recovery. From July to October 1982 the Department recovered Rs. 230 million as various taxes, he said.

He disclosed that during 1981-82 the Excise and Taxation Department had recovered 6900 kilograms of Charas all over the province while during the four months from July to October 826148 kilograms of charas was recovered.

The Minister disclosed that during the year 1981-82, 26 Kilograms of heroin was recovered while from July to Oct 1982 sixteen kilograms of heroin was recovered all over the province.

Mr Tabani said that in Sukkur division during the year 1981-82 four kilograms of heroin was recovered while only on Dec 8 five kilograms of heroin worth Rs. 50 million had been recovered. —APP.

NATIONAL LIBRARY TO START BY JUNE

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 82 p 9

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Dec 9: The National Library of Pakistan will be functioning by the end of June next, a Cultural Complex official source said here on Tuesday.

Cultural Complex consist of a Museum of Islamic Heritage, an Armed Forces Museum and a National Art Gallery. The approved cost of the library estimated in 1973 was Rs. 16.08 millions, but due to rise in prices the revised cost is now estimated at Rs. 84.289 millions including foreign exchange component of Rs. 16 millions.

It has been declared a deposit library under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962, and every publisher is bound to deposit one copy of its publication to the library.

The library has purchased 200 manuscripts and a number of rare periodicals.

It will also acquire the microfilming of unique records relating to Pakistan in foreign institutions.

The library plans to acquire over a million volumes in a period of 20-25 years. In national acquisitions,

the National Library will collect all materials in print as well as in other forms published in the country. It will also try to collect materials of the era of Fort Williams College Press.

For foreign literature, the National Library will be guided by the principal of selectiveness. The library has already received over 15,000 books and thousands of issues of periodicals and newspapers under the Copyright Ordinance. These collections will be organised in halls and rooms.

Study halls provide a space for 500 readers. Provision for 15 research rooms have also been made for researchers. The information and bibliographical functions of the national library will be broadly developed. It has already published the national bibliography upto 1978. For this purpose the library will make use of computer technology.

It will also provide inter-library lending facilities and international exchange of publications.—APP.

CSO: 4200/231

TRADING CORPORATION READY TO START IMPORTS FROM INDIA

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 82 p 16

[Text]

The acting Chairman of the Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) Mr Ahmed Rafi, said yesterday that the TCP was fully geared to start import of 40 identified items from India.

In an interview he said that rules and procedures in this respect had already been finalised and communicated to all trade associations in the country. Queries had started pouring in, he said and expressed the hope that actual flow of business would start next month.

Only one formality was incomplete, namely, State Bank of Pakistan's orders to the scheduled banks to endorse the import licences of the traders in favour of the TCP for opening LCs(As decided by the Government, import of 40 items from India is to be channelled through the TCP only).

Answering a question, the acting Chairman said, the TCP proposed to import four lakh tons of edible oil during the current fiscal year. Contracts for the import of 2,41,000 metric tons of edible oil worth Rs 129 crore had already been finalised. These comprised 1,57,000 tons of soyabean and 85,000 tons of refined palm oil. He added that soyabean is being imported mostly from the United States and palm oil from Malaysia.

He said only a few items are now left with the corporation for imports. These include newsprint for small consumers and for printing of the holy Quran, M.S. billets, steam

coal and aluminium, bidi leaves, copper and mercury, and tea for Afghan refugees. He added that tenders for the import of bidi leaves had just been floated.

He pointed out that the total imports by Corporation last year were of the order of Rs 314.5 crore. He said that while the demand for edible oil is on increase, there was decline in the import of other items by the Corporation mainly because some of the items are now being locally produced and other transferred to local consumers for import.

He referred to the import of billet and said that tenders for the import of 2500 metric tons of billet had been floated. Billet of such quality is not manufactured by Pakistan Steel.

Explaining, Mr Ahmad Rafi said, in the field of imports, the Corporation has been entrusted with the import of certain specified items which are mainly used as industrial raw material and essential goods in the country. Since the purchases are made in bulk, the Corporation is able to obtain competitive prices and effect considerable saving in storage and handling expenses. The arrangement thus helps to conserve foreign exchange and to eliminate certain malpractices. The national exchequer receives its full share of taxes and no undue or over-invoicing takes place. — APP.

WRETCHED CONDITIONS OF SCHOOLS DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 82 Magazine p I

[Article by Lala Rukh Hussain]

[Text]

We were told it was a school; yet nothing about it gave any indication of the fact. We could hardly believe what our eyes saw on entering the wretched place — stepping over a foot-high crooked threshold and straight into puddles of muddy water.

The water was coming from a hook held over a two-wheeled Honda by a young man who, undisturbed by our barging in like that, continued to wash his vehicle right in front of the class-rooms. And it was after school hours.

The school teacher escorting us took no notice of him either which we found rather strange. Obviously, it was a sight too familiar for him; for he gave no explanation.

Wasn't someone washing a large vehicle right in the middle of the school (and a very small one at that) filling the broken cement floor with water and splashing whatever remained of the school furniture... a sight to explain? Apparently not if that same one happens to be the landlord himself.

A Nationalised or Government school today means a conglomeration of crumbling walls, broken flooring, whirling litter and mounds of debris — an insult to the very concept of educational institutions. One feels only disgust and shame — to see little children literally rolling in the dirt, in an impossible effort to read, write and copy

from decaying bits of black painted wood; the dust settling on their hair, face, hands and feet. So that their own mothers wouldn't know them when they return home — as one teacher put it bitterly.

Everyone of these institutions has a story of despair, each different only to the extent of the endurance of those who have lived it...

In Globe Primary and Secondary School Nazimabad, they have five rooms (average size: 8'x9') on the ground floor and five on the upper storey. Of the latter five, only one has a roof consisting of loose straw resting on bamboo poles, the other four have only the sky. On the floor were some odd pieces of wood for seats in a seat:student ratio of 5:43.

Mid-term exams were in progress when we went there. Teen-aged boys were standing in water which was flowing out of an underground tank (or gutter) in a small backyard. Toilets to their left, the boys were writing in their exam-copies which they rested on a waist high porch.

Half-a-dozen were squatting on the floor of the platform with their copies on knees, backs, walls or whichever position they favoured in the unlimited opportunities they had at their disposal. Nearly thirty or so were crammed (three, even four to a bench) in another room which from all possibilities of imagination couldn't be called a classroom. The teachers hovered out-

side the room.

Kausar Lower Secondary and Primary School situated precariously over what must have been the ground floor of the school when it must have belonged to its original owner in a narrow garbage-littered lane in Paposhnagar didn't have even that "facility" for the teacher.

Once the classrooms are filled, with two sections to each room, stuffing nearly 100 kids in a space which measures about 10'x14', the teacher has to stay rooted to her spot by the black square patch on the wall.

Dreary

She cannot reach a child beyond the fourth row and none of the children beyond the first two rows can extract themselves from their tight shoulder into shoulder and knee-upon knee positions without walking over their classmates' heads.

Said the Headmistress, Mrs. Afifa Shaheen: "We are sent instructions from the Directorate of Education that teachers are to stroll between the rows of students when taking a class or conducting exams. You can see for yourselves that this is not only an impossibility, the teacher cannot check a child's copy or give individual attention to a few even if she had the time and inclination to."

So every morning, afternoon and evening, scores of children pack themselves into these dreary unpainted walls which are sometimes knocked out at places to let some breeze in.

The school with the grandiose name of Pak Cambridge was so grotesque we couldn't help wondering aloud how the teachers could suffer the surroundings and be prepared to even consider teaching.

The furniture consisted of three chairs plus a table or two and a bench lining the wall in a tiny room near the entrance which made up for the Headmistress's office, staff-room and the clerk's office.

The rest of the place was barren, with bits of paper rolling about in the breeze and a wee-begone children's slide almost black with rust (a sure way of getting tetanus). We felt like tourists looking around some centuries old and neglected monument.

To put it more precisely, there were four half-walls, and the half-

ing, mind you, was obviously not evenly done when the landlord's hired hands did a hurried job one fine day when the school was closed for summer.

Where had they got those tattered tarpauline swinging low over their heads they had to duck every now and then from? One of the woeful tales that we heard again and again was about how the school heads and staff couldn't procure even a nail to hold together a broken chair from the funds called the Student Fund.

That Fund, collected annually (Rs. 12 each student in the primary schools and Rs. 24 from the secondary) is deposited in the bank account of the Directorate and even though the signature of the school head is required to be able to draw any amount from that account, and many heads testified that they had often signed blank cheques on instructions from the Directorate they did not have the authority to use even a paisa towards school maintenance.

They could roll in dust, roast under the hot sun, drench in the rain or be on their aching feet for as many hours as required — the booklet on the Rules for Operating 'Students Fund' issued by the Directorate explicitly states:

"Expenditure on any item not meant for the benefit of the students, repairs to buildings, purchase of stationery articles etc...are not items of expenditure that can be met from the Students Fund" (Rule 12).

Rule No. 10 however says: "The Head of the school may in his/her discretion spend an amount up to Rs.50 only on any item not covered by the budget provided that justification of the expenditure beyond the budget items will be recorded by the Headmaster/Headmistress."

Most school heads I talked to said the only occasion they get any money sanctioned — and that too at the rate of one rupee or even fifty paises per student — was on religious occasions. And mind you, they said "it is not we who decide we want it and when we want it. The Directorate sends the orders, and we do our best."

Money from the Student Fund, collected in the name of "School activities meant solely for the benefit of the students such as games, sports, scouting, junior Red Cross, Junior Brigade, Girls Guides, tour-

naments, debates, social activities..." (Rule No.7) (a cruel joke) is drawn occasionally and on the whims of the Directorate officials. But its use for the schools' real needs is yet to take place.

This actually means that schools have to get their own chalk, blackboards and chairs for the teachers. And this is done in a variety of ways. Since there is a standing order against collecting funds from the children (other than the annual fund) the teachers have to contribute from their meagre salaries.

However, there are certain areas in which neither staff contributions nor student gifts can help — like desks for the children. They are the sole responsibility of the Directorate which they try to fulfil at the rate of nine dual-desks per school (maximum 24 desks) with a student strength of over 1,000 in a period of 10 years.

"Since the schools were nationalised, to this day we have received only 14 dual desks made of 'keekar' wood. Everyone of them went to bits and we didn't have the facility to get them together again." This was said by heads and teachers of a secondary school in one of the most crowded areas of the city.

Even the magnificent looking Ayesha Bawany School has suffered the same fate. You can hold your heart (and nose too) as you pass through depressingly grey corridors. Inside totally empty rooms which function as classrooms you will find an occasional improvised 'desk' — two broken chairs with a plank across — at best.

The headmistress whose first official task when she took over some months back was to sign away the Students Fund on a blank cheque and never know to this day how much of it was utilised for what purpose, bleeds her heart out — working two shifts singlehandedly without an extra allowance or even an official acknowledgement.

Like the Ayesha Bawany school, a large number of primary schools have no sweepers. Those who do

have them can hardly make them do their job well because their monthly wages for sweeping an average of 10 rooms and a compound every morning and evening (before the second shift) is only Rs. 50.

Large sums of money (besides the Students Fund) are often collected in the name of 'extra-curricular' activities which either have no practical utility or are created only for the benefit of certain influential houses.

Prominent amongst these gimmicks was the 'School Safety Badges' for which schools had orders to make their own arrangements (even if this meant funds collected from the children.) But the District officers were quick to exploit the matter and send out different orders. Each head of the primary and secondary schools was to collect two rupees from each student and deposit the sum at the Directorate which they said would arrange for the badges in turn.

One company was given the order for what turned out to be third rate badges that must have cost less than a rupee.

Jamboree

Some time back, for a much-publicised jamboree, a sum of Rs. 960 was drawn from the Students Funds of a school like the P.N.T. Primary Govt. School, where the children have only the bare ground to sit on. The fund cannot be used for buying some mats because the Rules forbid this expenditure.

Rule No 13 states: "No money shall be allocated to any activity for which facilities do not exist in the school." Since most schools have no facilities — not even mats — the funds can't be used for anything but school uplift.

The Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee of Teachers and Heads of Nationalised Schools,

Karachi Region, Mr. Latif Muhammad Khan, who teaches at the A.U. Islamia School, says that for his school alone an annual budget of Rs. 25,000 is sanctioned and not even a hundredth part of it gets utilised for the schools upkeep.

Several previous owners (now landlords of the school buildings) have taken the matter of getting their property vacated to court. "The Directorate has made that the biggest excuse for not spending towards its maintenance."

He quotes an incident of such under-hand transactions: Children of a Nazimabad School were given (for Rs. 200 each) school leaving certificate and the school building was returned to its owner, in spite of the fact that there is a Martial Law Regulation which forbids this.

Recently, a portion of the Muslim Girls School, Nazimabad, was returned to the owner by the Directorate. "There has to be a lot of motivation in order to violate an MLR by a Government official," he said.

Some of the schools already returned to their previous owners are: Jamia Taa'ila, North Nazimabad, Taaleemgah Govt. School near Sarafa Bazar and Modern Public School, Freedy Street where a high rise by the name of Japan Plaza is already coming up. The transfer of the Marie Calaco School (Saddar) was recently stopped on the timely intervention of the Co-ordination Committee's appeal to the President.

Mr Latif and his colleagues think that before more schools are dissolved in this scandalous way or merged with other already lacking and over-crowded ones — leaving thousands of children without means of education — a committee should be set up with representatives of the nationalised cadre on it to investigate into the matter.

The crux of the whole matter they say is that "Directorate Officials have sole charge over everything concerned with the nationalised schools. They never let us in on anything, and thus get away with this high-handedness".

BRIEFS

CHATTI TO VISIT--JEDDAH, Dec 12--The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Mr. Habib Chatti, leaves here later on Sunday on a 15-day tour that will consecutively take him to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan. He will discuss with the leaders of the four Asian countries current Islamic issue, situation in the Middle East, Iraq-Iran war and results of the efforts made by the 9-Member Islamic Peace Committee to resolve the 27-month old conflict. [Karachi DAWN in English 13 Dec 82 p 1]

ADHI OIL WELL--RAWALPINDI, Dec. 12--Another well is expected to be spudded in Adhi Oil fields, in Potohar range, next month it was learnt here. This will be the ninth well to be opened in this field, a joint venture of the Oil and Gas Development Corporation and Pakistan Petroleum. PPL is the operator under the joint venture agreement. Preparations are afoot and the site is being prepared for the purpose while engineers are busy in carrying out pre-rig operations. A water line for the well has been laid and waste water line is nearing completion. Other civil engineering jobs that have been started and are going ahead are construction of the cellar and the water pit. Jaxboard buildings at the well No. 8 will be dismantled and shifted to well No. 9. [Karachi DAWN in English 13 Dec 82 p 10]

CONSTRUCTION OF ISLAMIC CENTER--The construction of the Islamic Research Centre and Mosque in the peripheral area of mausoleum of the Quaid-i-Azam will begin in May next year, Federal Minister for Housing and Works, Air Marshal Inamul Huq Khan, said during an inspection of the site of the project yesterday. He said the project will be completed within 2-3 years. The president was keen to see the project coming up, he added. Besides, the Islamic Centre and Mosque, a piece of land has also been earmarked for the Quaid-i-Azam Academy. He said that instructions have already been issued that construction of no building will be allowed around the mausoleum which will be higher than the tomb of the Mazar. During the inspection the Minister was accompanied by Secretary Housing Maj. Gen Shafiq Ahmed. [Karachi DAWN In English 13 Dec 82 p 10]

NUSRAT BHUTTO IN PARIS--LONDON, Dec. 7--Begum Nusrat Bhutto has arrived in Paris after two weeks of tests in a Munich hospital. Before reaching Paris, Begum Bhutto, according to reports reaching here, addressed a reception arranged by her supporters living in Europe at a local Munich hall. The reception, according to a PPP source, was attended by nearly 500 people. The Begum

told her supporters that her defunct party, alongwith some other defunct parties in Pakistan, would continue demanding the return of democracy in Pakistan under 1973 Constitution. She is also believed to have claimed that no less than 15,000 political prisoners were still in jails in Pakistan. Quite a number of PPP supporters living in the UK are reported to have attended the reception. [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Dec 82 p 1]

MINISTER CRITICIZES BHUTTO'S ACTIVITIES--ISLAMABAD, Dec 7--Ghulam Dastgir Khan, Federal Minister for Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, while criticising Begum Nushar Bhutto's activities outside the country, has said she was granted permission by the Government for her treatment abroad but she was indulging in political activities there. The Federal Minister was addressing a gathering of labourers at Community Centre here today which was arranged by Pakistan WAPDA Hydro-Electric Central Labour union. The Minister said that such politicians who play dual role and who have difference in their words and deeds, could only lead the country towards destruction. [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Dec 82 p 1]

SCHOOLS IN OPEN SPACES--ATTOCK, Dec 7--Twenty thousands school are being run in open spaces in the Punjab because funds for constructing buildings are not available. This was stated by Punjab Education and Health Minister Hamid Nasir Chatta while addressing Councillors at Fateh Jang, 35 km from here. He said that the Government was constructing Tehsil Hospital at Fateh Jang at a cost of Rs.8.3 million and an inter-college for boys at a cost of Rs. 3.6 million for which a District Councillor, Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan has donated 125 canals of land. Replying to a question, he said a lady doctor was appointed for Fateh Jang, Hospital, but she refused to join. He said the promotion would not be given to those teachers who refuse to serve in the rural areas. The Punjab Communication Minister Mian Salahuddin, speaking on the occasion, said that after the construction of Shahpur Dam in Fateh Jang the people of the town will get more drinking water. He said that efforts were being made to include the construction of a bridge over Bahagwan Nadi in the next Annual Development Programme. [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Dec 82 p 4]

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY CHIEF--Air Vice-Marshal Khurshid Anwar Mirza on Tuesday took over as the Director-General of the newly created Civil Aviation Authority. Mr. N.H. Hanafi was Acting Director-General of the Department of Civil Aviation, till the creation of the Civil Aviation Authority. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Dec 82 p 8]

PRISONER DIES IN CUSTODY--An under custody prisoner, Mohammad Anwer (25) died in the Civil Hospital yesterday. He was arrested by the Chakiwara Police some three weeks ago and remanded to judicial custody about a week back. He was admitted in the Civil Hospital's surgical ward where he died yesterday. His relatives made a representation to the higher authorities claiming that the deceased was allegedly tortured by the police while in custody. However, there was no independent confirmation of this charge as no doctor was available for comments. [Karachi DAWN in English 8 Dec 82 p 8]

NOORANI BANNED--Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani's entry into Punjab has been banned for three months. A Punjab Government order was served on him at his

residence yesterday by a police party, headed by SDPO, Preedy, Choudhri Nisar Ahmed. The order was served under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (MPO). [Karachi DAWN In English 10 Dec 82 p 1]

POLISH PURCHASE TEAMS--Two Polish purchase teams are at present in Karachi to buy textile and leather worth about dollar 5.5 million, the Polish Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. Wladyslaw Neneman, told the Acting President of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), Syed Nazar Hussain Shah, at a meeting yesterday. The Ambassador said the Polish Commercial Counsellor's office was being shifted from Islamabad to Karachi with a view to facilitating trade between the two countries. He said Poland wanted to increase its trade with Pakistan substantially and stressed the need of identifying new avenues of trade. He said Poland could co-operate with Pakistan in developing sugar industry with a view to utilising all by-products of sugar mills like manufacture of molasses and industrial alcohol and also in setting up small and medium sized machine tool making units. [Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 82 p 14]

FLOGGING OF WOMAN SLATED--The Women's Action Forum, Karachi, has criticised the recent flogging of a woman in Swat. A Press release of the Forum said: Firstly, under Islamic Law, if the evidence of four eye-witnesses was not available, the woman could only be sentenced if she confessed. Secondly, where women are denied by custom and fanaticism the right to acquire education, the majority of our down-trodden sisters are unaware of their rights as given to them by Islam. What does a woman who wants to terminate her marriage, have to do under these circumstances. Can she be held guilty if no legal way is provided for her to cope with the situation. Thirdly, WAF believes that all societies, like all individuals, have both good and bad in them, it said. [Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 82 p 16].

'PAKISTAN TIMES' CHIEF EDITOR--LAHORE, Dec 9--Mr Maqbul Sharif took over as a professional journalist and broadcaster. He has been working for the Pakistan Times for the last 23 years. He has worked as a correspondent of the "Pakistan Observer", Dhaka, as a lecturer, as a guest producer of the Lahore Television Centre and Lahore Station of Radio Pakistan. He served as Secretary of the first and second Wage Boards for journalists and workers of the newspaper industry. [Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 82 p 17]

PROBE URGED INTO DEATH--Vice-Chairman of the Lyari Samaji Tanzeem, Mr Mohammad Hussain Baluch, has demanded magisterial inquiry into the death of Mohammad Anwar, who died in Civil Hospital while in custody. In a statement he, claimed that Anwar was allegedly tortured by the Chakiwara police. He asked the authorities why his post-mortem examination was not performed. [Karachi DAWN in English 13 December 82 p 10]

CSO: 4200/233

NATIONAL DEBT THREAT TO NATIONAL RESOURCES

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 26 Dec 82 pp 1, 3

[Article by Winston de Valliere]

[Text]

Authoritative Central Bank sources sounded a warning to the government, that the spiralling interest payments on the Public Debt, which stood at Rs. 65,000 million at the end of 1981, would pose a serious threat to the country's resources in the near future if the government did not find a way of meeting this commitment.

Government footed a massive Rs. 3,716 million on interest bills on the gross public debt in 1981, a sharp increase of 69 per cent over the previous year's interest payments, the sources said. Debt service payments (interest payments) as a ratio of government revenue was 33 per cent in 1981 from 26 per cent in 1980. The domestic debt interest bill amounted to Rs. 3,000 million while the foreign debt siphoned off Rs. 713 million. These represented increases of 68 and 73 per cent respectively, the sources said.

While the gross public debt at end of 1981 indicated an increase of 26 per cent, the increase in foreign debt was 52 per cent representing an increase in foreign loans amounting to Rs. 6.9 billion.

Government would face a difficult situation in finding adequate locally-recycled resources to meet the debt burden particularly the capital instalment payments due over the next ten to fifteen years, the sources said. By this time the foreign debt would be well past the 100 billion mark, the sources predicted.

If pre-emptive policies were not soon introduced the domestic and foreign debt burden would compel the government to go in for the very unpalatable option of taxation in productive areas of the economy. This would certainly serve as a major disincentive and could lead to a recurrence of the vicious circle of development being squeezed dry once again, the sources added.

The government must adopt policies which ensured the recycling of funds to meet the spiralling foreign debt burdens, the sources added. Foreign debts must be firstly kept down to a maximum level of 20 per cent of our export returns or Sri Lanka was liable to face a situation similar to Mexico, he said.

Mexico's foreign debt burden sucked off 80 per cent of its export earnings. As an equivalent percentage of Sri Lanka's export proceeds went into essential imports, the foreign debt burden should not go over the 20 per cent mark as a prudent fiscal policy, the sources said.

He added that it would not be fair by the younger generation for this debt burden to be placed on their shoulders when pre-emptive action vis-a-vis some forward-thinking policy was possible, if only the authorities gave this aspect some special attention.

Interest payments on the public debt in 1974 of a mere Rs. 1.1 billion was Rs. 580.2 million. But the public debt had now risen to gigantic proportions at Rs. 65 billion commanding an interest payment of Rs. 2.2 billion. With the increasing interest rates, including the maturing payment of capital, the overall commitment of Sri Lanka's earning capacity on the foreign debt would be enormous, he said. The situation needed to be brought into the open so that proper policies were formulated forthwith to meet the projected requirements in debt servicing, he added.

Government should also recognise the problems caused by the exchange rates trends which saw the depreciation of the Rupee increasing the outstanding debt liability by Rs. 2.2 billion over a one and one half year period, the source said.

Another authoritative Central Bank source said the government must immediately start channelling a specified quantum of the foreign loans into areas from which resources to meet the debt servicing burden could be generated. The Monetary Board had, in its last annual report, specifically drawn the government's attention to this fact.

He said the fact that the World Bank was now pushing all countries in the Third World particularly to shift to capital markets for their loan requirements was ample demonstration of the tight international monetary situation. The Central Bank, on its part, would call for better financial management at highest levels, keeping in mind Mexico's dilemma which would not have been as

had had that country decided on pre-emptive action a decade or two ago.

Since 1974, Sri Lanka has raised Rs. 14.8 billion from International agencies, Rs. 22.6 billion from the U.S.A., Rs. 24 million from U.S. Development Loan Funds, Rs. 5.1 billion from Canada, Rs. 3.9 billion from the People's Republic of China, Rs. 1.2 billion from the U.S.S.R., Rs. 11.7 billion from West Germany, Rs. 2.9 billion from France, Rs. 13.7 billion from Japan, Rs. 2.9 billion from India, Rs. 2.4 billion from the government of U.K., Rs. 868 million from Denmark, Rs. 1.5 billion from Iran, Rs. 3 billion from the Netherlands, Rs. 922 million from the U.A.E., Rs. 1.6 billion from Kuwait, Rs. 1.1 billion from Libya, Rs. 804 million from the OPEC Special Fund, Rs. 6.6 billion from the I.M.F. Trust Fund, Rs. 1.8 billion in Euro-Currency loans besides several other smaller loans.

CSO: 4200/275

ENERGY CRISIS EXPECTED TO WORSEN

Colombo SUN in English 25 Nov 82 pp 1, 15

[Article by Jennifer Henricus]

[Text] Sri Lanka's energy situation appears bleaker than ever and is expected to grow worse by 1985 when 45 percent of the projected export earnings will have to be spent for importing oil.

This estimated high expenditure in energy does not lie only in the petroleum energy sector. The power sector too will absorb a great deal of the country's revenue requiring as much as Rs. 23 billion in the next four years, most of it in the accelerated Mahaveli programme.

Despite this heavy investment in this sector, the World Bank in an energy study has predicted that there will be recurring energy shortages in the country.

The chief cause for worry is that the power projects of the Mahaveli may not be completed on schedule because of funding and manpower shortages, the bank's report states.

Under these circumstances the highest priority in short term energy supply management must be attached to ensuring that the first of the Mahaveli projects Victoria, comes on stream as scheduled in mid-1984. If Victoria is delayed from mid to end 1984, the bank predicts that an additional 100 GWH of thermal generation will be required in those six months at a 1980 fuel cost of Rs. 250 million.

Any further delays will have serious consequences for the cost and availability of adequate electricity in 1985.

While calling for a close Government monitor on the progress of Victoria, the bank has also urged that the LPG/air pipeline of the Colombo Gas and Water Company operated in Colombo be closed down to cut out heavy energy losses.

The pipeline's current losses have been estimated at 70 per cent of the input volumes, costing the country 0.5 million US dollars a year in lost fuel--a loss which Sri Lanka can ill-afford at this time.

The bank has called for detailed studies to assess the viability of recovering additional LPG from the refinery for distribution in bottled form.

All this however will not alleviate the country's short term energy problems unless a national energy conservation programme is evolved to improve the efficiency with which energy is currently used.

The national programme should focus initially on the industrial and commercial sectors. This could begin to yield substantial savings in a relatively short period and at little or no cost.

Efforts to promote conservation also need to be complemented by a rationalisation of energy pricing policy. The current demand charge for electricity, the bank says, is about one-tenth of the long run marginal cost and does not provide a sufficient incentive to reduce peak demand.

Similarly the price difference between light and heavy fuel oils is not sufficient to encourage users to invest in the facilities necessary to handle and use the heavier grades even where it is economical.

Kerosene

Among the other energy pricing issues that the bank has drawn attention to is the general price subsidy on kerosene. This, the bank says is superfluous given that, in the concurrently operated Kerosene stamp scheme, a mechanism is already in place to meet Government's objective of mitigating the effects of higher kerosene prices on poor households.

The price of kerosene should therefore be raised to its economic cost while simultaneously increasing the value of the kerosene stamps, thereby protecting poorer households but discouraging suboptimal kerosene use in other sectors.

A contingency programme for minimising the disruptive effects of possible electricity shortages upto 1984 must also be urgently developed.

CSO: 4200/239

RED BARNA DENIES TERRORISTIC ACTIVITIES

Colombo SUN in English 9 Dec 82 pp 1, 5

[Text] The Red Barna organisation said yesterday it was not involved in any way with alleged terrorist activities and did not have any connection with the terrorist movement:

Stan Burkey, Resident Representative of Red Barna told a news conference in Colombo yesterday that his knowledge of the allegations made against the Red Barna were confined to the newspaper reports. He said he had not got information on an official level of the allegation made by Home Minister K. W. Devanayagam at a Cabinet meeting recently.

However, he said, the Ministry of Plan Implementation with which they liaised directly had been instructed by President J. R. Jayewardene to hold an inquiry into the matter.

Mr. Burkey said Ministry Secretary Wickrama Weerasooria was in charge of the inquiry. According to Mr. Burkey an Assistant Secretary to the Ministry had discussed the inquiry with him yesterday morning.

Mr. Burkey said he had also met Home Minister Devanayagam in Batticaloa last morning.

He said he has no idea how or on what basis the allegations had been made.

Almost all the personnel attached to the Batticaloa project were Tamils from Jaffna while the Project Manager was a retired government servant who was the Assistant Government Agent for Batticaloa before retiring, he added.

The news conference had been called to spotlight the work by the Red Barna at Visvamadu, an under-developed village in Mullaitivu. Visvamadu is a settlement project involving over 400 families and has been undertaken by Red Barna in collaboration with the Ministry of Rural Industrial Development and the Ministry of Plan Implementation.

In this scheme some 300 families have been resettled in the first two stages and another 100 expected to be settled when the third stage is finalised.

CSO: 4200/239

ADDITIONAL MILLION TO GET FOOD STAMPS

Colombo SUN in English 10 Dec 82 p 1

[Article by Jennifer Henricus]

[Text] Nearly one million people who are eligible for Food Stamps but are not receiving them will be included in the government's social welfare programme from next year.

The Ministry of Finance and Planning is now working out the cost of including these people who are earning less than Rs. 300 per month into the Food Stamp scheme

It is estimated to cost the Government an additional Rs. 200 million, and this allocation is to be made in the 1983 Budget, "SUN" learns.

Food and Co-operative Minister S. B. Herath last week informed Government MPs of the findings of the Ministry survey into the numbers who are eligible for the stamps and not receiving them and the numbers who were not eligible but receiving them.

Mr. Herath, "SUN" learns, told the MPs that over 950 000 people who were eligible were not receiving the stamps due to various reasons, including negligence and manoeuvring on the part of the Grama Sevakas. This was while 160,000 people who earned much more than Rs. 300 monthly had Food Stamps.

The 160,000 illegal stamp holders will be eliminated from the scheme and the 950,000 deserving poor will be included into the programme, Mr. Herath assured the MPs who had voiced concern on several occasions about this discrimination.

Inquiries into the Grama Sevakas' involvement in this manoeuvring will also be initiated "SUN" learns, and those found guilty will be penalised.

The inclusion of these people will take the total number of stamp holders to 8.3 million, requiring an annual allocation of Rs 2.5 billion.

The Ministry of Finance is also looking into the possibility of increasing the value of the Food Stamps in the next budget.

This increased allocation for social welfare will however mean additional taxation of the rich, sources said.

MORE TAX HOLIDAYS FOR FTZ INVESTORS

Colombo SUN in English 11 Dec 82 p 1

[Article by Minoli De Soysa]

[Text] Investors in Sri Lanka's Free Trade Zone will receive enhanced tax holidays if they buy more locally produced raw materials and generate more employment in their projects, the Director General of the Greater Colombo Economic Commission Paul Perera said yesterday.

Every project seeking enhanced incentives will be evaluated on this two point criteria. The Commission will also take into consideration how local workers are treated by the managements concerned, he told 'SUN'.

At present tax holidays are granted on the basis of employment generation. The minimum tax holiday for projects employing over 501 people is five years. According to GCEC regulations, this minimum period can be enhanced upto seven years and in special cases upto ten years, according to nett foreign exchange earned on export sales, introduction of new technology, magnitude of fixed capital investment and substantial exports to new markets.

According to a recent International Labour Organisation sponsored study on an average, 76 per cent of the export turnover of GCEC enterprises represents the cost of imported raw materials. This proportion is one of the highest for the garment industry--84 per cent.

"When allowance is made for remittances in respect of profits loans and other foreign costs, the nett foreign exchange saving resulting from the operation of GCEC enterprises is likely to be small," the report stated.

However, Mr. Perera said this picture was changing, particularly with the decreasing number of garment industries coming into the KIPZ. In 1981, foreign exchange earnings of the GCEC were 300 million rupees. By the end of this year, this figure is expected to increase to 400 million rupees.

Upto date 88 agreements have been signed and 51 are in commercial production. The total investment generated by these projects is 6,000 million rupees.

CSO: 4200/239

SRI LANKA

BRIEFS

ANTI-GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS SEIZED--About 15,000 copies of the alleged anti-government leaflets put out by an organisation known as 'Pavidi Handa' have been seized by the Police. Gampaha Police Superintendent J. R. Udugampola and a party raided a printing press where these documents were being printed and had seized them, Police said. They also took into custody, the co-owners of the printing press who were later released on bail. A separate CID inquiry is already underway into the activities of this organisation. [Text] [Colombo SUN in English 13 Dec 82 p 2]

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